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NOTES

ON THE

CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION

By M. ROMANOVSKI



CALCUTTA :

OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING.

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PREFACE.

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AMONG the numerous questions engaging the attention of the Russian public, and questions of importance as regards their results in the future, that of Central Asia occupies a very prominent part. Without reference to the military operations, which at least up to this time have been connected with its solution, and which always excite a lively interest, this question, without doubt for many other reasons, is deserving of public attention.

Besides the general political significance to Russia of our Central Asiatic affairs, the importance of which becomes each year more and more visible, and besides their relation to our industry and trade which from remote times have found for themselves a lucrative market in the East, it is evident to all that the Central Asiatic question has now arrived at that stage when any further delay in its settlement is impossible, and at which, in one way or the other, it must be brought to a conclusion. It will, at the same time, be understood by all that from the mode of its settlement will depend, among many other consequences, the economical side of the question, and this latter, at the period of reform through which Russia is now passing, constitutes one of the most vital conditions of every matter.

Besides Mr. Levshine's well-known work, one that is valuable even to the present day, we ourselves possess a great deal of interesting data, and even complete circumstantial information, on the Kirghiz Stéppes and the lower course of the Syr-Daria. But on the populated parts of Central Asia, the late possessions of Bokhara and Kokand, and equally on the Khanats themselves of Central Asia, in our literature and in that of foreign countries, information is far from abundant, and yet it is these very parts that at the present moment attract a more lively interest. Vambery's work and the works of our learned men, Khanykof, Nikiforof, Kühlewein, Danilevski, and others who have at least succeeded in penetrating as far as the principal points in this remote country, give us, of course, tolerably accurate ideas in general of the life and character of the people, but

they are far from being rich enough to enable us to decide upon all those vital questions now collectively before us.

Naturally enough these works, though they are of great merit, cannot contain all we require at present. Circumstances and the march of time have brought with them fresh demands, and it is these latter that ask now to be satisfied.

The readers of the above-mentioned works will of course bear in mind the suspicion and animosity with which every European is regarded in the countries of Central Asia, and how limited were consequently his powers to make a complete collection of data, and to produce a trustworthy and exhaustive work. The only available process by which a traveller could obtain information was by means of interrogation; but independent of the faultiness of such a process, answering badly in all localities and among all people in Central Asia, a source of information like this presented an additional disadvantage; the natives, similar to savages, met all questions made to them by foreigners with suspicion, whilst sometimes, even though desirous to be candid, they could not give accurate information, simply because they could not comprehend these use of the interrogatories.

Under such circumstances, whilst on the one hand an extremely important and complicated question is requiring an immediate solution, and on the other the data already at hand for the purpose are anything but remarkable for their richness, the observations and opinions on the region of people who have been there, formed too from facts and correct materials, are calculated to be more than ever timely. In order, however, that the degree of authoritativeness of such opinion may be appreciated by the majority of the reading public, it is requisite that the facts themselves, on which these opinions are founded, should be laid before them in sufficient detail; the public can in such case only estimate the value of the theories and deductions placed before them.

In questions so new and complicated as our Central Asiatic question, there will hardly be found a man possessing sufficient self-confidence seriously to propose a complete finished system of action, touching everything we have yet to do in the region. No little time will probably elapse before a faultless and perfect view of the matter will be taken, and before an orderly and elaborate system will be worked out. But there is no doubt that both the view and the system will all the sooner and easier be arrived at by a

more frequent expression in point of candid and well-founded opinions.

However contradictory these published opinions may be, the question itself must win by the discussion. It is a hackneyed aphorism that a collision of opinions gives birth to truth.

The contemporary position of every country is inevitably the result of acts and events of past periods, and in most instances depends chiefly from the very latest events, from the very latest actions. This truth, so old, so long, and so well known, cannot but apply as well to our Central Asiatic affairs.

On the above grounds, wishing to familiarize those who are but little or not at all acquainted with the region with the question of Central Asia as it stands at present, I have considered it necessary to review in detail the principal acts performed and events which have transpired there since the beginning of the year 1854. The period from 1854 to 1867 is particularly remarkable for the working out of the long contemplated project for the settlement of the region, and for the accomplishment of all that directly led to the present position of our affairs in Central Asia. At the same time I consider it necessary also to cast a *cursor*y glance back over all that had passed even prior to that. If this remote pass has had nothing to do with bringing about the present condition of Central Asiatic affairs, it has helped at least to discover the measures which have been put into operation during the last 13 years.

Yet, to all that occurred before my arrival in the province, and of which I was not a witness, I shall make no more allusion than is necessary to give fullness to my narrative.*

The last occurrences in Central Asia are yet too fresh; they have had too little time to explain themselves to lend to our account of them in any form whatever an historical character. In this respect all similar works can be regarded merely as material for history. But again I say that on the

* The Appendices consist of the reports of those who controlled the operations of the Military Commanders, of the copies of the correspondence with the neighbouring Central Asiatic rulers, and of the communications addressed by the Cookees to our authorities on the frontier, as well as of several documents and materials giving a more clear and correct understanding of the region generally as well as of our position therein.

strength of all the information I produce the reader will, as I hope, himself be able to weigh the accuracy of the observations drawn from it, and by this means to guard himself against all extravagancies on my part should such against my will have crept into my notes.

I shall, at all events, allow myself to hope that the reader will not deny the two most important conclusions established by this book :—

1.—That the position we have gained in Central Asia up to the year 1867 is in all respects a more advantageous one than that we occupied 13 years ago, or, in other words, that the Central Asiatic question is now much more in the hands of the Government and under its control than at any previous time. This is not in the least affected by the circumstance that much remains still to be done finally to establish sound and profitable relations with our Central Asiatic neighbours, and to give our new Central Asiatic possessions a final and equally sound organization.

2.—That the extension of our dominions in the countries of Central Asia, within due limits, will not require any such extraordinary sacrifices and disbursements as will weigh heavily on the empire. Even now, taking into consideration all the results we have obtained, our position in respect of purely economy is not more onerous than it was in 1854; and in the future this side of the question gives promises of progressive improvement.

But at any rate I shall consider myself very fortunate if my observations on the Central Asiatic question will, by calling forth the judgments of competent persons, conduce in some measure towards the formation of opinions practically serviceable in the matter.

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NOTES

ON THE

CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.

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FIRST RELATIONS OF RUSSIA WITH CENTRAL ASIA—GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT THERE, FROM PETER THE GREAT'S TIME TO THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THIS CENTURY AND SUBSEQUENTLY—THE RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1854 WITH REGARD TO THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION—MEDITATED PROJECT FOR THE CONNECTION OF THE ADVANCED LINES OF THE ORENBURG AND SIBERIAN FRONTIERS—IMPORTANCE OF THIS SCHEME—INDISPENSABILITY OF THE MEASURE AND DIFFICULTY OF ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT IN EARLIER TIMES—DISTRIBUTION AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF OUR TROOPS ON THE CONFINES OF CENTRAL ASIA IN 1864—TWO CHIEF OPINIONS ON THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MODE OF ACTION FOR US TO ADOPT IN CENTRAL ASIA.

As soon as Russia began to free herself from the Tartars and to form an independent State, the views of her rulers turned towards the east, and in no long time, with comparatively small sacrifice, the power of Russia extended over most of her present Asiatic possessions.

Perm was subdued in 1472, during the reign of John III. "This conquest, by which the dominions of Moscow were made to abut on the Ural range of mountains, gladdened the Czar and the people by its promise of great commercial advantage, and by the memory it brought of the happy past."* Soon after this, and in the same reign, the subjugation of Viatka and of the Yugor country (north-western portion of Siberia) was effected. Subsequently, in the reign of John IV, and after the final downfall of the Kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan, Yermak annexed the greater part of Siberia, and almost simultaneously the Cossacks of the Ural occupied the valley of the Ural. The profits of trade and the natural fertility of the newly-acquired countries attracted many enterprising people, and with their assistance, in the seventeenth century Russia extended her dominion without much difficulty over the whole of Siberia as it now is, and over the Orenburg region to the Irtysh and Ural.

In addition to a constant and persevering attention to the firm and regular settlement of our frontiers along the Ural and Irtysh, by the establishment of Cossack colonies and the construction of fortifications, the Russian Government has, at intervals, since the close of the seventeenth century, undertaken tolerably large expeditions into the interior of the Steppes, and even into the very depths of Central Asia and its Khanats.

* History of the Russian Empire, Karamzin, Vol. VI.

But neither in the days of Peter the Great, nor during the reigns of Elizabeth II, Paul I, or even Alexander I, could these operations have been conducted on any system, or have been the results of any pre-conceived plan. At these periods, the primitive geographical and statistical data relative to the countries adjoining the north-eastern confines of Russia were too imperfect and confused to point the way clearly to any one permanent object, or to admit of its being steadily pursued. In those times, too, it required no small amount of care and of means thoroughly to secure our old lines along the Ural and Irtysh, and to organize the settlements of the Ural, Orenburg and Siberian Cossacks. We should look upon all those expeditions as reconnaissances for the purpose of gathering information about the region in which we were about to act, rather than as enterprizes based upon a pre-concerted plan.

As regards the actions and measures of our Government in relation to the Kirghiz Steppes and Central Asiatic Khanats during the last thirty or forty years, it may be easily observed that they were prosecuted with a firmness of purpose which has been well defined for the last thirteen years. The object which we should strive to attain became clear enough during the thirty years that preceded the year 1854. It was then that we first began to act upon many sound and rational suggestions concerning the organization of the Steppes and the best and most advantageous form of relations with our Central Asiatic neighbours—Khiva, Bokhara and Kokan.

It may even be said that, if the Crimean war had not diverted the attention of the Government, the state of our south-eastern confines and our relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats would now have been satisfactory.

So early as 1854, it was resolved by a Special Committee, and confirmed by the Emperor, to connect the then newly established Syr-Daria line with the newly advanced Siberian line of frontier.

Such a measure was even at that time substantially indispensable, since it was the only one that could secure the object of that advance into the Steppes which we commenced during the first twenty years of the present century, and which the force of circumstances compelled us to make.

As the old lines were established during the last century and in the beginning of this, and as they became more secure against the inroads of neighbouring nomads, so the settlers along those lines and the nomads camping about in the vicinity of our frontiers began to prosper, whilst Russian industry and trade found opportunity for development. But, in addition to these good results from the establishment of the old lines, another result soon became more and more evident, and that was, the utter impossibility of confining ourselves to the old lines along the Ural and Irtysh, and the necessity of moving still further into the Steppes; and at that time, especially, that necessity could not but involve us in difficulties, for many reasons.

In front of the old lines, to the east and south of the Ural and Irtysh, stretches a boundless plain, spreading on the one side thousands of versts up to the frontiers of Persia, and on the other, to the upper courses of the Syr and Amu-Daria, broken only in a few places by considerable mountain ranges and rivulets, and presenting for the most

part a waterless desert, with patches of sand extending for hundreds of versts. All the conditions necessary to settled life are found only on the south-eastern and southern borders of this vast level, where it is invaded by the spurs of the Tian Shan that confine it on the east and south, and by those of the Hindu Kush by which it is limited on the south. On those borders, particularly near the Tian Shan, at the upper courses of the Ili, Chui, Syr-Daria and other rivers, there is picturesque scenery and land richly endowed by nature. Such are found in the neighbourhoods of Almaty (Vernoe), Tashkend, Khodjend and other places. All these localities are remarkable for the fertility of their soil, for the luxuriance of their vegetation, and for their mineral wealth. But even here such localities are separated from each other, either by great distances, by arid steppes, or by mountains without any vegetation. Further west and north of the Tian Shan and Hindu Kush, fertile oases are of rarer occurrence. Even the valleys of the two principal rivers of this region, the Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria, are suitable for colonization only for a short distance from their banks,—at the lower course of the Syr-Daria for not more than 5, 10, and seldom 15 versts. The remainder of the area included between the Persian frontier, the Caspian and the Aral, as well as that to the north of the Syr-Daria (our Kirghiz Steppes) is only fit for nomads. The few spots here and there suitable for settlements could only be occupied at great expense and trouble.

If we add to this that a great part of the Steppes, even those of considerable width, are visited by severe winters and frequently subject to violent snowstorms, the difficulties of travelling over them may be easily conceived.

Even the nomads, although they wander perpetually over the Steppes, are obliged, by the scarcity of water and pasturage, to perform their migrations only at certain seasons of the year, and then, too, along a few known tracks. There are still fewer convenient roads for traversing the Steppes from our frontiers to the permanently settled districts of Central Asia.

Trade still avails itself mostly of the so-called caravan routes. The number of these roads is very small, and some of them are devoid of water over a length of 70 versts and more, which necessitates the almost exclusive use of camels in the carriage of goods.*

The general features of the country to the south and east of the Ural and Irtysh were well known to our Government forty years ago, when not a single point in front of our old lines had yet been occupied. It is plain, therefore, why our Government hesitated so long in assuming direct possession of even those portions of the Steppes—the Kirghiz Steppes—which had long been considered as belonging to Russia, and why we reconciled ourselves to the many unfavourable consequences that ensued from our moderation. These, however, at length assumed such importance, that any further delay in the occupation of the Steppes became absolutely impossible.

* We have now established postal communication along some of these roads, but this has been effected by the digging of wells and other artificial works. It must, nevertheless, be confessed that these postal communications have been very unsatisfactory, even up to a recent date.

Although the Kirghizes had acknowledged themselves subjects of Russia in the first half of the last century, this subjection was merely nominal for the majority of the Kirghizes up to the time of the occupation of the Steppes. Many of the tribes calling themselves Russian subjects not only entered, according to their own pleasure, into one form or other of relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats and conducted desperate warfare among themselves, but even rose against us, attacked our caravans, and sometimes made raids upon our lines. Some of the Orenburg Kirghizes, as for instance the Adayefs, still preserve similar relations towards us.

By doing everything to avoid the erection of works, and the movement of troops into the Steppes to cover them, the Government limited its action in respect to the Kirghizes to governing them from within the old lines, and thereby renounced all immediate active control over them. But as the settlement of the old lines progressed, and as order became established, such a state of confusion could not be allowed to continue; it was not alone insufferable to us, but also to those Kirghiz tribes who, living in the vicinity of our lines, and accommodating themselves to Russian life, had ceased to participate in the ceaseless quarrels of their brethren, and heartily wished to devote themselves to a peaceful existence and to industrial pursuits. To aid them in this, to enter closer into their mode of life, and to protect them against their turbulent neighbours, was morally obligatory on Russia. In order to effect this, it was necessary to move our troops forward, to establish posts, and to build forts in the Steppes. These measures were also needed for the protection of our caravans, and for the purpose of counteracting the influence of the Central Asiatic Khanats over the Kirghizes, which was hostile towards Russia.

From the beginning of their submission to Russia, the Kirghizes were divided for administrative purposes, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Governors General of Siberia and Orenburg. These two independent Governors did not always agree in their views as to the best method of governing the Kirghizes, and as to the conduct generally of affairs in the Steppes. It not unfrequently happened that their opinions were diametrically opposite. A more immediate interest in the condition of the Kirghizes and in their internal government according to Russian forms was first taken by Count Speranski when Governor of Western Siberia. It was from Western Siberia that our advance into the Steppes originated: first small bodies of troops were sent out to watch and to protect the Kirghizes; then fortified posts were established; and at last detached forts were built, and Russian settlements introduced into the Steppes. The authorities of Orenburg long abstained from establishing any kind of permanent posts in the Steppes, and confined themselves to sending out small detachments for the maintenance of order. But the insufficiency of this measure became more and more apparent, especially after the year 1839, when the attempt to bring Khiva under our influence, as the power most hostile to us, by means of a single strong expedition, failed of success.

In this manner, however great were the apparent difficulties of an advance into the Steppes, and however conflicting were the views of the

Governors General of Siberia and Orenburg regarding the settlement of our north-eastern frontiers, the force of circumstances, both on the side of Siberia and of Orenburg compelled us to abandon our old lines and gradually to occupy the Steppes. Yet so great an object could not have been accomplished at once. Not only did the erection of forts and the establishment of colonies in the Steppes entail very heavy expenses, in addition to other difficulties, the maintenance of the troops in most of the advanced posts was of itself always very costly. Everything that was required by the garrisons of those forts, not excepting provisions, had to be brought from the old lines. What the expense must have been, we may easily imagine from the fact that the transport of one chetvert (5·77 bushels) of flour from Orenburg to the Syr-Daria cost the Government sometimes more than R. 20 (£3).

Our first advance into the Steppes may be said to have taken place in the early part of the first twenty years of this century, when the outer districts of Western Siberia were organized. During the thirty years following, we gradually penetrated further and further until we spread ourselves nearly over its entire extent. Between the years 1850 and 1860 our detached posts, forts, and military settlements were scattered over the vast surface of the Steppes on the one side, from the Ural and Irtysh to the north-eastern part of the Caspian as far as the northern parts of the Sea of Aral and Syr-Daria; and on the other, as far as the valley of the Ili river, at the base of the Tian Shan mountains. Thus, in 1854, we had the fort of Novo-Petrovski, on the Mangyshlak peninsula, on the north-eastern coast of the Caspian, while the Syr-Daria line was established along a distance of 400 versts from the fall of that river into the Sea of Aral as far as Fort Perovski; permanent communication being established between this and the old lines by means of several military posts and of forts, the former of which were surrounded by small settlements.

From the side of Siberia a whole brigade of Cossacks was colonized in the Steppes, in addition to the erection of forts.

Owing to these measures, we became more completely masters in the Steppes than we had ever been before. The majority of the Kirghizes, not only nominally, but actually, succumbed to Russian power. The Steppes became peaceful, the well-being of the inhabitants increased, whilst Russian industry and trade visibly progressed. At the same time, the introduction of a flotilla on the waters of the Aral enabled us to prevent any hostile attack against us on the part of Khiva.

Nevertheless, neither our position in the Steppes, nor our relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats could be considered satisfactory, and we could not but acknowledge that the results we had attained were not in the least degree proportionate, either to the sacrifices we had made for them, or to the means required for the conduct of affairs as they then stood.

All our available military force, of the then Orenburg and Siberian Corps, was almost exclusively employed in the Steppes. Excepting the Ural, Orenburg and Siberian Cossacks, settled in the Steppes, and who number altogether 400,000 men, women and children, the military force consisted of 23 battalions of the line, exclusive of invalid, escort and

other companies.* Notwithstanding, however, the greatness of these means, we did not succeed in placing ourselves in a favorable position with regard to our neighbours, nor did we either finally or effectually pacify the Steppes.

Notwithstanding the insignificance of the Central Asiatic Khanats of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokan, with their six or seven millions of inhabitants, inclusive of their semi-dependent nomad populations; notwithstanding, also, that their weak governments are perpetually at war with each other and are always threatened by internal tumults; those Khanats, surrounded as they are by thousands of miles of Steppes so difficult to be traversed, have accustomed themselves to a sense of perfect independence, and, with the exception of Bokhara, have generally assumed a hostile attitude towards Russia. Even with Bokhara, friendly relations were not maintained without some sacrifices on our part. In addition to the kindness and attention bestowed by our Government on the Emirs of Bokhara, and the immunities enjoyed by Bokharian merchants in Russia, who were permitted to trade in our country without paying guild dues, the customs duties on Bokharian merchandise were reduced to a most trifling figure, while such of our merchants who managed to penetrate into Bokhara were charged, like all non-Mussulmen, at the maximum rate of duty, *viz.*, 10 per cent. instead of 2 per cent., and were subjected to every kind of molestation and violence. Nomads pursued by us for turbulent conduct and for robberies, as well as our deserters, nearly always found safe shelter in Bokhara. Our relations with Khiva improved after the establishment of the Syr-Darian line and the Aral flotilla. They became noticeably less hostile, but, on the other hand, as we approached Kokan from Orenburg, along the Syr-Daria, or from Siberia in the direction of the Tian Shan, so the Kokanians became more hostile towards us, and considering themselves sufficiently powerful, they not only refused to make any concessions to us, but even made occasional inroads into those portions of the region which we had occupied. For instance, in the winter following our occupation of Fort Perovski, 12,000 Kokanians with 10 guns surrounded the fort. They were, however, totally defeated under its walls by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) Ogarëf, who was sent out against them with a column numbering 500 to 600 men.

Yet, notwithstanding our material and moral superiority over our Central Asiatic neighbours, we cannot but admit that, considering the position of our forts and the military resources of the Orenburg region and of Siberia in 1854, we could not calculate much upon the effect of our moral influence over the Khanats.

The difficulty and cost of maintaining the troops at the advanced posts, more than 1,000 versts in front of the old lines, compelled us to limit their garrisons to the smallest number possible. In 1854 we did not hold a single point from Novo-Petrovski fort to the Aral, about 300 versts, or from Fort Perovski to Fort Ili, which is about 1,000 versts distant. Under these circumstances, our Central Asiatic neighbours

* In the late detached Orenburg Corps there were 11 battalions of the line, and in that of Western Siberia 12 (excepting, of course, the battalions in Eastern Siberia).

could not only fancy themselves secure against all attacks, but had also opportunities for freely invading our Steppes which, although unoccupied by Russia, nevertheless belonged to us. These attacks were more commonly made by Kokan between Forts Ili and Perovski,—a part of the country which served as a refuge for all the turbulent individuals of the Steppes who fled from punishment for their crimes.

Although the country between the Caspian and Aral also suffered from disturbances and from the inroads of nomads, who were either not under our control or who rebelled against our Government, yet those inroads and disturbances were not of such consequence as the Kokan irruptions. They were occasioned by insignificant tribes who could be easily dealt with by small detachments. In the direction also of Khiva the country was ensured against attacks by the distance which separated us, as well as by the difficulty of communication across the barren and rocky Ust-Urt which separates the Caspian and Aral seas. Nor were there any caravan roads in that direction requiring protection, whilst there were many that intersected the unoccupied tracts on the side of Kokan.

In order to pacify the Steppes and to alter our position with regard to the Central Asiatic Khanats, *i. e.*, to place ourselves in such a position that instead of being obliged to guard against their invasion it might be the reverse, and that in the event of any hostile designs against us, we might be able to threaten the Khanats with attack, it became necessary—

1. To protect the yet unoccupied parts of our frontier by advanced forts, as we had already done on the Syr-Daria and at the base of the Tian Shan, from the side of Siberia, or at least to protect that portion of the Steppes between Fort Perovski and Vernoe which had suffered most from attack.

2. To concentrate on our front lines as many troops as would be sufficient, not only for defence, but, if necessary, for aggression also.

The necessity of taking those measures had long been acknowledged. So early as 1834 Colonel (now Adjutant General) Verigin, who executed a survey of the Steppes at the instance of the War Ministry, pointed out the necessity of their adoption. Later, in 1841, the same suggestions were made by General Annenkov and by the Governor General of Western Siberia, General Hasford. But at that time there were undoubtedly many serious difficulties to be encountered in the execution, not only of the second measure, *i. e.*, the concentration of a large force, but also in that of the first,—the construction of forts along the entire extent of our advanced Siberian and Orenburg frontiers, for we had then no advanced posts at the base of the Tian Shan, and no line on the Syr-Daria. In the year 1854, however, when we were complete masters of the greater part of the Steppes, with safe communications with our old lines, and when the unoccupied extent of country was already reduced by half, the connection of the lines might easily have been effected within a few years. Moreover, the advanced forts of the Siberian lines, owing to the settlements made around them, were at that time supplied with provisions obtained on the spot, and not brought from the old lines as on the Syr-Daria. It was consequently more practicable at that time to concentrate a strong body of troops on the advanced frontiers. The

projected line to connect the frontiers was contiguous to, and partly passed through, a locality which had always been famous for its fertility; there was consequently a sure prospect of obtaining a sufficient quantity of local supplies on the establishment of that line. In fact, we had then traversed the most difficult and the poorest portion of the Steppes, and we had only to take advantage of a position which was in every respect more advantageous than the one we occupied.

On the strength of all these considerations, the Committee of 1854, which deliberated on the organization of our south-eastern confines, and in which Count Perovski, the then Governor General of Orenburg, and General Hasford, Governor General of Western Siberia, took part, decided in favour of the connection of the Orenburg and Siberian lines.

But whilst accepting this decision, which must have inevitably led one way or another to the subjection of Kokan, Bokhara and Khiva to our influence, the Russian Government was far from entertaining any ambitious views.

There have always existed two diametrically opposite opinions as to the best mode of action in Central Asia. Some, pointing to the anomalous nature of our relations with the feeble, but restless Khanats, believe that the best way to alter those relations is to commence resolute aggressive operations against Kokan, Bokhara, and Khiva, and to conquer them at once. The holders of this opinion, at the same time, affirm that, in hesitating to conquer those Khanats, we run the risk of creating another Caucasus. Others, whilst fully admitting the anomaly of our position with regard to the Khanats and the necessity for an immediate change in the character of our relations with them, consider that there is yet no urgent necessity for such resolute aggressive action. They apprehend that, considering the small amount of information which we possess concerning Central Asia, an immediate conquest of the Khanats, which would require very extensive means without bringing any particular profit, might involve us in new, worthless and endless conquests. Examining into the causes of the anomalousness of our relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats, they do not see any reason yet for giving up all hope of removing them, and of seeing the Khanats situated as we should like them to be; provided even the more important part of the ancient policy of Russia is fully carried out by firmly establishing our advanced frontier over such an extent of country as circumstances may require us to hold; when, having strengthened our military position, we can refrain from all further aggression. The supporters of the second and more moderate form of action, believe that it will be more effectual in protecting us against any inimical attempts than any acts of determined aggression on our part. They believe that, by renouncing unnecessary conquests, we may entertain the hope of sincerely attaching towards us, not only the mass of the population that has long derived material benefits from its relations with Russia, but the rulers of Central Asia as well, who would then look upon our Government as their natural protector.

But while the representatives of the second opinion do not, of course, render themselves responsible for the success of the moderate plan of action (there being as yet no reliable ground for such responsibility), they do not take upon themselves to assert that we must once for all

desist from further aggressive operations. Their opinion amounts only to this, that it is in every respect better to confine ourselves at present to laying a firm foundation for future action, when every shot shall not, as it now does, cost the Government scores of roubles, and that it is advisable to concentrate a sufficient number of troops in Central Asia ready for any emergency.

As regards the apprehension that, by a dilatory extension of Russian power and influence in Central Asia, we may bring about a state of warfare similar to that which existed in the Caucasus, the advocates of the moderate form of action consider that the fear is not sufficiently justified. In their opinion, the industrious and peaceful inhabitants of Central Asia cannot, in the course of a few years, be turned into idle and warlike Caucasian mountaineers, who by nature and history have, for a long series of ages, been a martial people.

However that may be, in approving, in 1854, the recommendation to connect the advanced frontiers of Orenburg and Siberia, the Government resolved to limit itself to the execution of that plan, and was far from harbouring projects of further conquest.

CHAPTER II.

THE CRIMEAN WAR HINDERS THE CARRYING OUT OF THE PROJECT OF CONNECTING THE ORENBURG AND SIBERIAN FRONTIERS—FIRST STEPS TOWARDS ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT—OPERATIONS IN 1860—OCCUPATION OF THE KOKAN FORTS OF TOKMAK AND PISHPEK—CONSTRUCTION OF FORT DJULEK ON THE SYR-DARIA—DEMOLITION OF FORT YANY-KURGAN IN 1862—REALISATION OF THE LONG CONTEMPLATED PROJECT OF CONNECTING THE FRONTIERS—SIMULTANEOUS ADVANCE OF THE DETACHMENTS FROM THE SYR-DARIA AND FROM WESTERN SIBERIA—CAPTURE OF TURKISTAN AND AULIETA—JUNCTION OF THE TWO DETACHMENTS—CAPTURE OF CHERMKEND—VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT AT THAT PERIOD—FIRST UNSUCCESSFUL MOVEMENT AGAINST TASHKEND—IRRUPTION OF THE KOKANIANS—ACTION AT THE VILLAGE OF IKAN—FORMATION OF THE TURKISTAN PROVINCE—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1865—CAPTURE OF FORT NIAZ-BEK—OCCUPATION OF FORT CHINAZ—CONQUEST OF TASHKEND—ARREST OF BOKHARIAN MERCHANTS WITH THEIR GOODS—ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN THE NEWLY OCCUPIED REGION—DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF ORENBURG AND THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TURKISTAN—PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR RECONCILING THIS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION.

THE accomplishment of the proposed scheme to join the frontiers, approved by the Government in 1854, was delayed by the Crimean War. There was no intention of giving it up, and, as far as our circumstances and means would permit, preparations were gradually made for carrying out this necessary and important undertaking.

Accordingly, between 1854 and 1860, we took possession of the trans-Ili region; Forts Vernoe and Kastek were built at the very foot of the Tian Shan range of mountains, and in 1860 Major General Zimmermann took and destroyed the Kokan forts of Pishpek and Tokmak; (see apps. 1, 2, 3, 4). In later years, reconnaissances were made from Siberia of the valley of the Chui river and of Aulieta fort. With the same view, Fort Djulek was constructed in 1859 from the side of Orenburg; and in the three following years, surveys were made of the valleys of the Syr-Daria and of the Karatau mountains. In 1863 Lieutenant General Debout captured the Kokan fort of Yany-Kurgan, situated not far from Turkistan.

Thus, by the year 1864, all we had to do in order to effect a junction of the lines was, to make a minute survey of the country from Yany-Kurgan to the valley of the Chui, and to establish ourselves firmly in it.

The Government recognized the expediency of effecting this by means of simultaneous expeditions from Siberia and from the Orenburg region. A detachment of about 2,500 men under Colonel (now Major General) Cherniayef, was appointed for the work from Siberia, and another, about 1,200 strong, from Orenburg, under Colonel (now Major General) Verëfkin. It was first proposed to draw the new line from Aulieta to Suzan and Djulek along the small Karatau ridge. At General Verëfkin's recommendation this was changed for a line in the direction of Turkistan, but it was subsequently advanced to Chermkend, at the instance of General Cherniayef. All these measures were executed within the same year. In the month of June, Aulieta was taken by General Cherniayef (app. No. 6) and Turkistan by General Verëfkin (app. No. 7); while in the month of October, the combined

forces, under the command of General Cherniayef, occupied Chemkend (apps. Nos. 9, 10).

Thus the long meditated project of connecting the Orenburg and Siberian lines was at length accomplished. There is no doubt that the line eventually adopted was much more advantageous than the one originally proposed. By occupying Auliéta, Turkistan and Chemkend, we not only obtained possession of more fertile localities and insured thereby the means of drawing supplies for our troops on the spot, but by establishing ourselves in those places we finally occupied the fertile oasis in which they were situated, and which is separated from that in which Tashkend is placed by an inferior, but bare and uninhabited, chain of mountains.

Everything appeared to have been done in accordance with the view which the Government had long entertained with regard to the settlement of our Central Asiatic frontiers. We enclosed our Steppes and emerged beyond them into a fertile country capable of affording local supplies, and this consequently gave us the facility of concentrating our troops at pleasure. Being well satisfied with the results obtained, our Government sincerely desired to rest there. The sincerity of that desire was well known to all who served in Central Asia. Having no intention of performing any further acts of aggression, the Government naturally issued no more money for the purpose, so that, when a combination of unforeseen circumstances made it necessary to open further military operations, the local authorities had no alternative but that of appropriating the sums that first arrived, whether these were for wages, soldiers' rations, or anything else.

Notwithstanding unforeseen circumstances, we are justified in believing that the general results obtained during the last few years have not been unfavourable to Russian interests in Central Asia. It would nevertheless be unfair to accuse the Central Government of insincerity in its professions on the subject of Central Asiatic affairs.

Considering it necessary to obtain a more intimate knowledge of the state of affairs in Tashkend before the winter set in, General Cherniayef, who directed the military operations, made a move upon Tashkend immediately after occupying Chemkend. In this "reconnaissance," on the assumption that the numerous but unwarlike population of the town would not be able, under a sudden attack, to defend the whole length of their walls (24 versts long), General Cherniayef stormed a part which seemed to him most accessible. Contrary, however, to expectation, the attempt failed (app. No. 11). Nevertheless, General Cherniayef represented the necessity of an immediate occupation of Tashkend, and wishing to reconcile what seemed to him an inevitable necessity with the previous views of the Government, which objected to the extension of our dominions, he proposed, after conquering Tashkend, to make it independent of Kokan, and to place it under the protectorate of Russia. In the meanwhile, towards the end of 1864, the Kokanians made an inroad into the newly occupied region from Tashkend in the direction of Turkistan, in the same way as in 1853, when they attacked Fort Perovski, and were repelled by General Ogaréf, as in 1859. Soon after the demolition of Pishpek, they broke into our territories and were entirely routed by General Kolpakovski. This time

also they obtained no military success. All the endeavours of their host of 12,000 men, under the personal command of Alimkul, the then ruler of Kokan, were spent in vain against the firm stand of a single sotnia (hundred) of Ural Cossacks under Colonel Serof. After sustaining a three days' attack by the Kokanians near the village of Ikan, this "sotnia" actually obliged the enemy to throw up siege works and retreated with honor to Turkistan.

The Kokanians, however, succeeded in taking possession of the village of Ikan (25 versts from Turkistan), which, though very recently annexed to Russia, remained true and held out several days (see app. No. 12). In order to punish the resistance of the inhabitants, the Kokanians took them all prisoners to Tashkend.

The Government refused its sanction to General Cherniayef's project of conquering Tashkend, but took care to provide him, without loss of time, with means for a strong defence of the whole of the extent of country already occupied. With that object, the newly acquired territory, inclusive of the line of the Syr-Daria, was converted, in the beginning of 1865, into a province with the name of Turkistan (see app. No. 13), and subordinated to Orenburg; and in addition to the troops there under General Cherniayef, who was appointed Governor of the region and commander of the forces, fresh troops were sent out from Orenburg and Western Siberia. The aggregate number of troops in the new province was to have amounted, by the month of September 1865, to 15,000 men, which was not only to have been sufficient for the defence of the newly occupied country, and for the execution of works generally performed by soldiers, but was also to have supplied a reserve for operations in the field, in case of emergency.

Whilst not approving General Cherniayef's project of occupying Tashkend, the Government did not deem it expedient to place too great a check upon him, as he was personally responsible for the defence of a region then completely unknown. For the better elucidation of the state of affairs, General Kryjanovski, then newly appointed to Orenburg, was to have made a journey through the province during the summer of 1865, and to submit his opinions upon the subject.

Rumours having reached General Cherniayef, in April 1865, of a gathering of Bokharian troops at Ura Tiube, which made him apprehend the seizure of Tashkend by the Emir (app. No. 14), the Military Governor of Turkistan was induced to commence aggressive operations, the first object of which was to place Tashkend in a state of dependence, and thus to compel its submission.

With that object, General Cherniayef marched his force to the Kokan fort of Niazbek, which commanded the water supply of Tashkend, and, after two days' obstinate resistance on the part of the Kokanians, possessed himself of it on the 29th April (O. S.). Leaving a small garrison in Niazbek, General Cherniayef took the direction of Tashkend, and, on the 7th May, encamped within eight versts of the town. The garrison of Tashkend had, meanwhile, been strengthened, and the ruler of Kokan himself hastened to its assistance. On the 9th of May, a "sortie" was made from Tashkend with a force of 7,000 men and artillery, led by Alimkul in person. The enemy were beaten, losing two guns, and Alimkul was mortally wounded (app. 15).

But even after this success, and although assured by some of the inhabitants that Tashkend desired to submit to Russia, General Cherniayef restricted himself to measures for the prevention of the Emir's approach to the town.

In the middle of May our troops occupied Chinaz, a fort situated on the road to Bokhara at the confluence of the Chirchick with the Syrdaria, and Tashkend was invested on three sides. In the beginning of June, a party of Bokharians succeeded in secretly entering Tashkend, and Iskander Bek came from Bokhara to take command of the garrison. As rumours of the advance of the Emir were increasing, General Cherniayef found it necessary to seize Tashkend by open force. After a three-days' struggle on the walls and in the streets, Tashkend was compelled to surrender (apps. Nos. 16, 20).

This populous and important commercial town then passed into our hands. From a military point of view, the success was brilliant. Yet in the face of our insufficiency of troops, its acquisition could not but increase the difficulties of our position, generally, in the region. Although reinforcements were despatched from Orenburg and from the Volga as soon as intelligence of the capture of Tashkend was received, the latter arrived in Orenburg only in the autumn, and the authorities in Orenburg found it impossible to forward them before the next spring, so that the reinforcements actually reached the province only in the month of September 1866.

In the meanwhile, the Emir of Bokhara, by seizing Hodjent almost simultaneously with our capture of Tashkend, changed his hitherto friendly attitude to one of menace against us. In order to check him, it was necessary to have recourse to a measure which, if it incommoded the Bokharians, was no less inconvenient to ourselves, and that was to stop the trade with Bokhara. Tashkend had scarcely been occupied when General Cherniayef was obliged to arrest all Bokharians and their merchandise within the province, and in his report of the 26th June, *i. e.*, nine days after his entrance into that town, he represented to the Governor General the urgency of extending that measure to the whole of the Empire. He stated that, unless such a measure was adopted, our influence in Central Asia would succumb to that of Bokhara, and that it would be impossible to answer for the safety of the province (apps. 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24). On the strength of these representations, in the middle of July, all Bokharian subjects who were then in Orenburg were arrested, and their goods sequestered. The Emir did not commence hostilities against us, but at the same time we could not hinder him from taking Kokan and from subjecting the whole of that Khanat to himself, in consequence of which he gained a very great accession to his means, and particularly to his influence in Central Asia. Nor were we able to prevent the Emir from arresting on his part our merchants and their goods in Bokhara, which he immediately did on hearing that we had detained his subjects.

Small reinforcements arrived from Orenburg in August, but they were scarcely sufficient to render it possible to occupy even that part of the trans-Chirchik region which was nearest to Tashkend.* And yet,

* The Chirchik is only nine versts from Tashkend.

irrespective of political and military considerations, that occupation was absolutely necessary, for, situated within a very short distance of Tashkend, that region contains a great many fields belonging to the inhabitants of the town, who to this day derive the greater part of their supplies from it.

In the month of September, the Governor General of Orenburg arrived in the province, and was met on the Syr-Daria by a friendly mission from the Emir of Bokhara, which requested permission to proceed to St. Petersburg in order to negotiate with the Imperial Government. As the Governor General was already empowered to negotiate with the Emir, the request was not granted; and, in the expectation of further instructions from the Emir, the mission remained at Fort No. 1 on the Syr-Daria, where it met the Governor General.

After taking possession of Tashkend and gaining a closer insight into the state of affairs, General Cherniayef abandoned his previous idea of making Tashkend independent, and advised its final annexation to the Empire. General Kryjanovski, on the contrary, adopting the original idea, insisted on its execution, notwithstanding an address of the inhabitants of Tashkend, in which they prayed to be annexed to the Empire without being formed into a separate Khanat. But as will be shown in detail hereafter, the address contained some requests which we could not well grant, and which were inserted at the instigation of the clergy. This difference of opinion, and the refusal of the Emir to negotiate with the Governor General, caused the question to be left unsettled. On his return to Orenburg, General Kryjanovski submitted his own plans, together with the opinion of General Cherniayef, to the consideration of the Imperial Government.*

The Imperial Government then resolved to summon Generals Kryjanovski and Romanovski to St. Petersburg, in order to make a searching enquiry into the misunderstanding that had arisen with reference to the settlement of our Central Asiatic affairs, and to arrive at a final decision by the aid of a special committee composed of persons well acquainted with the subject. This step was the more necessary, since the occupation of Tashkend, originally unintended, had altered the old programme of the Government, and had made requisite the preparation of a new one, to serve, at least in outline, as a guide to local officers.

* Having accompanied General Kryjanovski during his journey into the province of Turkistan, the author of this work is necessarily well acquainted with the views held by the Governor General.

CHAPTER III.

INCREASE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH BOKHARA—DESPATCH OF A MISSION TO BOKHARA FROM TASHKEND—DETENTION OF OUR OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS BY THE EMIR—COMMENCEMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS—MOVEMENT UPON DJIZAK AND RETURN TO CHINAZ—APPOINTMENT OF A NEW CHIEF OVER THE TURKISTAN PROVINCE IN MARCH 1866—INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE NEW CHIEF, AND HIS OWN IDEAS OF AFFAIRS—THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE PROVINCE AT THAT TIME IN POLITICAL, MILITARY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMICAL RESPECTS.

THE affairs of the province became still more complicated at the end of October 1865, very soon after the departure of the Governor General of Orenburg. Desirous of re-establishing friendly relations with Bokhara and of re-opening trade, General Cherniayef despatched to the Emir a mission composed of Military and Civil Officers. The Emir had the audacity to detain that mission, whereupon General Cherniayef found himself obliged to commence operations against him with a view to the release of his officers.

In the month of January, General Cherniayef collected a force at Chinaz and marched to Djizak, expecting that this menace would of itself produce the release of the detained mission. These expectations were not fulfilled. A lack of forage and provisions obliged our troops to return from Djizak after a slight brush under the walls of the town; they therefore did not wait for the release of the mission, and obtained only certain promise of the Emir. On its way back to Chinaz the detachment was pursued by Bokharian cavalry assembled in haste several thousand strong (app. Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 33).

On receipt of the first intelligence of these new complications, the Government hastened to recall Generals Cherniayef and Kryjanovski to St. Petersburg for the purpose of deliberating on the future conduct of affairs with respect to the Khanats, and appointed the author of this sketch to the command of the troops and to the post of Military Governor, under the control of the Governor General of Orenburg, who, in all further proceedings, was to be guided by instructions drawn up by the Ministries for War and Foreign Affairs and approved by the Emperor. These instructions were submitted by me to the Governor General and were thenceforward taken as a guide. Their basis and chief sense was, to reconcile as soon as possible the previous programme with the late accidental circumstances. Whilst adhering to its former view, *i. e.*, that of not extending our limits any further, and of organizing first of all the newly acquired territory, the Government at the same time fully recognised the primary necessity of maintaining our dignity under the altered circumstances, and of reducing the Emir to the position which he should always hold in relation to Russia.

The instructions went on to say:

"From incomplete information received, it appears that all attempts to arrive at that amicable understanding with the Central Asiatic Rulers, which is so essential to the tranquility of our possessions, have not alone failed of success, but, on the contrary, the late proceedings have irritated the neighbouring potentates against us, and have, perhaps,

turned the Emir of Bokhara, who has long considered himself a friend of Russia, into an open enemy. The late events have, at the same time, tended to show that the conversion of the nearest outlying portions of Central Asia into feudatory states, would be practically attended with great difficulties, and would raise questions, which can only be developed in the course of time."

Further:

"While striving undeviatingly to avoid the extension of absolute dominion in Central Asia, it is not advisable that we should refrain from such operations and arrangements as might be indispensably necessary; and, generally, the true interests of Russia should be kept in view."

As regards Tashkend, the instructions observed:

"It is not expedient that we should embarrass ourselves with any minute regulations in Tashkend but the town should receive such an organization, as would be commensurate with our common advantage."

Finally, with reference to Bokhara, the following instructions were laid down:

"As regards Bokhara, it is above all desirable to re-establish speedily friendly commercial relations with that Khanat; but at the same time, the immediate local chief is bound to remember that the Asiatic respects only the force of arms; that the slightest vacillation and irresolution, and particularly any concession, in the face of any uncalled for representations or acts on the part of the Asiatics, will be looked upon by them as symptoms of weakness, and will therefore not only fail of the object, but may also have a disastrous effect in the country newly occupied by us, in the Steppes as well as on our former lines."

"The main object of the Commander should therefore be to make the Emir understand that we are not desirous of conquests, and that we do not threaten the integrity of his dominions, but that we shall not allow him to extend his dominion in the direction of our limits."

Subsequently, when the return of our detachment from Djizak became known at St. Petersburg, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed itself still more strongly with reference to Bokhara. Until the release of our mission all negotiations with the Emir were justly considered to be quite out of the question.

Leaving St. Petersburg on the 10th of February (O. S.), I reached the Syr-Daria only in the beginning (O. S.) of March, having been detained about a week by official duties at Orenburg. The first intelligence that reached me in the province of Turkistan was conveyed in a despatch from General Cherniayef to the Governor General, reporting the withdrawal of our troops from before Djizak to Chinaz.

Before entering into the subject of the events that occurred up to the month of August while I had the chief control of affairs, until the arrival of the Governor General, I consider it necessary to express my own opinion as to the method of arriving at an advantageous settlement of affairs in Central Asia. Of course I endeavoured above all to act strictly in accordance with the instructions and orders which were sent to me, but owing to the country being almost unknown, and to the difficult circumstances under which I was placed, I frequently had to act according to my own judgment, and was consequently guided by my own personal views.

I always sincerely belonged to the moderate party of which I have spoken, and which, while not objecting to military operations as extreme measures, believed in the greater advantage of endeavouring to subject our Central Asiatic neighbours to our influence by means of a strong and durable settlement of our frontier, and by moral persuasion rather than by direct conquest of the Khanats. It appeared to me, and I am still convinced, that the principal obstacle to the establishment of the most desirable form of relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats, has been our own mode of action in those countries.

In the first place, we have always been numerically weak in proportion to the area which we occupied, and no sooner did reinforcements arrive than we annexed more territory, leaving behind no reserves for action in cases of emergency. Our neighbours knew our circumstances, and seeing our inability to undertake any aggressive movement were not induced to observe a careful attitude. Their actions were not in the least restrained because of our presence; on the contrary, they contrived to turn our presence to their own advantage. If, for instance, we had had any spare troops in the summer of 1865, the Emir of Bokhara would scarcely have dared to take advantage of the disorders in Kokan consequent on the death of Alimkul, or to have occupied Khodjend and Kokan before our very eyes, an act by which he almost doubled the extent of his dominion, and which cannot, of course, be regarded as having been favourable to Russian policy.

Secondly, notwithstanding our long continued and uninterrupted successes in Central Asia, from the capture of Fort Perovski to the brilliant military achievements of later times, of which the capture of Tashkend is unmistakeably one, we have not convinced the half savage population of Central Asia of our real superiority over Bokhara. On the contrary, knowing nothing of our country, they form their conclusions from superficial observations, and give an unfavourable interpretation to what they see. The clemency and kindness with which our government treated Bokhara in former times were of course explained to the people in a sense conformable to the views of the Khan; and the outspread of Bokharian dominion at the expense of Kokan, before our very eyes, naturally contributed to confirm a belief in the correctness of their opinions.

To our last vigorous measures,—the arrest of Bokharian merchants and their goods,—the Government of Bokhara responded by a measure of still greater vigour, *viz.*, the arrest of our own merchants and merchandise, and the detention of the officers whom we had sent on a mission to Bokhara.

At Orenburg, I met the Bokharian mission which had been passed on from Fort No. 1 simultaneously with the despatch of some officers to Bokhara by General Cherniayef. The result of the advance of our troops against Djizak was not then known at Orenburg; we only knew that it had been undertaken; considering, therefore, that the Bokharian mission had frequent and quick direct communication with Bokhara, I thought it advisable to express strongly the intentions of our Government, and to support General Cherniayef's demand for the immediate release of our officers, pointing, at the same time, to the consequences which might result from any delay in complying with that demand. The

Bokharians admitted the necessity of releasing our mission, but, nevertheless, displayed a remarkable amount of calmness and firmness in discussing the possibility of a rupture or a war between Bokhara and Russia. We could not fail to notice that they were well acquainted with the weak points of our position.

Thirdly and lastly, notwithstanding our amicable views, we had had no opportunity for proving practically the friendliness of our disposition towards our Central Asiatic neighbours. On the contrary, our dominion has been rapidly and ceaselessly extending. So that, in addition to a variety of other causes, and to an extraneous hostile influence, a natural desire for self-preservation urged them to oppose us in every possible way.

For all these reasons, I came to the conclusion, that, in order to improve and strengthen our position, it was imperatively necessary for us to weaken the influence of Bokhara as much as possible, to limit our extension to the occupation only of such points as would give us a better command of the region instead of enfeebling our position, and finally to convince our neighbours practically of the peaceful views of our Government. This I strove to accomplish in all my subsequent acts, to the extent, of course, of the powers and means at my disposal.

But before I proceeded to any action which was thenceforward to depend upon my own initiative, it was incumbent upon me first to deal with the difficulties that stood in the way of the mode of action I desired to adopt, and to remove them to an extent that would enable me to act.

These difficulties were not few, and the condition of the province was in no respects satisfactory. The insufficiency of troops and the want of money, are vividly traced in General Cherniayef's report to the Governor General, dated the 12th-24th January 1866, in which he most urgently requests a speedy supply of men and money (app. 25).

Among the chief difficulties, I may mention the insufficiency of troops, the entanglement of previous accounts, and the want of means to cover many unavoidable expenses.

It must be borne in mind that, immediately after the occupation of Tashkend, on the strength of General Cherniayef's representations, it was acknowledged necessary to increase the forces in Turkistan by several battalions from the Volga, in order to ensure the safe tenure of the newly-acquired territories. On the arrival of those troops, the force in the province would have been increased to about 16,000, but 3,000 of them were detained in Orenburg for the winter; and, according to the arrangements made by the Orenburg authorities, could be expected to reach the scene of action only in the month of August 1866. Consequently, the number of troops in the province on my arrival was limited to the same figure of 13,000, which had been recognised as insufficient for the defence even of the province; and yet hostilities had already been commenced against Bokhara.

It must also be remembered that, owing to the sudden capture of Tashkend, which was unexpected by the Imperial Government, no funds had previously been assigned for the undertaking; and that the local authorities were consequently obliged to appropriate monies issued for other purposes to the necessary expenses of war, the building of forts,

barracks, hospitals, &c. We may easily imagine the confusion to which this led in the accounts, especially when we consider that the requirements of the province had already outgrown the number of officers employed in the service of administration. The staff of Civil and Military functionaries was that which had been fixed for a region with a frontier only as far as Chemkend, and a proportionate body of troops. But even these establishments, inclusive of the Intendantship, were fixed only in the latter part of 1865, so that they were practically applicable only in 1866. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, receiving no correct accounts of expenses incurred, could make no issues for meeting them, and yet whilst these accounts were being made up, fresh military operations were begun which were equally unforeseen, and for the prosecution of which there was no alternative but that of seizing the funds that first came to hand.

In addition to these pecuniary embarrassments, the timely transmission of money was greatly embarrassed by the immensity of the distance, while the keeping of accounts was rendered more difficult by the introduction of a new system of audit. As regards the civil administration itself—on my arrival in the province in March (O. S.) 1866, I found only 8,* out of the 18 offices created actually filled, and only 5 men at their posts, who were thoroughly acquainted with the duties they had to perform. The rest, instead of fulfilling the duties to which they were appointed, were temporarily employed in other duties (app. 77). It would be unjust not to praise the useful services of most of these worthy officers. Nevertheless it is not difficult to understand to how small an extent it was possible, with so limited a staff, to carry out the system recommended by the local authorities and established by Imperial order in 1865; and it can as easily be imagined what amount of immediate, effective control could be exercised with so small a staff, over all that occurred in the newly constituted province. The necessity for such control was growing greater and greater in the interior, as the province was, so to speak, palpably lapsing into that period of disenchantment which invariably succeeds every conquest, and which is all the stronger and more dangerous when the language, customs, and religion of the conquerors and conquered present striking contrasts.

The innovations introduced by conquerors into a strange country cannot be equally agreeable to all, however beneficial they may be on the whole, and by the very force of circumstances, irrespective of individuals, they cannot but be more or less oppressive to those who previously commanded the greatest influence in the country, as well as to their friends and adherents. Whether the men of influence be kings, princes, nobles, or spiritual chiefs, when removed by conquest to a secondary position, they do not willingly reconcile themselves to it, and almost never, otherwise than after a more or less protracted and strong internal commotion. Italy and Germany have lately shown and do still show examples of this. We all know how a few battalions of volunteers proved sufficient for the annihilation of the Neapolitan kingdom, while it took an army of 120,000 men, and more than one year to establish an order of things desired by the whole of the Italian nation.

* Among these were two Civil functionaries, two Military Officers of the regular forces, and four Cossack Officers.

Similar internal commotions have attended the transition of existing orders of things in the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Orenburg Region.

The more humanizing principles which Russia introduced into all those countries gave her at first a host of adherents, but the influence of those who were foremost previous to the invasion soon produced an inward commotion and a period of disenchantment. We did not escape such a period even in Georgia—a country which professed our own faith and which had long and earnestly solicited our assistance. Those who have read the interesting work of Dubrovin will have seen what great difficulties our government had to contend with during the first year of the annexation of Georgia to Russia. And where, besides a difference in language and customs, there happens to be a difference in religion, such internal resistance is the more unavoidable, and will assume a variety of forms that depend principally on the character of the conquered race.

This immutable law of “disenchantment” could not fail to operate against us in Central Asia, but with this sole difference, that the natives are more reserved, and that their more influential order—the clergy—have been accustomed to clothe their opposition in a very docile form and bearing. Thus, in the address presented by the inhabitants of Tashkend (app. 24) to the Governor General in the autumn of 1865, and written under the influence of the clergy, the annexation of Tashkend to the empire is very earnestly requested; yet the same address demands, not less urgently, that their Spiritual Chief or “Kazy-Kilian” should possess the right not only of making appointments to all spiritual offices, but also of nominating Judges or “Kazys” within the whole of the province of Turkistan. All who are acquainted with Mussulman legislation will at once see what an enormous power we should have accorded to the native clergy had we acceded to this request. By granting the petition, which was drawn up in a very humble form, the Russian Government would have placed in the hands of the clergy, and particularly in those of their chief, a power over the people and the whole region superior to any which they had wielded under their own Mahomedan rulers. The Tashkendians did not forget, also, in their address, to petition for immunities from house tax, &c., &c.

In the rupture with Bokhara, which occurred soon after our occupation of Tashkend, the conduct of the clergy did not inspire confidence. Many had seriously compromised themselves, and a conspiracy which was set on foot in Tashkend did not, certainly, owe its failure to the influence of the clergy.

Acquainted with the state of affairs in Turkistan, from which I only returned in the month of November, I foresaw the nature of the difficulties I should have to deal with. I therefore took the precaution, when at St. Petersburg, to make the following requests:—*firstly*, that in case of emergency I might be allowed to refer to the authorities of Western Siberia for a temporary supply of even small reinforcements; and *secondly*, that in the case of an urgent want of money, I might dispense with formalities, and employ, as loans, monies destined for other purposes, on the condition, however, of such measures being immediately reported, and detailed accounts being duly rendered. Both these requests


were found reasonable, and the Governor General of Siberia was instructed to assist me with troops to the extent of his ability. His Imperial Majesty was, at the same time, pleased to order all the revenues of Tashkend and other places not yet annexed to the Empire to be carried to an extraordinary account, and to be placed at the disposal of the Military Governor, under the supervision of the Governor General, until the settlement of affairs and final organization of the province. On my way through Orenburg, I repeated to the Governor General my request not to be hampered by formalities, and General Kryjanovski, who was well acquainted with the state of affairs, could not but admit the reasonableness of such a request.

As might have been expected, on reaching the province, I found the deficiency in men and money to be the first great obstacle in my path.

The intelligence of the withdrawal of our troops from before Djizak, which I received on entering the province, argued plainly the necessity of strengthening our active force. That hostilities would soon assume a greater proportion could not be doubted. One circumstance was in our favour, and that was the cessation of trade with Bokhara, which by stimulating our trade with Khiva, induced the latter to be better disposed towards us, and thus enabled us to reduce without danger the garrisons on the Syr-Daria line to a minimum. I found, on communicating with the authorities of that line, that I could strengthen the forces in Turkistan by two companies of infantry, besides a company of rifles and some Cossacks. The authorities of the line were, however, not only unable to equip those troops for a march of 1,000 versts, but they had not even the means of supplying their ordinary wants. For instance, soldiers returning from the province on unlimited furlough, after having served their full terms, could not continue the journey beyond the forts, because there was no money with which to pay the allowances that were due to them. I considered these circumstances justified me in dispensing with formalities; and therefore, as I was followed by a baggage train with specie for the Pay Master's Department, I issued an order to the Commandant of Fort No. 1 to take from the chests on their passage the sums required for the despatch of the companies and for the payment of the unlimited-furlough men.

It became known to the Governor General at Fort Perovski, by a report from General Cherniayef, that military operations on an extensive scale were impending; that the Emir had proclaimed a holy war against us; that Kokan and Khiva were invited to participate in it; that immense quantities of troops and stores were already being concentrated in Bokhara; and, finally, that the Emir himself had set out to join his advanced army at the Bokharian frontier fort of Ura-Tiube. All these rumours, with the exception of that of the alliance between Bokhara and Khiva, had the semblance of truth, especially as the warlike character of the present Emir was well known; for, during his eight years' reign, he had constantly waged war against his neighbours, and so successfully, that he had almost trebled his dominions. The rumoured participation of Khiva in a war against us was not very credible. That Khanat appreciated too highly the profits of a trade which had greatly increased; and, moreover, Khiva looked upon Bokhara with distrust.

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Further alarming rumours from Tashkend (apps. 32 and 34) urged me to apply to the authorities of Western Siberia for a temporary supply of reinforcements, and simultaneously to request the Governor General of Orenburg to hasten the despatch of the troops which had been ordered into the province so far back as 1865. At Fort Perovski, it was arranged that two steamers should prepare, as quickly as possible, to proceed up the river to Chinaz, in order to support the military operations.

The information received at Turkistan from the detachment was of a still more alarming character. The Kirghizes began to show signs of disturbance, which necessitated the formation of a militia at once. All these measures for the immediate reinforcement of our active force at Chinaz necessitated an outlay of money, which was also required for the defence of the province, so that, as there were no available sums (at some posts, even private remittances were appropriated to Government services), I was obliged to issue to every post an order similar to that given by me to the Commandant of Fort No. 1. All the Commandants had to report on the receipt of the monies taken from the train as it passed through. The total expenses on the occasion did not, however, exceed 30,000 to 40,000 roubles, and there was no confusion in the accounts, for arrangements were duly made for replacing the sums thus borrowed.

I arrived at Tashkend on the 25th March (O. S.), and staying there only one day, reached the detachment on the 26th. On the 27th I assumed the command of the troops and the Military Governorship, while General Cherniayef took his departure for St. Petersburg.

CHAPTER IV.

STATE OF THE ACTIVE DETACHMENTS AND OUR RELATIONS WITH BOKHARA AT THE END OF MARCH—MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE DETACHMENTS AND FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REGION—ACTION AT MUZZA-RABAT ON THE 5-17TH OF APRIL—COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOKHARA AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH KOKAN—ARRIVAL OF THE STEAMERS—CO-OPERATION FROM WESTERN SIBERIA—NO HOPE OF ASSISTANCE FROM ORENBURG—INCREASE OF DIFFICULTIES—DESIGNS OF THE EMIR—REPEATED ATTACKS ON OUR COMMUNICATIONS AND IN THE REAR OF ACTING COLUMNS—ANOTHER MISSION TO THE EMIR—PRETENSIONS OF THE BOKHARIAN POTENTATE—CATEGORICAL ANSWER TO THEM—ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS—ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REGION—INEVITABLE NECESSITY FOR A DETERMINED ADVANCE ON OUR PART—ENCOUNTER AT IRDJAR ON THE 8-20TH OF MAY—MOVEMENT ON KHODJEND—SEIZURE OF THAT TOWN ON THE 23TH MAY (5TH JUNE)—EMBASSIES FROM BOKHARA AND KOKAN—RETURN OF ONE OF THE RUSSIAN OFFICERS DETAINED IN BOKHARA—CESSATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND RETURN TO TASHKEND ON THE 2-14TH JUNE.

The following was the condition of the detachments, and the state of our relations with Bokhara at the end of March when I assumed command of the forces. All our resources for war consisted of two detachments: the *principal* one composed of $2\frac{1}{2}$ thousand troops collected at Chinaz, and the Keréúchi detachment, in the neighbourhood of Keréúché fort and numbering about 500 men, the two detachments forming an aggregate of 3,000 fighting-men. With the exception of the forts on the Syr-Daria, garrisons in Tashkend and other forts were so feeble as to be scarcely equal to the defence of the nearest outlying localities.

There was a great deal of illness in the active detachment in consequence of the men having constantly lived in earth huts or in hastily erected barracks while undergoing a variety of privations during a winter campaign. The cases of sickness daily exceeded 20 in the principal detachment. At the same time the troops despatched from the Syr-Daria for the reinforcement of the detachments assembled for operations in the field, and the contingent from Siberia could not arrive before the end of April (O. S.). Meanwhile the Emir, whose advanced troops were not more than 50 versts distant from Chinaz, was declared to have mustered an army of 100,000 men with 100 guns. It should also be mentioned that our troops had hitherto never come into collision with the Bokharians or their regular forces, which were held in high esteem by the natives, whilst the Emir himself was held to be unconquerable.

The detachments felt the want of funds much more strongly than the forts. I found no money at all with the troops, and, pending the arrival of supplies, was obliged to expend my own private means on such primary objects as, for instance, the care of the sick, the payment of spies, and the expenses of carriage. When my means failed I was

compelled to borrow of Major-General Count Woronzow-Dashkof, now of his Imperial Majesty's Staff, who arrived with me.*

War had not yet been formally declared either by us or by the Bokharians, but the military operation which commenced in the advance to Djizak in the month of January had not been discontinued. Bokharian horsemen made frequent attacks on our communications, and even made onslaughts in the neighbourhood of our camp. Thus, on the 24th of February, two of our soldiers barely escaped from 10 Bokharian horsemen, who fell upon them within sight of our camp; and on the 26th 2 Cossacks were made prisoners by the Bokharians, also within sight of our camp.

On the 11th of March some Bokharian horsemen seized a soldier who had incautiously strayed beyond our lines; the man was beheaded on the spot, and the Bokharians carried away his head (Appendix 34).

In the beginning of March, the Bokharians having placed a small garrison in Fort Chardary began to send out detachments to operate against our communications; however, by General Chernayeff's orders, they were soon driven out of Chardary by a small column under Captain (now Colonel†) Abramof, on which occasion our troops captured 2,000 Bokharian sheep.

For these reasons, although I sincerely desired to improve our position in the country without having recourse to hazardous undertakings which, in the event of miscarriage, would involve additional sacrifices, I could not but come to the conclusion that such action was, under the circumstances, absolutely indispensable.

Familiar as I was with the temper of Asiatics, through my previous service in the Caucasus, I could not but deem it necessary *firstly*, to guard against any thing that might be interpreted as a symptom of weakness, and *secondly*, to decline to enter into futile negotiations with Bokhara. On these grounds, therefore, I could not mark the inauguration of my command by any amicable negotiations with an antagonist who had insulted us, and that too in a strange country, where the result of the collision was being anxiously watched by all.

Indefinitely postponing negotiations, I considered it necessary first of all to devote myself to the task of making preparations for a hostile collision. All my endeavours were directed towards the improvement of the condition of the troops, the reduction of the amount of illness amongst them, as well as towards increasing the strength of the operating detachments by recalling the men who had been draughted for various service, and who could be temporarily spared. Small detachments of Cossacks and militia were meanwhile formed to put an end to the attacks of the enemy in the vicinity of our camp and on our communications, and minor columns were detached for the same

* Count Woronzow-Dashkof was sent to proclaim to the troops, in the name of the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty's thanks for their gallant conduct, as reported by the Governor General on his inspection in 1865, and to distribute gratuities amongst them. In the month of September, Count Woronzow-Dashkof was appointed by the Governor General to act as my assistant in command of the forces of the province, and in October, in addition to his elevation to the rank of Major-General, Count Woronzow was, by Imperial order, appointed Assistant Military Governor.

† Now Major-General Abramof.

purpose from our corps of operation. It was also considered expedient to make reconnaissances from time to time in the direction of the enemy, with the object of obtaining a better knowledge of the locality, as well as with that of anticipating any sudden attack upon our camp by the Bokharians, rumours of which, confirmed by spies, were perpetually current. Thus, on the 5-17th April, I made a reconnaissance in the direction of Muzza-Rabat, situated nearly midway between Chinaz and Irdjar, where the advanced forces of the Emir had been located for several weeks. This reconnaissance was undertaken in consequence of information which I received on the 4-16th concerning the accumulation of a large body of the enemy's horse at Muzza-Rabat, about whose intentions the spies learnt nothing definite. The enemy was discovered before reaching Muzza-Rabat at a distance of 10 or 15 versts from our camp. The head of our column routed the Bokharian horse, and succeeded in taking 14,000 head of sheep, partly belonging to the Beks of Djizak, Uratiúbé, and Samarkand, and partly taken from the inhabitants on the occasion of the approaching festival of Kuram-Bairan.

The Emir had intended to observe this holiday with special solemnity in the midst of his army assembled at Uratiúbé. The trifling affair at Muzza-Rabat was in itself of no actual significance, but, besides suffering a very palpable material loss, it must have impressed the enemy with a greater respect for our force. From that time the inroads into the vicinity of our camp ceased entirely. The skirmish was of great importance to me personally, because it gave me an opportunity of studying the spirit of the troops over whom I was taking command under very trying circumstances. I could now place full and perfect confidence in them, and could wait more calmly for an improvement in the condition of affairs.

The advanced troops that took part in the affair consisted of 2½ sotnias of Cossacks, 2 pieces of horse artillery, a company of infantry, and a rocket company. The numbers of the Bokharians were differently stated by the spies. At any rate, the enemy considerably outnumbered our advanced detachment, and it more than once happened during the conflict and the pursuit that, observing the disorder into which our Cossacks were thrown when elated with success, the Bokharians rapidly fell back, and at the same time threw forward bodies of horse to take us in flank or to fall upon the guns, which were sometimes left entirely exposed to attack. In all instances of this kind, we had a company of soldiers who, following at a run, almost kept pace with the Cossacks, and, watching the enemy sharply, always came up at the right time.* (Appendix No. 38).

The booty taken from the enemy at Muzza-Rabat proved very seasonable. The number of head of cattle seized on this occasion and those captured by Colonel Abramof at Chardary amounted to more than 16,000, so that the men of the main detachment, as well as those stationed within a certain distance, had their rations considerably increased. After the hard winter which the troops had passed this increase of allowance was not superfluous.

Having regard to the pacific aims of our Government, and taking into consideration that the affairs of Chardary and Muzza-Rabat had,

* The Rifle Company of the late 4th Orenburg, now the Turkistan battalion of the line

in some measure at least, smoothed the impression produced on the natives by the retreat of our detachment from before Djizak to Chinaz. I now found that I might enter into negotiations with the Emir.

Three days after the action, I despatched to the Khan of Bokhara a letter (Appendix 35), in which I informed him of my appointment to the office of Military Governor, and proposed as conditions of peace the immediate release of our mission and the removal of all his troops from our territory. At the same time I entered, through agents, into communication with the Khan of Kokan, and endeavoured to reassure him with regard to the aims of our Government.

Before my letter to the Emir had reached its destination, a messenger arrived in camp with a letter from the Bek of Djizak (Appendices 36, 37). Its contents were, however, exactly similar to those of the letters that had been repeatedly written to my predecessor. The Bek assured me of the continuance of the ancient friendship of Bokhara towards Russia, and entreated me not to violate that friendship by any acts of hostility, but to endeavour to establish peace as quickly as possible. As usual he alluded very evasively to the return of our embassy, insisting only that our officers were being kindly treated by the Emir in Bokhara and very well entertained.

It was evident that the Bokharians were only trying to gain time and to collect more troops. But it was still more important to us to gain time. The Bokharians could not, in the course of a few weeks, strengthen either their regular troops or their field artillery, *i. e.*, the chief and only military arm which could be the object of any serious concern on our part, as up to that time we had had no encounters with those branches of the Bokharian army. The principal mass of the Bokharian forces, *viz.*, their irregular horse, which was constantly increasing in strength, could offer no serious resistance in case of a decisive collision. But to us the gain of a few weeks afforded the prospect of an increase of our active force by one-third. I was therefore in no hurry to clear up our mutual relations, and commissioned Count Woronzow-Dashkof, who was then acting chief of the staff of the detachment, to acquaint the Bek that I had dispatched a letter to the Emir, and that my further action would depend on the answer which I expected. My reply was very brief, for it was necessary to show the Bokharians that we were not disposed to enter into any fruitless recriminations.

The first steamer arrived at Chinaz from Fort Perovski, on the 10-22nd of April, and the other joined a few days later; they had both exchanged shots with the Bokharians, who had several times tried to stop them. The companies of Rifles and Cossacks from Fort Perovski arrived at the same time.

On the 15-27th of April, I was very much gladdened by intelligence from Western Siberia to the effect that the assistance I had asked for had been dispatched immediately on receipt of my request, so that I could now reckon upon an increase by the end of the month of the troops in the neighbourhood of Tashkend to the extent of 2 companies, 2 sotnias, and 2 guns; by that time, also, the 2 companies from the Syr-Daria which were advancing almost without halting and by forced marches were calculated to come up. But to my great regret the reply from Orenburg, which arrived simultaneously with that from

Western Siberia, was not of the same character. While sympathizing with me in the difficulty of my position, the Governor General only announced that the three battalions which were to reinforce the troops in the province would arrive by the month of August, and that, according to the distribution of the troops marked out for me by His Excellency, I would by that time be able to take the field with 30 companies:—a force with which, His Excellency stated, I should know how to repulse the Emir in a proper manner. As regards hastening the despatch of this contingent, it appeared that the advance of only two of the foremost companies could be accelerated, and that they might be expected, not by the end of June as previously arranged, but not before the middle, or perhaps even the *end*, of July.

In the meanwhile, it became daily more evident towards the end of April that decisive aggressive operations on our part were unavoidable. The attacks on our communications were renewed (Appendix 39). Parties of the enemy's horse again began to appear in the vicinity of Chardary, on our line of communication between Chemkend and Tashkend, and they were particularly strong on the left bank of the Chirehik. Attacks were even made in the neighbourhood of Tashkend, in the gardens surrounding the town. Thus, on the 18th of April, a party of mounted Bokharians succeeded in penetrating almost up to Tashkend itself, and at a distance of 12 versts from the town captured three of our soldiers, and on the 19th, the same party carried off our picket of militia at Niazbek. At the same time we intercepted several letters from the Emir and other influential persons in Bokhara addressed to the people under our rule, and which revealed traces of an extensive conspiracy preparing in Tashkend and elsewhere in the region newly occupied by us. Most ridiculous rumours were likewise circulated among the people about what was believed to be the perilous position of our detachment stationed at Chinaz. It was said in the bazars that the detachment remained at Chinaz only because it could not undertake anything, that it did not dare to venture against the army of the Emir, and was afraid to retreat for the whole of the Emir's army would at once descend upon it. In the latter part of April, all the troops of the Emir assembled at Uratiúbé had actually been concentrated in the direction of Irdjar. The Emir himself was expected to arrive early in May, when it was also expected that a decided aggressive movement would be made by the enemy. The scale of the arrangements for these aggressive operations, and the expectations of the Emir as regards support and assistance in the country, were as follows. After the victory at Irdjar, besides immense quantities of military stores scattered along all the roads by which the Bokharians retreated, or rather fled, 220,000 cartridges and 700 pounds of gunpowder were found untouched on the site of their position alone.

The state of affairs with the detachment and in the neighbourhood of Tashkend was so constrained, that it naturally affected our general position in the whole province, making it more and more trying.

We could only alter the position of affairs by decisive aggressive operations and the utter annihilation of the Emir's army. It was however necessary to strengthen our active force, and to await a favor-

able opportunity, as otherwise resolute action might have increased the difficulty of our position instead of improving it.

Such then was the condition of affairs, when I received a letter* from the Emir on the 19th April (1st May.) Though referring as usual to his old friendship with the Russian Czar, the Ruler of Bokhara nevertheless very openly expressed his opinion on the subject of my predecessor's advance against Djizak. Referring to that advance in a tone exactly similar to that employed by the Bek of Djizak, he strongly insisted on the immediate withdrawal of our troops beyond the Syr-Daria, and warned me that we might otherwise meet with the fate of our troops before Djizak. The release of our mission was alluded to very evasively. It was a significant fact that the mission which brought me this letter avoided the route by which former envoys had come, and appeared quite unexpectedly at the village of Chinaz, lying seven versts to the rear of our camp, on the road to Tashkend. We found that it had crossed the Syr-Daria in the neighbourhood of Irdjar with the assistance of the local inhabitants, and had very deliberately traversed the Trans-Chirchik district, halting in the villages and spreading all sorts of rumours favorable to Bokhara, none of the inhabitants deeming it necessary to give information either to the principal detachment or to that at Kereuchi, although both were at no great distance.

Fully appreciating the importance of the moment, and feeling that this was not an occasion for the least display of weakness, I explained categorically to the Emir all the inconsistency of his proposals, and of his conduct in general since our occupation of Tashkend, whilst I did not, of course, omit to controvert the strange inference he had drawn from my predecessor's mode of action and advance on Djizak. In conclusion, I demanded more peremptorily than ever the instant return of our mission and the immediate withdrawal of all the troops and partizans of the Emir from our limits.

The conferences with the Bokharian embassy lasted more than a week. The envoys left me only at the end of April (O. S.), and of course by the direct road to the enemy's camp, not by the Trans-Chirchik region. The time passed in these conferences was of great importance and profit to us. In addition to receiving all the reinforcements which we expected, *i. e.*, those from Western Siberia and the line of the Syr-Daria, we had, by the end of April, finished all the works of Fort New Chinaz (founded in the beginning of that month), for which a very favorable position was chosen at the mouth of the Chirchik (very close to the position we then held), and to which the garrison and arms of Old Chinaz were transferred. As this fort stood on the very bank of the Syr-Daria, we were enabled to deposit in it all our superfluous baggage, and to leave there the steamers and other appliances for transport, which greatly facilitated the impending advance.

The Bokharian mission was invited to witness the ceremony of raising the flag of the fort, which was armed and consecrated in their presence.

* To my great regret I have not yet received a copy of this letter, so that I can give the contents of it only from memory. As soon as I receive it I shall not fail to publish it, as well as the letter I wrote in answer to the Emir.

As the reinforcements came in, they were either forwarded to the active detachment or placed in the forts nearest to the scene of action, and a special flying detachment was formed for the protection of the more immediate vicinity of Tashkend and the Trans-Chirchik district. The main detachment remained almost unaltered: it was strengthened only by two guns and reduced by a sotnia of Cossacks. But as the complement of each arm was at the same time made as full as possible, the total of the chief detachment was raised to 3,000 men.*

This force included about 600 cavalry, a figure which our active detachments in Central Asia had hitherto not possessed, and which conducted very much towards our further successes. The Kereúchi detachment was somewhat strengthened; its number was made up to 1,000 men in order that it might, during the prospective advance, afford to keep a garrison in the fort of Kereúchi, and still be a sufficiently independent force.

Thus, all the arrangements connected with strengthening the active detachments and distributing the troops, as far as they appeared to meet the position of affairs, were completed by the beginning of the month of May (O. S.); and we had then only to wait for a favorable opportunity to advance. On the 5-17th and 6-18th of May, we received intelligence that the Emir had come to Irdjar; that immediately on his arrival a host of 10,000 men had been despatched to the right bank of the Syr-Daria and into the Trans-Chirchik region; and that the alarming rumours and the agitation of the population, especially in Tashkend, were much on the increase.

The time for decisive action on our part had at last arrived.

I confess that at that moment I had to struggle inwardly with strong emotions. Great as was my confidence in the troops and my reliance on their superiority to the Bokharians, I was nevertheless aware that—*firstly*, in addition to numerous irregular masses, the Emir had tolerably good regular troops, which, up to that time, we had not encountered; and *secondly*, that success did not invariably attend the most desperate acts of determination. At the same time, a failure when we had no reliable points of support in our rear nearer than fort Perovski and Fort Vernoe, 700 or 800 versts distant, would inevitably have been followed by a catastrophe; the new province would have been lost to us, and much money and time would have been required for its re-occupation. On the other hand, a temporizing course threatened to bring about the same catastrophe—the loss of the province. The reinforcements from Orenburg were to arrive only in August. The Emir knew of their being on their way to the province, and, of course, would not have waited idly at Irdjar until we had received our supports. That the policy which he had pursued in the Trans-Chirchik region and in Tashkend would have been soon applied to the whole province does not admit of a doubt. The favorable disposition shown towards him by the population and his great masses of horsemen, gave him all the chances of success. It would have been more than visionary to hope,

* At this time, as during the advance on Djizak under the command of General Chernayef, the chief detachment consisted of 14 companies of foot, 5 sotnias of Cossacks (instead of 6), 22 guns (instead of 20), and a rocket company.

under such circumstances, to be able to retain a province which extended over 1,500 versts with the number of troops we then had in it, and while we confined ourselves to defensive operations. It was impossible for the Emir to withdraw from his position at Irdjar in the face of our advance without accepting battle, as such a proceeding would have abased him for ever before the eyes of the entire population of Central Asia.

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On the morning of the 7-19th of May, the main detachment set out along the left bank of the Syr-Daria in the direction of Irdjar, and the Kereuchi detachment was marched towards the same place along the right bank, their advance being so timed that both the detachments might appear before the enemy simultaneously.

A decisive encounter between our detachments and the Emir's army took place on the 8-20th of May at Irdjar (Appendices 40, 41).

With all praise to the Almighty, the truly gallant spirit of our troops, and the exemplary conduct of the officers, produced results than which we could have desired no better. The Emir's army was annihilated, his artillery, immense stores, and the whole of his camp were left in our hands. For the first time, after a successful military career of eight years, the ruler of Bokhara was obliged to seek safety in precipitate flight, and he just saved himself from us as well as from his own people by taking the shorter road through Djizak to Samarcand.

The consequences proved that for more reasons than one our advance was undertaken at the proper time. The conspiracy revealed to us in the middle of April was joined by a great many in Tashkend. The time and mode of action were already settled by the conspirators. It was proposed to admit secretly into Tashkend a party of the enemy and then simultaneously to fall upon and massacre all the chief inhabitants devoted to our cause, after which an attack was to be made on the garrison, in conjunction with another body of the enemy conducted towards the town. At that time the fort of Kereuchi was surrounded by a host of 10,000 men, and was in a state of blockade from the 8-20th to the 10-22nd May, *i. e.*, until the enemy received intelligence of the Emir's defeat at Irdjar.

The conspiracy in Tashkend miscarried through the opportune measures taken by the officer placed over the native population of Tashkend, and after our military successes all attempts at conspiracy were abandoned by the natives.*

The action at Irdjar having completely altered our position in the country, left me free to take such measures as I might consider most advantageous under the circumstances.

Although the instructions which received Imperial confirmation before my departure from St. Petersburg contained general directions

* Count Woronzow-Dashkof, who, being laid up with a broken leg, could not take part in the campaign, and who, on my departure with the troops for Irdjar, was left in charge of the province, bore special testimony in favour of the extraordinary zeal and capacities of that worthy officer. Indeed, by his brave conduct at Ikan, Mr. Scrof attracted the attention of my predecessor, and fully justified his appointment in 1865. In a short time he succeeded in winning over many natives, who became sincerely devoted to our cause, and perceptibly weakened the party hostile to us. For his useful service at Tashkend he was in a few months recommended by General Cherniayef for the order of St. Vladimir of the 4th class. It was through his unceasing endeavours, chiefly, that the malevolent designs of the natives were revealed in time and anticipated.

for my conduct with relation to Bokhara and Kokan; yet, when they were drawn up in the beginning of February, our position in May could not naturally have been foreseen. Neither the local authorities nor the Supreme Government had then lost all hope of averting a collision with Bokhara by peaceful means. It was equally impossible to ask for fresh directions. An answer could not have reached me in less than two or three months. For these reasons I was guided principally by my own views from the 8-20th of May to the middle of June (O. S.), when fresh orders arrived from the Governor General based on considerations arising out of the defeat of the Emir; but I continued to use my own discrimination until the month of August when the Governor General himself arrived in the province. The responsibility for my acts up to that time rests therefore exclusively upon me.

Two courses were left open to us for following up our decided success at Irdjar,—one was vigorously to pursue the defeated enemy and to march on to Djizak, Samarcand, and even beyond; the other to proceed to Naï and Khodjend.

The first of these courses undoubtedly offered the best chances of easy and rapid successes. In all probability we should, without much trouble, have taken possession of Djizak and other points as far as we may have gone, and should even hardly have stopped at Samarcand. But the experience of the last years had convinced us that, after occupying any point in Central Asia, it was impossible for us to abandon it. The arrival of Russian troops creates at once a mass of Russian adherents whom it is impossible for us, without detriment to our own moral influence, to forsake again to the mercies of semi-barbarous potentates. At the same time the extension of our dominions in the direction of Bokhara never entered into the programme of our Government, nor did it present any great advantages. It is not to be forgotten, in addition, that we were not then in possession of either Khodjend or Ouratiubé, and that the only direct communication with Djizak lay across the barren steppe; at the same time we could not but labour under apprehensions as to the probable fate of our mission and of our merchants detained in Bokhara. In a moment of desperation both might become the victims of any adverse circumstances, and such moments would have been rendered inevitable both for the Government and population of Bokhara by an advance into the limits of the Khanat.

A march on Khodjend did not offer any of these disadvantages. The possession of this point, important both in military and commercial respects, was to us a matter of the greatest necessity. Situated on the Syr-Daria, near the bend of the river, at a point where it abruptly turns to the south-east, and at a crossing of the roads to Tashkend and Kokan, Balkh, and Bokhara, Khodjend, as during the wars between Kokan and Bokhara, always took a prominent part in Central Asiatic trade.

It was only by occupying Khodjend that we could consider ourselves really masters in the Trans-Chirchik region, and could look forward to the establishment of perfect tranquillity in the newly-occupied regions of Central Asia. The presence of our troops in Khodjend would at the same time sever Kokan from Bokhara, and give us the most convenient access into both of these dominions.

On the strength of these considerations both the detachments, the main one and that of Kereùchi, were advanced from Irdjar to Khodjend (Appendix 45); the first along the left bank of the Syr-Daria by Naù, the second by the straight road along the right bank; the small but strong fort of Naù was taken without a single shot, the garrison fled, and the inhabitants offered their allegiance. On the 17-29th of May both the detachments met under the walls of Khodjend, each halting on their respective sides of the river.

From Chinaz I had issued proclamations to the inhabitants (Appendix 40), in which I informed them that, having arrived in the province by order of the "White Czar" to establish within it peace and tranquillity, I was going to act only against the Emir's troops, and invited all the peaceful inhabitants not to take part in the military operations, but quietly to continue their ordinary occupations. In return for this I promised them complete security for their lives and properties. A similar proclamation was again issued after Irdjar. And indeed, with the exception of Naù, the inhabitants of all the villages along the road met me with offerings of bread and salt. Even from other and very remote villages people came to me with similar tokens of submission. Upon this I expected that Khodjend too would surrender without resistance, but on this head the inhabitants of the villages expressed great doubts.

Khodjend is one of the most populous, wealthy, and picturesque towns of Central Asia, and its inhabitants were always distinguished for their spirit of independence, great obstinacy, and at the same time, to do them justice, for the faithful performance of their promises. Profiting by their position between Kokan and Bokhara, the inhabitants of Khodjend had acquired a certain degree of freedom, submitting at pleasure to the authority of the ruler of either of these Khanats. They spared no means to support this independence. The fortifications of Khodjend, notwithstanding their length of 11 versts, with the exception of the side facing the river, consist entirely of a double row of very high and thick walls, strengthened by towers and barbettes. The citadel stands almost in the very centre of the town by the bank of the Syr-Daria on an artificial elevation, and may be considered impregnable. Generally speaking the defences of Khodjend were stronger than those of any of the forts occupied by us before and after in that country.*

The capture of Khodjend was attended with this other difficulty, that our relations with Kokan were then not yet clearly defined, and the Kokanians appeared to be making preparations for an energetic defence of the place; large parties were hovering in the vicinity, and some succeeded in getting into the town.

Thanks, however, to our brave troops and to their commanding officers, who had so brilliantly distinguished themselves at Irdjar, Khodjend was taken by storm on the 24th May or 5th June after a siege of eight days.

On the first day of the arrival of the detachment before Khodjend, some emissaries came to our camp with a letter from the Bek of Djizak,

* Djizak is the only exception; it had this superiority, that while strongly fortified it was defended by a garrison of corresponding strength.

in which the latter begged me to suspend hostilities, and informed me that the Emir had ordered the release of our envoys. I considered it not only inexpedient to reply to this letter, but detaining the emissaries in camp, and giving them into the charge of one of the officers of my staff, I caused them to be informed that I should myself release them only when our own envoys were in my camp. Ten days afterwards, *i. e.*, on the day after our occupation of Khodjend, one of the members of our mission, the Cossack *Khorundji* Gerasimof, did actually return to me, while another letter from the Bek, brought by a fresh messenger who arrived at the same time, informed me that our envoys had already been released and were expected in a few days at Djizakh. The Bek desired me in this letter to let him know where the envoys should be sent to: to our troops in Khodjend or by direct road to Chinaz? In the name of the Emir, the Bek also earnestly requested me to give some guarantee of our peaceful intentions, and not to occupy any more of the Emir's dominions.

This fresh envoy from Bokhara had hardly left me when another from the Khan of Kokan arrived. In an extremely friendly letter, Hudoyar Khan of Kokan congratulated me on the successes I had achieved and on the occupation of Khodjend, and expressed his sincere readiness to co-operate with me in re-establishing good relations with the Russians (Appendix 46).

Such expressions on the part of Bokhara and Kokan fully corresponded with the long felt and constant desires of our Government, as they afforded the possibility of establishing at length befitting friendly relations with our Central Asiatic neighbours. It must at the same time be confessed that these representations came to me very opportunely, for at this juncture I was prevented by orders from Orenburg, issued through misunderstandings, from military operations.

A few days before the storming of Khodjend I received, under its walls, a reprimand in writing from the Governor General of Orenburg for arrangements made by me on my way to Tashkend on the subject of the issues of money at the forts, of which an explanation has already been given. In this communication I was strictly enjoined not to depart from the new rules with regard to disbursements, *i. e.*, to use the different sums only for the purposes for which they were assigned. A communication to the same effect was also received by the Intendant from the Chief Intendant of the Orenburg district. By this order the Tashkend Intendant was placed in such a position that he was utterly unable to fulfil any of my demands with regard to the pay of the expeditionary force, for no allowance had yet been made on account of the expedition, although a special sum had long been applied for to cover its expenses.

The want of funds was so great, that Count Woronzow-Dashkof was obliged to have recourse to that same method, which was more than once employed by my predecessor, *viz.*, to borrow from one of the rich natives a sum of 3,000 roubles for the purpose of forwarding the last transport to Khodjend.

In my reply to the letter from Bokhara (Appendix 48), I requested that our mission might be sent direct to Tashkend by Chinaz, expressing my complete readiness, on the return of our mission, to assist in the estab-

lishment of peace. The Government of Bokhara was at the same time informed that, in proof of our peaceful intentions with regard to it, after the necessary garrisons were placed in Naù and Khodjend, our troops would be withdrawn to the right bank of the Syr-Daria. It was, however, also given to understand that the troops on their way back would be located on the Syr at Irdjar in expectation of the return of our mission and pending the conclusion of peace. I replied by a still more friendly letter to Hudoyar Khan (Appendix 47), whose conduct towards us I found generally very sensible and quite in conformity with the views of our Government.*

It must be here observed that it would be perfectly wrong to regard Central Asiatic potentates from an European point of view; to expect from them what may be expected from friendly European Governments. If, on the one hand, the Central Asiatic Khans make no scruple whatever to deal arbitrarily with a certain portion of their subjects, on the other hand very many of their subjects only nominally submit to their authority.

After finishing all the most necessary preparations for the protection of newly annexed districts on the left bank of the Syr-Daria, and for the introduction of an internal administration, I hastened to return to Tashkend. It was necessary as quickly as possible to provide in some way for the detachments left on the advanced line, which, as all issues from the Intendantship for expeditionary requirements had ceased, might, even remaining where they were, be placed in a difficult predicament.

It would have been extremely rash to have relied upon the professions of Bokhara until the final return of all the Russians detained there. It was much safer to provide for our detachments, so that in case of need they might be able at once to resume aggressive operations.

On the 21st of May, (12th June,) I left Khodjend, proceeding by way of Kereùchi. This road was recommended to me as best suited for the establishment of postal communications. And such indeed I found it.

On the 2nd-14th of June I was again in Tashkend.

* During the whole period of our conflict with Bokhara, Hudoyar Khan behaved with great moderation, and there were no evidences of his having taken part in the war against us. If some bands of Kokanians did really act with the Bokharians, and afterwards assist in the defence of Khodjend, the Khan could not be blamed. His power is not at all so great that he can restrain all disorderly people from acts of this kind. If Hudoyar did assist the Emir in a general way, he did not do so zealously, and there is no doubt that had he lent him more vigorous aid he might have greatly embarrassed us.

CHAPTER V.

CHANGE IN THE ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN THE PROVINCE AND IN THE DEMEANOUR TOWARDS US OF THE NATIVES—RETURN OF OUR OFFICERS FROM BOKHARA—NEW MISSIONS OF PEACE FROM BOKHARA AND KOKAN—ANSWERS TO THE EMIR OF BOKHARA AND KHAN OF KOKAN—PRECAUTIONS TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF MEN AT THE FRONT, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDISPENSABLE ENGINEERING WORKS—INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION—ACCOUNTS—FORMATION OF RUSSIAN SETTLEMENTS IN TASHKEND, KHODJEND, AND CHINAZ—FOUNDATION OF AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL—EXPLORATION OF THE SOURCES OF THE CHIRCHIK.

I CAN hardly describe the change I found in the province and in the demeanour of the people, not excepting even the inhabitants of Tashkend, on my return from Khodjend in the beginning (O. S.) of June. Not more than three weeks had elapsed since the issue of the detachment from Chinaz to Irdjar, yet everything was different, and complete tranquillity prevailed. Not alone had the enemy's bands disappeared, even the marauding parties which had always infested the Trans-Chui district had now vanished into the mountains at the head waters of the Chirchik and Syr-Daria rivers. A peace and quiet were established, the like of which the old men of the country declared they had never before enjoyed. The inhabitants of all the villages round about flocked to meet me with earnest expressions of gratitude and with assurances of their readiness to obey all orders; their faces, previously wearing lowering and distrustful expressions, now beamed with confidence. Some of the natives implicated in secret communications with Bokhara naively confessed that they could never conceive how so small a detachment could defeat so great a man as the Emir.

At Tashkend I found our embassy already returned by way of Chinaz, attended by an agent from the Emir bearing presents to me (a khalat and a cap), who begged to know the conditions upon which we would agree to a treaty of peace. Very soon after another friendly embassy arrived from the Khan of Kokan with similar interrogatories (see Appendix 46). Thus at one and the same time friendly embassies appeared at Tashkend from both of these neighbouring potentates who had ever contended one against the other, and who had occasionally combined for hostilities against us. It was necessary to give them prompt replies, although the nature of these might greatly influence the future.

The conflict with Bokhara, as well as everything that had occurred in the region from February to May; had been so unforeseen that there was nothing in the instructions which I had received to guide me through the circumstances that had arisen. The movement on Khodjend and the capture of that town had been dictated by my own judgment with a view to increase the effect of our victory at Irdjar. In the meanwhile, the position of the province being differently circumstanced—other views might be entertained by the Government, and a fresh line of action might perhaps be chosen. This was all the more probable since my predecessor and the Governor General himself, who had left Orenburg almost at the same time as General Cherniayef, were both at St.

Petersburg. Owing to the great distance between us it was impossible to receive fresh instructions before the month of July.* But of course I could not put off my replies to Bokhara and Kokan for so long a period. Such a delay would inevitably have alarmed our neighbours,—always exceedingly suspicious,—and the trust which they had visibly begun to place in us might again have been shaken.

Under these circumstances, considering that any excessive demand, or any engagement which the Government might afterwards not recognize, would shake the growing confidence in Russia, and that the same result would probably proceed from any evasion on my part, I acted in the following manner:—All that appeared to me necessary for the final pacification of the region and for the development of our trade, *i. e.*, for the accomplishment of all those objects which mainly the Russian Government had always in sight, I expressed in the form of preliminary conditions and indications as bases for treaties in which the Governor General of Orenburg himself had power finally to conclude. Of these conditions I only apprized the Emir, promising to suspend military operations if he would assent to them. I exacted the immediate performance of things which in my opinion brooked no delay if hostilities were to be suspended, and gave notice that these would be continued if the least hesitation were shown.

Mindful of the two truly rational fundamental principles of action of the Russian Government with reference to Central Asia, I deemed it necessary before all deliberately and impartially to regard our position from the stand-point supplied by them; these principles were—*the maintenance of our moral influence in Central Asia, and not the extension, but the consolidation of our freshly occupied territories, and the general pacification of the region.* Towards the attainment of the first object, after the successes we had achieved, it appeared to me to insist on the immediate liberation of all our merchants, adopting as a rule for the future the fulfilment of all our engagements. To attain the second, I judged it necessary to retain all the country newly occupied by us on the *left* bank of the Syr-Daria, but yet to avoid making any further acquisitions whatever in the direction of Bokhara. On the Kokan side it appeared to me not inexpedient to annex Namangan, more especially if the Government, as it was rumoured, had the intention of increasing the number of troops in the province.

Besides the fact that Namangan is in itself of importance as a great centre of trade, the province of Turkistan, by the annexation to it of that town, would extend to the head waters of the Naryn which has long been reckoned as our own river, and we should thus obtain the whole of the right bank of the Syr-Daria as a frontier to Khodjend. From thence our frontier would pass along the boundaries of the Khodjend and Nau districts as far as the Kizyl-Kum sands.

The annexation of Namangan would, I considered, give us, in addition, a well wooded country and localities always famed for their mineral wealth. Forming a fragmentary portion of the Kokan dominions,—the last of the Kokan possessions on the right bank of the

* Under the most favourable circumstances, no answer to applications from Tashkend ever reached in less than from seven to eight weeks.

Syr-Daria,—it was to be expected that Namangan could, on a promise of protection being given to the Khan of Kokan, be annexed without recourse to military operations. In the commencement we might have conflicts with the small detached tribes of nomads, who lately, when Kokan was reduced, roamed in the vicinity of Namangan, without properly acknowledging the authority of any government. There was no doubt, too, that even these nomads would submit to our rule and be pacified in the course of time.

But in every case the occupation of Namangan was not a matter of prime necessity; there was no authority for it in the instructions; and it would have been advantageous only on the condition of an increase of our forces in the province to a number exceeding even that of the 16,000 men who composed the establishment for 1865. Besides, this undertaking could have been performed in August only on the arrival of the contingent then on its way from Orenburg. The number of troops in the province at that time, that is in the beginning (O. S.) of July, was still confined to the previous figure of 18,000, which was recognised to be insufficient for its tenure even in 1865, immediately after the capture of Tashkend when neither the Trans-Chirchik region nor the country on the left bank of the Syr-Daria were yet in our possession.

The project for the occupation of Namangan was not carried out for reasons which will be explained in due course. I may nevertheless here mention one argument which was raised by some in opposition to this project. Pointing out the contiguity of Kokan to our frontier which such an occupation would entail, it was said that our communications with Namangan would be in constant danger. There might have been some foundation for this apprehension if the idea of a perpetual enmity towards us of Kokan could have been admitted. But it could not be imagined that, after the occupation of Tashkend and Khodjend, Kokan would assume such an attitude. Holding these two points we can suffer Kokan to retain her independence only on the condition of her being friendly, or at the least not inimical towards us. Such a relative position is for numerous reasons far more advantageous to us than a direct conquest of Kokan. Should our good relations cease and Kokan break out against us, the destruction of its independence would be to us a matter of necessity. Not admitting then the probability of hostile relations with Kokan, all cause for apprehensions for the safety of our communications with Namangan must naturally disappear.

On the strength of the above considerations I made the following propositions in my answer to the Emir, which was partly by letter and partly by word of mouth; they were the preliminaries to final negotiations for which he was to send an agent to the Governor General:—

(a).—The recognition of our right of proprietorship over all the lands recently conquered, and acceptance of the deserts and Kizyl-Kum sands as the Russian boundaries;

(b).—The reduction of the duties imposed in Bokhara on Russian goods to the level of those levied by us on Bokharian products;

(c).—The concession of full liberty to, and the protection of, all our subjects in Bokhara; and

(d).—The reimbursement of all our military expenses for the last expedition.

The fourth clause I added chiefly with a view to the substitution of a demand for an indemnity by any other claim which it might be found necessary to make in case the altered circumstances should produce a change in the policy of the Government.

As a condition on which military operations would be stopped, I demanded the instant release of our merchants and their goods. But in order at the same time to assure the Government of Bokhara of the sincerity of our peaceful inclinations, I promised to endeavour to procure the immediate release of Bokharian subjects in Orenburg and their despatch, without delay, to the forts on the Syr-Daria, where, however, they should bide the return of our own merchants from Bokhara to the same river.

Being vested with no authority, the Emir's envoy did not take upon himself to give any assurances relative to these preliminary conditions; but with reference to the release of our merchants, he positively declared that the Emir would not delay their return, with their goods, free from all hindrances, and therefore begged that military operations might be postponed for at least a few days.

As regards my reply to the Khan of Kokan (see Appendix 47), I confined myself, in my letter, to proposing a joint protection of his traders and our own, and the equalization of the duties exacted on our side and in Kokand; I demanded, moreover, that he should do his utmost to prevent all his troublesome subjects from making inroads into our limits, and by no means allow his troops to cross to the right bank of the Syr-Daria. I considered it at that time premature to enter into any more detailed explanations. The Khan's envoy, on taking the letter and learning its contents, assured me that Hudoyar Khan would always faithfully obey the *commands* of Russian authorities,—a most significant and characteristic assurance, which, was more than once repeated later by emissaries from the Khan.

These negotiations and the considerations by which I was guided I reported at once to the Governor General of Orenburg, forwarding at the same time a copy of the whole correspondence.

Whilst conducting these negotiations I had to study to provide for our men at the front, and to find means for prosecuting our engineering works for which also no sums had yet been received.

It appeared on enquiry that the local revenues, placed partially under the control of the Military Governor, amounted at that time only to the insignificant sum of 822 roubles 1½ cobs.* (about £123), the rest having been applied to the payment of expenses incurred before my time, and to the payment of salaries to the officers of the local administration.† I had no other resources. In the Department of Issue there was, however, cash enough not alone to cover the pay of the troops and the cost of all their requirements, but even to admit of the advance to me of a loan—pending the receipt of the amounts already applied for—of as much as I then needed. The only difficulty was this—accord-

* Report to the Governor General of Orenburg, 30th November 1866, No. 1211.
12th December

† The amount of the revenue of Taskend in the preceding year did not, however, exceed 35,000 roubles, owing to the immunities that were granted.

ing to the new system of control, no sum could be applied to a purpose different from that for which it was assigned, and no issue in the form of a loan was permitted.

My extremity was so great that I was obliged to call a committee, composed of all the persons concerned in the disbursement of monies, such as the Intendant, the Chief of the Issue Department, and the officers who had recently arrived in the province to establish the new order of control, the officials from the Ministry of Finance and Control. I explained to them the nature of the pressing circumstances in which I was placed, the necessity for dispensing in this instance with the observance of the new regulations, and asked the sanction of the Committee for an advance, in the form of a loan, from the Issue Department to meet immediate wants. The responsibility for this departure from the rules I was myself, of course, obliged to assume. But there was no reason to apprehend that this course would involve any difficulties, since there was cash enough in the Issue Department, and since the receipt of the much-needed means which had long ago been applied for could not fail to arrive shortly. Without reference even to the necessity for providing instantly for the detachments, it was impossible to defer the prosecution of the engineering works. Any such delay might leave the troops without winter quarters, and might consequently produce amongst them sickness and mortality. It was resolved in Committee to sanction the advance of a sum of money pending the arrival of the funds demanded, throwing upon me the responsibility for this unavoidable departure from the regulations, and to acquaint the Governor General at once with this divergence from them,—all the members agreeing to report thereon to their respective superior authorities,—which was forthwith done.

The whole of the month of June passed in perfect quiet. The skirmishes on the line, owing to the unsettled state of the region and to the freedom of some of the bordering tribes of nomads from every restraint, were in themselves of no importance during that period. The intelligence arriving from Bokhara and Kokan was as satisfactory as could be desired. Immediately on the return of his envoy, the Emir did indeed allow our merchants to depart, after delivering up to them all their merchandise. This intelligence was highly gratifying, for had our merchants been wronged and suffered losses, we had not the wherewith to compensate them. The greater portion of the Bokharian goods sequestered in Orenburg in 1865 had long been sold and the proceeds given up to the Bokharians. We had certainly the option of renewing military operations, with perfect confidence in brilliant results, but from these our merchants would not have reaped any advantages.

In like manner, the Khan of Kokan also most conscientiously fulfilled the promises made by his envoy.

I was at this time much rejoiced by a letter from the Governor General, written from St. Petersburg immediately after the receipt of the news of the victory at Irdjar, but before the results of our further operations had become known. Among other things, the Governor General dwelt very strongly in his letter on the necessity for occupying Khodjend before coming to any terms with Bokhara. It was therefore to be hoped

that, as this had in the meanwhile been accomplished, the fact did not run counter to the views of the Government.

All these favorable circumstances gave us at last the opportunity to realize the settled purpose of the Government, *viz.*, to organize the internal administration of the province and to adjust the local revenues, which were in every respect matters of necessity. Radical reforms were out of the question, so also was the idea of making these departments answer every expectation; but at the least it was necessary to introduce those principles for a local administration, and for the assessment and collection of taxes, which are essential to a proper government of the province.

These views, however limited, in their practical application, provoked much greater difficulties than those that could stand in the way of even a resumption of hostilities, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops and the lack of material resources. The latter can always be obtained in one way or the other, and as regards soldiers, we all know how soon the fatigues of a campaign are forgotten when success attends them, and how much they prefer a life of military exploits to the monotony of peaceful occupations, and particularly to engineering labours. Mine was an ungrateful task. It was necessary to exercise a vigilant control, to enforce the observance of certain rules, and what was still more important, to impose duties and taxes upon the population in place of the immunities which they enjoyed. I had also to contend with the Mussulman expounders of the law. But it was full time at length to carry out the projects of the Government. Having by our military successes lowered the Emir (the head of the Mussulman spiritual class in Central Asia) in the estimation of the people, and thereby visibly weakened the influence of the spiritual class, it was all the more necessary at that time to hasten the accomplishment of the task. The native teachers of religion having witnessed the defeat of their head and chief, and feeling conscious that many of their order were seriously compromised in relations with Bokhara, became very subdued.

As I have observed before, I found on my return to Tashkend that the local revenues amounted to the modest figure of 800 roubles; yet I received, at the same time, an order to draw on the revenues the sum of 62,000 roubles which had been demanded on account of supplies for the troops, and that of 50,000 roubles for engineering works. Such an order could have been issued by Government only in the full expectation of a positive increase of the local revenues, for in the preceding year, the whole of the revenue of Tashkend was limited to a total of 38,000 roubles.

With respect to internal administration and to the collection of taxes, the province entrusted to my charge was composed at that time of two totally distinct parts; the former Syr-Darian line, with the territory from Julek to Tokmak inclusive, annexed during the period from 1859 to 1864, composed then the Turkistan district, for the administration of which a plan had already been settled, although it had not been brought into operation merely for want of time and of officials. All the remaining portion of the region, from Tashkend to Khodjend and Naú, was not only unprovided with any Imperial Regulations for its

government, but its annexation to the empire had not even yet been sanctioned.

The local revenues of the Turkistan district were carried to the account of general revenue of the empire, and had to be paid over intact to the local department of the Finance Ministry. But the revenues of the rest of the country not yet annexed to the empire, and perhaps only temporarily occupied by our troops, were allowed to be appropriated to extraordinary purposes. At that time all the settled population in the Turkistan district, and all the inhabitants generally of the Tashkend 'rayon,' were exempted from the payment of taxes* through the intercession of my predecessors. Fortunately these immunities expired in 1866, therefore, being of opinion that, irrespective of economical considerations, the grant of similar exemptions was calculated to produce more harm than good, I recommended the re-imposition of taxes in the region occupied before my advent, and the assessment of the people in the remaining portion of the province *from the day of its occupation by our troops.*

Prior to our rule in the region, the taxes imposed upon the inhabitants were of two kinds; there were permanent taxes based on the *Sharihat* or on the customs of the people, and so-called *Khan's* taxes, arbitrarily imposed by the Khan, and sometimes exceeding twice the amount of all the other taxes put together. Conformably with imperial directions, it was intended to do away entirely with the tribute to the Khan and to levy only the legal taxes. This measure was calculated to relieve the people of a heavy burthen, therefore there was no need to apply in their behalf for any fresh exemptions. And we had already conferred upon the people a great benefit by emancipating them from the tyrannous yoke of their former rulers.

Moreover, a system of exemption, followed by the imposition of taxes, has, in the period of transition, invariably produced murmurs and complaints.

I have already remarked, that when I arrived in the province the local authorities had but small means for carrying out the project of administration of 1865, and that there was a great lack of persons qualified to serve in the local government. As I said before, there were in the end of March only eight officers to fifteen posts, and of these six had been taken from the front. This deficiency was not made up even by June month. Not a single officer prepared for the service was sent out during that period. But as military operations had ceased, it was found possible to detach some perfectly reliable officers from the front who were competent to serve well in the internal administration. This and similar measures were taken in the beginning of June. A corresponding form of administration was at the same time introduced into the recently occupied districts.

For the purpose of promoting a more thorough acquaintance with the country, a statistical department was formed in the Military Governor's office, the expenses of which were defrayed from the local

* Excepting the so-called "customs dues," i. e., 1-40th of the value of all in-coming and out-going caravans, and a bazar impost.

resources,* and concurrently with all this, measures were adopted for arranging the heads of the different sources of revenue of the province, and for introducing some proper order into the system of receipts and issues. The Intendant Department of the district, established in 1865, had by this time succeeded in introducing some regularity in the *current* accounts, if not in thoroughly disentangling those of former times.

As regards the revenue accounts, they were wanting both in accuracy and regularity, because, owing to a want of time and of officials, local administration was as yet more a theory than a practice, and in some places no accounts were kept at all.

I am here bound to acknowledge that, neither during this state of confusion, nor later, when the accounts were in order, did it occur to me to discover any corrupt practices; and not alone that, but all who were engaged in the completion of this important work displayed great zeal in co-operating with me. But progress was impeded, *firstly*, by the novelty of the work, and *secondly*, by the fact that many of the officers were but little acquainted with the method of dealing with Government sums.

For example, collectors would deduct from the amount of revenue payable intact to the exchequer sums due to them on various accounts, and refund the balance. This could not be called corrupt practice, but the proceeding complicated the accounts and made it more difficult to act up to the regulations.

For all these reasons it was excessively difficult to make even the simple improvements that had long been called for; as for radical reforms, they were necessary only in Tashkend, where the inhabitants constituted only one-tenth of the whole population of the province. Besides, the reforms there applied merely to the establishment of civil law courts, which referred neither to the religion nor the customs of the people, and which were temporarily established by the local authorities to supply a pressing want.

The address presented to the Governor General of Orenburg by the inhabitants of Tashkend in the autumn of 1865 (see Appendix 24), plainly showed the object aimed at by the local religious class and by their head, the Kazy Kilian of Tashkend. Later events, also, proved how little reliance could have been placed even in the temper of the population, had the influence of the head of the Mussulman preachers not been weakened in one way or another. I had occasion to be dissatisfied with the Kazy Kilian on my arrival in the province, but for the nonce I was obliged to restrict myself to palliative measures with regard to him, in the form of advice, reprimands, &c., &c., &c. These measures to some extent served their end. He toned down in his conduct; he interfered less in the affairs of the officer in charge of the population; and in his relations with me he changed his insulting demeanour into an insinuating manner. With all that, he was a person of great importance. Confering as he did upon his nearest relatives all the principal religious offices and judgeship, and combining in his own person the chief spiritual and judicial powers, the Kazy Kilian of Tashkend was capable of doing us a great deal of injury notwithstanding that he was disliked by the people.

* The labours of some of the members of this department have been published in various journals.

Not to take advantage of the times, when the population had ceased to regard us with distrust, for improving this situation seemed to be a dereliction of duty.

I could have dealt with the Kazy Kilian of Tashkend in either of two ways.

By virtue of the powers then vested in the Military Governor of the province of Turkistan, I could have exiled the Kazy Kilian to a residence in Omsk, and in his place I could have appointed somebody who could be better relied upon. But while such a measure could not finally have secured us against a recurrence of the same circumstances, his banishment might have lent his relatives and adherents a pretext for proclaiming him a martyr to religious convictions, and even for turning him into a saint, although up to that time the people had not in the least been well disposed towards him. There was another method available by which, without converting the Kazy Kilian into a martyr, without even affecting his own religious privileges, there was a possibility of depriving all the religious class of Tashkend of those powers which were particularly damaging to our influence, a method which, by us as well as by others, had been more than once employed with great benefit under similar circumstances, and which had everywhere met with the sincere sympathies of the people.

This last method was the establishment of *mekhhkemé*, i. e., civil tribunals, for Mahomedan natives alone, similar to the courts established by the French in Algeria; the same were first instituted by us in the Caucasus in Yermolof's time, and subsequently popularized with great benefit by Field Marshal Prince Bariátinski. In no instance have the *mekhhkemé* ever excited, nor can they excite, the fanaticism of the natives, because the mollahs themselves take part in the adjudication on all matters that come before these courts, with others chosen from among the people, in the presence of an officer of the Government.

I was, however, firmly convinced that the establishment of *mekhhkemé* would prove beneficial, yet, considering how slight was our acquaintance with the region, and bearing in mind that there was never yet a measure applied well, and with even the best of intentions, and great, which was not regarded in a wrong light, I concluded that it was expedient to consult the people, or at least the most influential persons among them, on the subject of the proposed institutions. After explaining to the latter the nature of the innovation, I commissioned them to ascertain the opinion of the people. In the meanwhile I, of course, gathered this information myself through my interpreters. It appeared that the people very soon understood the advantages of these institutions, and even found in them much that resembled a system that had prevailed among them sometime previously. At all events, it was not before two months' later that I could apply myself to the establishment of a *mekhhkemé*,—the opening of the first institution of this kind in Tashkend took place only on the arrival of the Governor General in the province. But about three weeks previous to the opening ceremony, I sanctioned adjudication in this court in order practically to acquaint the people with the working of the system.

In addition to all this variety of cares, I had to take immediate steps for building quarters for the troops, and for forming Russian

settlements, however small, in Tashkend, in Khodjend, and at Chinaz. In Tashkend there were many private houses, but still not enough for our wants. To satisfy these, a space was appropriated in Tashkend for a European quarter; a town council was formed; a macadamised road was commenced, &c. At the same time a Russian school was built, partly by subscription and partly on local funds, in which it was intended to give elementary instruction to boys and girls.

Whilst all these measures for the organization of the province were in hand, it was found practicable to send a small detachment of troops to perform a minute survey of the head waters of the Chirchik (*Chatkal*), said to be rich in forests and the favourite haunt of bands of robbers.

CHAPTER VI.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISTURBANCES IN THE PROVINCE—DETENTION OF BOKHARIAN MERCHANTS IN OKENBURG—AGITATIONS IN BOKHARA AND KOKAN—RUMOURS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON A LARGE SCALE CONTEMPLATED BY US—LETTER OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL—VIEWS OF GENERAL KRYJANOVSKI ON THE CONQUEST OF KOKAN—DESIGNS AGAINST BOKHARA AND FORMATION OF A TASHKEND DISTRICT—REJOINDER—ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN THE PROVINCE—ACCEPTANCE OF TASHKEND AS A DEPENDENCY OF RUSSIA—ESTABLISHMENT OF MEKHKEME—ANNEXATION OF THE TRANS-CHIRCHIK REGION KHODJEND AND NAU—RELATIONS WITH KOKAN AND BOKHARA—RENEWAL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS—CAPTURE OF URATIUBE AND DJIZAKH—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S RETURN FROM THE CORPS OF OPERATION, AND HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE PROVINCE—PROJECTS FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION—GENERAL RESULT OF THE MEASURES OF 1866 WITH REGARD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FISCAL ORDER.

THUS, in proportion to our power and means, the essential requirements were satisfied. It was to be hoped that the steps taken would, if matters were steadily persevered in, bring forth sufficiently satisfactory results for the first year. There was all the more reason to hope so, because nothing in the region indicated the necessity of a call for a speedy resumption of hostilities. To add to this, information was received in the end of June, (O. S.) that the demand for money to cover the military expenses had been granted; that the money would in a short time come to hand, and that a special commission was coming from St. Petersburg to lighten the labours of the local authorities and to regulate the accounts for the past period.*

Unfortunately, however, our hopes on a calm continuance of peaceful occupations were frustrated. The mutual confidence between us and our neighbours, as well as the perfect tranquillity of the region—so identical with the former—continued only for a very short time.

A strange rumour reached us from Bokhara in the beginning of July to the effect that our merchants, after being first conscientiously allowed to depart from Bokhara with all their merchandise, were again detained by the Emir, who for some reason doubted the return of his own subjects, and fancied that we were harbouring some deep designs against him. It was said that troops were again gathering in Bokhara, and that the frontier forts were being strengthened. Then also came the news that disturbances and fears had arisen in Kokand, and in confirmation, as it were, of these strange rumours, there happened at this time an affray at our advanced posts at Nau with the Bokharian pickets, and the supply of timber from Kokan to Khodjend, which we so much needed for the works which we had already commenced, was put a stop to.

* A special commission under Colonel Bykof was sent out from St. Petersburg in 1866 for the purpose of revising and closing the accounts on the spot, and a sum of Rs. 4,00,000 was remitted to cover the non-estimated expenses incurred for military purposes. The commission was directed to open accounts from the date of the last expeditions so as to obviate as speedily as possible any confusion in the future. The accounts, therefore, for the expedition of 1866, were finished last year (1867), when a portion of the earlier accounts was also closed.

Without attributing particular importance to these rumours, I nevertheless considered it necessary to visit the advanced posts and to intimate to our neighbours that with all our great inclination to live in peace and concord with them, we should, without a moment's hesitation, recommence military operations if they showed the slightest intention of disturbing our good relations.

For this once the alarm was not followed by any serious consequences. I received on the road re-assuring news concerning our merchants. At that time, too, the Bokharians delivered up some natives who had been seized in the neighbourhood of Naú; it was this that had given rise to the conflict mentioned. Very soon after our good understanding with Kokan was re-established.

Two months had not elapsed since our occupation of Khodjend, and yet the inhabitants met me with bread and salt according to Russian custom, and with assurances of their great pleasure and happiness in becoming subjects of Russia (see Appendix 63). I had been met in the same manner on my return to Tashkend (see Appendix 64). In the address delivered to me on that occasion the more influential citizens of the town expressed themselves, in the name of the whole people, very strongly in favor of the contemplated establishment of *mekhkeké*. This was all the more significant, inasmuch as it deprived those who were against us of the power of spreading the report that this new institution was opposed to the will of the people.

A feeling of security seemed again to prevail in the region, but in fact that tranquillity which had commenced to reign no longer existed. Hostile conflicts and collisions happened, indeed, but rarely up to the resumption of military operations, and were of no significance,* but yet a perfect mutual confidence between us and our neighbours was not again restored. Various alarming rumours were incessantly current, the theme being almost always one and the same, for instance, that we were making preparations for aggressive operations on a large scale. Our merchants returned from Bokhara, but the merchandise of those in the rear on the way back was abandoned on the road by the Bokharian drivers; we had to send out Kirghizes to bring it to the forts.

Towards the end of July, I at last received a reply to my letter relative to further operations. But to my great regret this reply was not such as to encourage me in the work I had already commenced. Alluding in very complimentary terms to all that I had done, and without even making objections to my propositions, General Kryjanovski nevertheless seemed to desire an enlargement of the programme submitted by me. His Excellency did not limit his views to the occupation of Namangan, but considered it necessary to occupy the entire Khanat of Kokan and to extend our dominions to the celestial mountains and

* The affair of Kolesnikof's gold seekers, which gave rise to strange interpretations in some of our journals, is referable to this period. The affair happened within the sphere of operations of the detachment sent to survey the head waters of the Chirchik, not in the quarter of the province already pacified. The authors of the accounts of this business seem, by their extravagant statements, to have had no wish to receive the facts of the case from Kolesnikof himself (see No. 12 of the "Vest," 1867), and even after the publication of his explanation of it, they continued to give their own versions, whereby the facts, which of themselves spoke in our favour, were most unceremoniously distorted, and, instead of the praises which were due, brought down blame upon our administration.

the Bolors. This he proposed to accomplish without delay on the arrival of reinforcements and on his own arrival in the province. With this view I was recommended to "*assume a high tone towards Kokan and to treat Hudoyar Khan as a man who by his position should be a vassal of Russia. Should he take umbrage and operate against us,*" wrote the Governor General, "*so much the better, it will give us a pretext to close with him.*" The Governor General at the same time appeared to be dissatisfied with the relations which I had begun to establish with the Emir of Bokhara. My representations in favor of the release of the merchants in Orenburg and of their return to the Syr-Daria were looked upon by His Excellency as a concession on our part. With reference to the Emir, it was said in the letter, "*having beaten the Emir as you have done, everything must be demanded of, nothing conceded to, him*" at the same time His Excellency, fearing lest the Bokharian merchants, through oversight of the commandants, might escape from the forts on the Syr-Daria, considered their release inexpedient, so that the Bokharians were not allowed to depart from Orenburg to that river.

With reference to the internal administration, General Kryjanovski in the above letter announced a totally fresh scheme, and requested me to take immediate measures for carrying it out. I had, as it has been fully explained, already applied myself to the settlement of the important question of the local revenues; yet other and greater reforms were pointed out to me in this letter. Thus, among other things, I was directed "*to draw up a project for detaching the Turkistan district from Western Siberia, and from Tashkend*" (which was to give name to a new district the Governor General contemplated inaugurating). "*The boundary projects,*" he wrote, "*are to be formed on the spot with the aid of persons to be specially appointed for the service, to which I beg your Excellency will give your immediate attention.*" As no one was sent out for the execution of this work, it was necessary to make a selection from among the very limited number of persons in the region.

It will easily be conceived how embarrassing was the situation in which I was placed by this letter.

In questions so open as that of Central Asia he thinks that the course he prefers is unerring and the best for his country. I, of course, had no such assurance, more especially as the Governor General may have founded his instructions on prescripts of which I was totally ignorant, and calculated on resources which I neither commanded nor expected to possess. It was, at all events, evident that General Kryjanovski wished to change the moderate form of proceeding for one of more decided action. But it will doubtless be acknowledged by all that, in the interest of affairs themselves, it is essentially necessary for those participating directly in their settlement, with whom rest more or less independent rights of action, and who bear some degree of responsibility,—as was my case in the Central Asian question,—that it is, I repeat, essentially necessary for those to be thoroughly convinced before carrying it out that the method indicated to them for the settlement of such affairs is really the best that can be adopted; otherwise, it appears to me, it were irreconcilable with their conscience to continue in the direction of affairs; they ought, on the first opportunity, to retire and leave matters

in the hands of those who do not doubt the soundness of the proposed measures.

My opinion on the settlement of the Central Asian question has already been stated. By this opinion, in all that depended from me, I was guided from first to last. Yet the mode of action dictated to me by General Kryjanovski, and his schemes for the future, were diametrically opposed to my own unbiassed view of affairs—and one in which I had long been confirmed through its practical application. The old truism, that “it is the tone that makes the music,” would here most inevitably have been demonstrated, and applied, I may say, literally. The “*high*” tone which I was directed to assume, of course, excluded every kind of condescension on our part; whereas, from the view I took, it appeared to me that condescension, with a certain amount of firmness of course, was one of the most essential conditions for the permanent establishment of that mutual confidence which was evidently coming about between ourselves and our neighbours. With reference to Kokan, there was one more very important circumstance—besides those already mentioned—which could not be lost sight of; even by the annexation of Namangan only one-third of Kokan would have passed into our hands, the other two-thirds of the Khanat on the left bank of the Syr-Daria would have still remained to be conquered (see Appendix 83). Truly, in military operations against Kokan our success would have been undoubted, and easier too than in the direction of Bokhara, but for the actual occupation of the Khanat we should have been obliged to employ all the expected reinforcements and at the same time to have located them there for the winter in any quarters we might have found. Under these circumstances, and while the Emir’s very natural enmity would continue to last, we might very easily have found ourselves in the spring of 1867 in a situation not a whit better than that which we occupied in the spring of the year 1866.

The designs of General Kryjanovski might, however, possibly have undergone a change on his arrival in the province, and after some insight into the position of affairs. But the detention of the Bokharians in Orenburg, while our merchants, released from Bokhara, were already on their way with all their goods to the Syr-Daria, was an accomplished fact, and it was much to be feared that this would be found to be the cause of the perturbations arising in the province.

In my answer to the letter I did not screen from His Excellency any one of my apprehensions or withhold any of my convictions. I also humbly begged to be allowed to conduct affairs as I had commenced them, at least until the arrival of the Governor General himself. This answer was despatched without any delay.

I received no fresh instructions after this, and in the middle of August (O. S.) the Governor General himself arrived in Tashkend.

On his entry into the town, His Excellency was received in great state by all the inhabitants, and the leading citizens, in the name of all, presented him with the bread and salt, and with an address in which they urgently begged the acceptance of their allegiance to Russia. But it was remarkable that, in this fresh address (see Appendix 68) the Tashkendians did not, as in the address of last year, express any other

particular desires, but begged only that their town might be made a component part of the empire and placed on an equal footing with its other portions.

With regard to this, the following passage occurred in the address:—

“In one sea there are not two seas, consequently also in one empire there cannot be two empires, so take it then upon yourself to recommend the annexation of our district to Russia as a part always to belong to her on an equality with the other parts of the empire.”

In the same address the Tashkendians, alluding to the beneficial results accruing to them through the establishment of Russian rule in the province, spoke with especial praise of the *mekhkeké*. On this subject it was said in the address—“A *mekhkeké* has been established which, dealing justly, disinterestedly and impartially, settles our affairs in perfect accordance with the rules of our religion and our popular customs.”

This could not but be taken as an evidence of a circumstance most favorable to us,—a diminution of the influence of the religious party.

On his arrival in the province the Governor General approved all my proceedings with respect to both military and civil affairs, abandoned his own schemes for the settlement of the province and fell in with my own plans. In the military operations, which commenced soon after, General Kryjanovski, although himself present with the troops, left me in command of the corps and confined himself to general directions, reserving to me the management of all the details. Such relations with the superior of the province could not but be a source of great pleasure to myself and it stimulated my zeal for the service. But with all that there was still one circumstance which could not but embarrass me. However much I desired to do so, I could not persuade His Excellency to look upon Kokand with a more amicable, or lenient eye. On his arrival at Tashkend, General Kryjanovski immediately reported to St. Petersburg on the necessity of commencing decisive operations against Kokand without delay.

On this point my own views and those of my superior were frequently in collision. Thus, for example, General Kryjanovski blamed the Khan of Kokand for the attacks made by parties of robbers, and for the concentration of his forces on his own territories.

It was my opinion that the Khan of Kokand simply had not the means wherewith to put a stop to the inroads of predatory parties, and that the concentration of his troops in Kokand was merely the very natural consequence of the concentration of our own troops in Khodjend, which began immediately after the arrival of the Governor General in the province.

As our relations with Kokand had not yet been definitely settled, his measures for self-defence were but natural and lawful. It must at the same time be observed that, simultaneously with the adoption of these measures for self-defence, the Kokandians sent me two letters: one was from the highest dignitaries in Kokand, and the other from the Khan himself. In both of these letters (see Appendices 54 & 60) was expressed not only a disinclination to war against us, but also a perfect readiness to enter into the most stable friendly relations. In each of these letters it was said that the bearer—a Kokandian of rank—was empowered to express minutely the desires of the inhabitants, and that whatever he

asserted was to be believed. The bearer testified to the desire of the Kokandians to become subjects of the "White Czar." These letters were then and there submitted to the Governor General.

The sincerity of the amicable disposition of the Kokandians was proved by their conduct during the military operations against Bokhara, which commenced soon after.

Little qualified as I may have been to consider my own views as faultless, my apprehensions of evil consequence from the advance against Kokand, projected by the Governor General, were very burdensome. I must confess that if I did not there and then insist on my recall, it was purely on the grounds of the apparent inevitability of hostilities with Bokhara. There were other reasons why I wanted to withdraw, if only for a time: two journeys from St. Petersburg to Tashkend and a close application to business, had greatly fatigued me. However, General Kryjanovski promised to grant me leave to go to Russia in the winter.

I do not know what our projects with regard to Kokand would have ended in had circumstances not compelled us to turn our entire attention to Bokhara.

On the Governor General's arrival in Tashkend the Emir was at once made acquainted with the fact, and was invited, in case he wished to make peace with us, to send a delegate immediately (see Appendices 73 & 74). Pending this His Excellency occupied himself with internal affairs and with reviewing the troops.

The forces were found, according to General Kryjanovski's report, to be in a somewhat improved condition as compared with that of last year. Constant campaigns and movements did not, of course, allow of their being brought to the desirable state of perfection; there was yet much to be done for their improvement, organization and formation. But with all their defects, the troops had been specially favoured in the last year of 1865, through the representation of the same Inspector, with the "Imperial thanks" conveyed to them through an Aide-de-Camp from St. Petersburg, and there was the more hope of their attaining the desired perfection, seeing they were already improved since then.

Being commissioned by His Imperial Majesty to accept the allegiance of the inhabitants in case the latter should reiterate their request to be made subjects of Russia, General Kryjanovski announced to them that they should be so constituted. Upon this the inhabitants of the Trans-Chirchik District also applied to the Governor General with urgent petitions to the same effect, and the inhabitants of Khodjend and of other localities followed in their wake, so that all the country to Khodjend and Naû inclusive, occupied by us up to May 1866, became for ever subjected to Russia.

The announcement of the acceptance of their allegiance was made by General Kryjanovski with becoming solemnity, and the opening of the *mekhkemé* in Tashkend was attended on the same day with like ceremony. At this opening, the Governor General stated, in my presence, to an assembly of the inhabitants *that he considered my services in the matter of the establishment of the mekhkemé quite as important as the victory at Irájar*. I cannot omit to mention that at a lunch given on this occasion by Mr. Serof, the Controller of the population, the inhabitants from various other localities, who had come to the celebration,

appealed to the Governor General with requests for the establishment of similar *mekhkemes* amongst them.

In a short time an answer came from Bokhara, intimating that a delegate would soon arrive to conclude a treaty of peace. As the Governor General intended to proceed early in September to Khodjend, where, as it has been observed, the troops began to concentrate immediately on his arrival in the province, the embassy from Bokhara was consequently sent to that place. As a base for operations, Khodjend then offered undoubted advantages; that point commanded all the most convenient approaches to Bokhara, by way of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, as well as to Kokand, and to Namangan.

The Governor General's arrival in Khodjend, in the first days of September, was immediately followed by that of the embassy from the Emir (see pp. 71, 72). The envoy on this occasion was a very great and influential personage in the Khanat of Bokhara; Karili was the chief of the religious class of the capital, a man who was on intimate terms with the Emir's family, even during the reign of the present ruler's father, and who had always commanded special confidence and respect. The envoy gave assurance in the Emir's name of his master's perfect readiness to fulfil all our demands, as it was also written in the letter he presented. When it came, however, to the question of an indemnity, the envoy spoke first in terms of evasion, saying he had no authority on the subject, and then begged us to be lenient.

It was more difficult for us to make concessions at this time, when the Bokharians had collected their troops and strengthened their forts, than it had been at the time when Bokhara was unarmed, as in July, month. For this reason, the Governor General found it impossible to agree to any concessions (see App. 73), and declared to the envoy that, if in the course of ten days no indemnity were forwarded, military operations would be renewed. At the very same time I was ordered by His Excellency to prepare everything for a campaign and for a march, with such calculation, that on the tenth day we might enter within the limits of Bokhara.

The ten days' term was to expire on the 23rd September (5th October), and as no intelligence was received from the Emir when it elapsed our column entered the Khanat. The military operations thus commenced placed in our hands the forts of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh; the first was taken by storm on the ^{2nd}/_{14th} and the second on the ^{18th}/_{30th} of October. The small fort of Zaámin, as the enemy did not attempt to defend it, was seized without shot (see Appendices 51 & 52). Time alone can, of course, determine which of the two frontiers was the best,—that which I had previously traced across the hungry Steppe, or that which we obtained in consequence of our new conquests. Anyhow, it was a cause of great satisfaction that on the recommencement of hostilities in the year 1866, military operations were conducted in the direction of Bokhara instead of Kokand. Besides acquiring thereby a position which served better to protect the region occupied by us than that in which we should have found ourselves placed through the occupation of Kokand, we reduced, by operations against Bokhara, an enemy most dangerous to us; whereas by operations against Kokand we should

have weakened the perpetual rival of Bokhara, and a ruler, too, who at that time evidently sought the protection of Russia.

Shortly after the capture of Jizakh, a deputation arrived in our camp from Shuhr-i-Subz and other localities in our front, begging us to continue our advance, and professing a readiness to co-operate with us. But the lateness of the season, and a disinclination to extend our conquests beyond the range of mountains forming the southern wall of the plain of the Syr-Daria, induced the Governor General to arrest our progress. The troops were put into winter quarters and, as a matter of course, a detachment strong enough in itself—of 10 companies, 12 guns, and 3 “sotnias” of Cossacks—was left in Jizakh.

Simultaneously with the cessation of military operations, a proclamation was issued to the inhabitants, in which the peaceful residents were informed of the causes of the commencement and termination of hostilities and requested to have no fears, but to return quietly to their homes and resume their peaceful avocations (see Appendix 53).

On the day after the capture of Jizakh, the Governor General received a telegram from St. Petersburg in answer to his propositions relative to Kokand, in which the disinclination of the Government to extend our limits was very positively stated. The Government insisted on an adherence to the instructions which had been given on the strength of the achievements of May 1866. These, framed by the Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs, were merely to the following effect:—“Should the inhabitants of Tashkend and of other localities occupied by our troops in that region renew their requests to be adopted as our subjects, in order to obtain protection against the designs of the Emir, His Imperial Majesty is graciously pleased to permit of their being constituted subjects of Russia.”

In the end (O. S.) of October, General Kryzhanovski returned to Tashkend, and on the ^{1st}/_{13th} of November left for Orenburg. On his departure, His Excellency handed me a draft of new regulations for the province, but at the same time gave me leave to construct a fresh plan in case I objected to his draft, and to proceed to Orenburg and St. Petersburg in order to report personally upon all the schemes.

A committee of officers of long service in the province, was called in Tashkend to consider the new regulations contained in the draft which had been made in the chancery of the Governor General.

Upon careful consideration of this draft, the committee could not agree with many of its leading principles, whereupon fresh projects were sketched of military and civil administration. I ought to observe that, in my own opinion, it was better to put off the drawing up of new regulations. It appeared to me that we were yet too little acquainted with the region to establish any. But in compliance with orders, I proceeded to draw up a project in which, however, the existing order of things was as far as possible retained, and which allowed of a new system being gradually introduced according to the judgment of the local authorities.

I was enabled through the termination of military operations to revert to the labours connected with the settlement of the internal administration and the local revenues; but even during the six weeks which

I passed in the province after the departure of the Governor General, I had once more to tear myself away from my peaceful occupations in order to visit our advanced line, where it was necessary to make final arrangements for the coming winter. This journey occupied about two weeks, but nevertheless the projects of administration drawn up by the committee over which I presided myself, were finished and despatched to Orenburg in the beginning of December.

The extremely unsatisfactory condition of the existing forms of direction, and the utter impossibility of removing their defects without the necessary means to do so, were candidly expressed in these projects, (see Appendix 84), for whilst a reticence under the circumstances might have injuriously affected the cause, the local administration had no reason to screen anything. Never and nowhere have people yet been blamed for not having had the strength to accomplish impossibilities. It was out of the question to introduce order even into the military administration so long as the various staffs remained the same as when the dimensions of the province were half as small, when the number of troops was considerably less, and so long as the officers in the service, while fulfilling the current duties of their respective offices, were being constantly diverted from them by military operations and other calls of the service, which in their turn were equally imperative.

As regards the organization of the civil branch, this complicated question having been only very recently taken up, and the number of officials qualified for this service being so very limited, the impossibility of putting this branch into a satisfactory working condition could not have been more self-evident. *

What was, however, practicable in this matter was not neglected. While the number of officials in the civil branch had almost doubled in consequence of the extension of the province, no fresh supply of trained officials was sent from St. Petersburg in 1866, yet it was then directed that all the berths should be filled by December, and that the officers appointed should remain constantly at their posts; the appointments were accordingly all made, one officer being drawn from the Caucasus (see Appendices 77 & 78). Most of the officers selected were taken from the various bodies of troops; among twenty-two officers in departments of the Civil Administration in December month, three alone were Civilians, thirteen were officers of the regular forces, and six were Cossacks. Nevertheless, very few of these failed to justify the confidence that was placed in them.

It is incumbent on the Chief of a fresh and remote region to give his serious attention not alone to whatever complaints may reach him, but sometimes even to rumours, although the latter are very frequently the result of misunderstanding and "ennui," &c. I did so. Yet, as the results of information laid before me and of legal investigation, corrupt practices were discovered only in two instances. One of these referred to a man who was not concerned in the civil administration, and in the other the person implicated had only just been appointed. The same cannot be said of the natives who held appointments in this service.

Over these, too, supervision was of course exercised, and they were sometimes subjected to a severe punishment; but, doubtless, no little time will elapse before all the natives accustom themselves to the idea, which is perfectly new to them,—that a power given by

Government should not be employed for self-enrichment. The appointments that were made were, of course, only the first steps towards the establishment of a desirable order in the province; and, as by these first steps the affairs of the province were being brought under the more immediate actual control of the organs of the Government, it may be inferred that, as they showed in the end, they were also in the beginning, not without good results.* The appointment of Russians to the posts of supervisors of the population, assistant supervisors, &c., throughout the entire region, very materially conduced, with other causes, *firstly*, to the fact that during the whole of the year 1866, as during the winter of 1866-67, not a single mail was robbed, and that no other mal-practices of a serious nature occurred within it, and, *secondly* to that, that the transition from immunities to imposts—a transition not lightly or pleasantly borne in any country—was effected, I shall not say without murmurs or complaints, but without any great difficulties.

With reference to the establishment of a system in the accounts of local revenue, even during the presence of the Governor General in the region, returns of income and expenditure were rendered to His Excellency from all parts where the collection of taxes constituted part of the duty of the Military Governor (see pp. 79, 80). Owing to the novelty of the work, the returns of income were, of course, only approximative. At the end of the year, similar returns were rendered to the Governor General for all the other portions of the region, excepting Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, which had only just been annexed (see app. 81). By this time the accounts were so accurately kept that the Supreme Government was not alone made acquainted with all the sources and amounts of the revenue of the province, but was likewise enabled to assign these sums to the purposes it considered they would best serve. Towards the end of the year 1866, the regularity established in the accounts of receipts and expenditure was such that it was possible in 1867 to render monthly returns to the Governor General.

The first returns of this nature, giving every detail from the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ April 1866, were rendered up to the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ February (see Appendix 82).

These accounts showed all the receipts to have amounted to R. 262,455-15 $\frac{1}{4}$ cop. (about £39,368),* and the expenditure incurred by Imperial authority, or that of the Governor General, limited, for the same period, to R. 199,205-37 $\frac{1}{4}$ cop. (about £29,880), leaving a credit balance of R. 63,249-78 cop. (about £9,487).

The local revenues having considerably increased since the abolition of immunities, *i. e.* since the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ of July, the sum of R. 262,455-15 $\frac{1}{4}$ cop. properly represents the income for the last seven months and not for all the ten months. Consequently, the approximative return of annual revenues from the Tashkend and Khodjend "rayons," submitted in the month of August to the Governor General, showing R. 370,000 (about £55,500), was very nearly correct.

Besides the incomes from Tashkend, Khodjend and other newly occupied portions of the region under the charge of the Military Governor, incomes were derived from the former Syr-Darian line, from Turkistan and other places (see Appendix 81) which amounted to R. 165,533

* Calculating at 3s. to the Rouble.

(about £ 24,830) ; so that the entire local revenue amounted, during the first year, to no less than Roubles 530,000 (£79,500).

There were other measures adopted in 1866 for the settlement of the region which were not fruitless of good consequences. Besides the new points of Oura-Tiubé, Zaámin and Jizakh, our troops had elsewhere, generally speaking, satisfactory hospitals and quarters for the winter. Notwithstanding the scanty means that had been available for the purpose, the Russian settlements in Khodjend and Chinaz were tolerably well constructed. In Chinaz, which was only founded in April, and in which there was only one house in July, there were, in addition to the barracks, to an excellent hospital and to officers' quarters, 72 private houses constructed by the month of October. In Tashkend, a macadamised road was completed, and the buildings in the European quarters of the town, commenced in the summer, were very far advanced; some tolerably handsome buildings were even finished.

My last visit to the advanced lines, performed at the close of the month of November, finally convinced me that, owing to the precautions taken, there was no cause for apprehension of any serious operations on the part of Bokhara during the approaching winter, notwithstanding the close proximity of Samarcand.

As regards Kokand, during the whole period of my direction of the affairs of the region, I not only failed to observe anything hostile in the behaviour of the Khan, but on the contrary experienced an eager desire on his part to enter into closer amicable relations with us. We again twice exchanged friendly letters and presents in the month of November and in the beginning of December (see Appendices 75, 76, 74, 73). The first Russian trading caravan left for Kokand before my departure from the province. This caravan was not the last; others followed, as I learned, so that I conclude our merchandise has found a profitable market in that khanat.

Whilst the Governor General was in the province of Turkistan, the Chief of the Orenburg Customs District and the so-called Steppe Commission arrived in it. The latter, composed of four members,* was organized in the beginning of the year 1865, the first object of these Commissioners was to travel through the Kirghiz Steppes, and afterwards to draw up a new scheme of regulations to apply to the Kirghizes alone. When the limits of the province of Turkistan were subsequently extended, the Commissioners were deputed to travel through it also with the same object. All those who visited the region afterwards, collected information about it which has served since to throw greater light upon the whole question.

On the ^{11th}/_{23rd} of December I took my departure from Tashkend, having thus performed the duties of Military Governor of the Turkistan province for a period of eight months and sixteen days, of which nearly four months were passed in campaigns. Therefore if in my time anything was done for the advantage of the region, I must of course consider myself much indebted to my late colleagues for their sincere attachment to their duties and for their honest zeal.

* Acting Privy Councillor Hirz of the Ministry of the Interior, Colonel (now Major General) Heins, of the War Ministry, Major General (the late) Gutkovski of the Orenburg region, and Lieut.-Colonel Protzenko, of Western Siberia.

CHAPTER VII.

RECAPITULATION.—TURKISTAN CONSTITUTED A MILITARY DISTRICT AND GOVERNOR GENERALSHIP—A FEW WORDS ON THE ROADS AND TRADE.

THE preceding sketch of occurrences on our Central Asiatic Frontier during the period from 1854 to 1866, inclusive, will, it is hoped, sufficiently explain the real significance of all that latterly transpired in the region. A careful consideration of each fact, and of the whole combination of circumstances by those who have not visited the region must lead them to the conviction that all the later events on our Central Asiatic Frontier were the direct consequences of a scheme that had been very long in contemplation, and which had been favoured with His Imperial Majesty's approval in the year 1854. But the vastness of the scheme, and the then prevalent ignorance with regard to the region, entirely prevented the execution of the complicated task according to the detailed plan originally drawn up. Confining itself to general directions, and making these applicable only to the time being, the Government nevertheless held firmly to, and pursued its chief original idea. During the period between the years 1854 and 1865, the Government scheme was actually carried out; the advanced lines of Orenburg and Western Siberia were finally closed, and at the same time we obtained beyond the steppes fertile tracts of land upon which, without inconvenience, we could concentrate an adequate number of troops. Here the Government proposed to halt. But it was exactly at this point, that those unlooked for events occurred which, being but the natural results of circumstances, interfered temporarily with the regular course of affairs.

The unauthorised occupation of Tashkend, and the accomplishment of this, too, at a time when the reinforcements for the province had not yet arrived, placed us in a very embarrassing position with regard to our Central Asiatic neighbours. Not having sufficient troops wherewith openly to counteract their hostile designs, the character of which was of course aggravated by our occupation of Tashkend, we were by degrees forced to take measures which rendered our own situation more and more difficult. The cessation of trade; the detention of our envoys by the Emir of Bokhara and the attempt to recover them by force of arms, and finally the unsuccessful advance on Jizakh—without exaggeration it may be said—placed at stake all our fresh acquisitions in Central Asia.

In the spring of the year 1866 we were compelled to engage in a war with Bokhara under circumstances which to us were extremely unfavourable. Being far from well settled in the province, and lacking everything, we were obliged to sustain ourselves in a struggle against the chief potentate in Central Asia, who, besides possessing great political and spiritual influences, was regarded by the native population as an invincible conqueror, and whose regular forces our soldiers had as yet never encountered.

The number of troops then in the province was about 13,000, but being obliged to preserve tranquillity in the interior of a province,

1,500 versts in extent, by means of scattered garrisons, the corps of operation mustered not more than 3,000 men. This number could be increased to 4,000 only towards the close of April by means of small contingents from the line of the Syr-Daria and from Western Siberia. As regards the main supports destined for the province, they were still at Orenburg in the month of April 1866—that is 2,000 versts from Tashkend. On the other hand, the forces assembled for action by the Emir, were not farther than 50 versts from our advanced detachments, and amounted, according to all accounts, to an enormous figure. There may have been great exaggeration in these rumours, but the numerical force of the army collected by the enemy was, without doubt, 60,000 or 70,000; in every case exceeding our military strength by *fifteen or twenty* times. It is true that, with the exception of some 5,000 or 7,000 regular Bokharian soldiers, the rest were in no way to be distinguished from the Kokandian troops with whom we were so well acquainted. But being composed of cavalry capable of moving swiftly from one place to another, they may have proved very dangerous to us, if we had suffered the least check or had shown any hesitation. The occupation of Ikan by Alimkul's hordes in the winter of 1864, and the abduction of our subjects on that occasion, were still fresh in the memory of the people.

Our decided victory at Irdjar averted all danger and dispelled the phantom invincibility of the Emir, and the subsequent occupation of Khodjend perfectly tranquillized the province. Besides finally annexing the Trans-Chirchik district and pacifying the country along the right bank of the Syr-Daria, we severed the Khanats of Bokhara and Kokand by taking Khodjend. But we failed to conclude an opportune treaty of peace with the Emir, and the misunderstandings that followed led to a resumption of hostilities.

This unfavorable eventuality arose partially from the fact of our having been obliged to go to war against Bokhara when we were ourselves unprepared for it, and perhaps more from the fact that the guiding power was 2,000 versts distant from the theatre of action, and could not correctly realize the true position of affairs, whilst the acting power on the spot neither wielded authority nor received instructions. Yet even these operations were not barren of good results. By the capture of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh in the autumn of the year we completely separated Kokand from Bokhara, and the whole valley of the Syr-Daria fell into our possession. In every case these acquisitions render it easier for us now to assume towards Bokhara, the attitude that may best suit our Government.

The behaviour of the Khan of Kokand during the whole of the year 1866 gave us hopes that that Khanat would submit to our influence, without recourse to military operations, even if only inasmuch as we could and had a right to expect. At all events, all our just demands and desires were promptly fulfilled. We abstained, however, from making any extravagant claims, and our relations steadily improved. Relations like these show that there is no reason yet to despair of the possibility of attaining desirable results in Central Asia without hostilities. In the event, however, of our good relations with Kokand being broken off in the future, military measures against Kokand, as it

now stands detached, will at least be easier than against Kokand in combination with Bokhara.

The operations of 1865 and 1866 could, of course, not have entered into the Government programme. The Government could in no way have desired operations attended with risk,—which in case of failure might have involved enormous sacrifices to retrieve entailed loss. But such operations having been commenced, the country being remote and utterly unknown, there was no other course but to rely upon the executive powers on the spot for the application of measures which would harmonise the original programme with the unforeseen circumstances which had arisen. The authorities in the region having but general instructions, very frequently took widely different views of one and the same question. Nevertheless the general results of the later operations proved in the long run to be satisfactory enough.

Our present position in the Kirghiz Steppes, and relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats are incomparably better than they were thirteen years ago, whilst our present military expenditure for the protection of our South-eastern frontiers, exclusive of the cost of campaigns, is hardly in excess of what it was before; if there is an excess, it is very insignificant when compared with the aggregate of advantages that we have gained.

It has been already shown that in 1854 twenty-three battalions of the line were employed in the protection of our steppes, besides the Cossack forces of the Ural, of Orenburg and Siberia, which lined the frontiers of the steppes. At the present time, in addition to these Cossack forces, (see Appendix 84,) there are only sixteen battalions of the line and one rifle battalion (see Appendix 87) in all the three military districts of Orenburg, Siberia and Turkistan. It is true that some of these line battalions have been substituted by local corps and that a brigade of Artillery has been newly organized, but with all that the numerical strength of the regular troops is not greater, but rather less than that of 1854. As regards the cost of local administration, the expenditure under this head is more than covered by the local revenue.

Almost simultaneously with the formation of the province of Turkistan a code of Imperial Regulations was issued for it, and it was enjoined that special attention should be paid to the adjustment of the local revenues. But the military operations which continued almost without cessation through the year 1865 and during the first six months of the year 1866 prevented the realization of these views of the Government also. Subsequently, that is, immediately after the occupation of Khokand, the code of Regulations and the local revenues engaged the unremitting attention of the local authorities. Towards the end of 1866 the newly occupied region was governed on the principles of a regular Russian province. The influence of Bokhara and Kokand and of the Mohannmedan priesthood over the people, so injurious to ourselves, sensibly declined. The exemption of the people from taxes was substituted by imposts; correct estimates of the revenues of the province were at length made, and order was introduced into the systems of accounts. By these accounts it appears that in the first year after the abolition of immunities, not only was the whole cost of the local administration

covered by the local revenues, but that a large surplus of the latter was transferred to the Imperial exchequer. Many expenses generally provided for in the Imperial estimates were charged against the local revenue; such as engineering works, formation of Russian settlements in the province, &c., &c.

Through the common efforts of the local administration, of the Governor General himself, of the members of the Steppe Commission and of other persons, the light thrown in 1866 on the Central Asiatic question has at least been so great that the Government has been able at last to lay down certain broad principles for its final settlement, although a variety of circumstances have of late rendered it still more complicated.

The opinions so obtained, with reference to the further conduct of political affairs in Central Asia and to the organization of the province, at a time when the question was not fully understood, were very different, and, in some instances, diametrically opposed to each other.

But notwithstanding all this difference of opinion some ideas already stand out in relief, with reference to which all who have considered the subject are almost entirely of one mind, and which, it is to be hoped, will aid in removing those Utopian fancies which have hitherto obscured the Central-Asiatic question.

Central Asia being so little known, it was regarded by some as so peculiar a country that neither our own experience nor that of any other people in the matter of governing a non-European race was considered available in it. Whilst we ourselves and all other nations, not excepting the English in India, have after much bitter experience arrived at the conviction that it is impossible to rule without a firm administration of one's own; it has been declared that in Central Asia such an administration is altogether superfluous and that the country should be governed upon some kind of peculiar principles. The suggestions made at the same time were so vague that it was not only impossible to analyze but ever to comprehend them. Now-a-days very few advocates will be found of a complicated system of administration with a large staff of officials; but an adequate number of the latter is indispensable. The only means perhaps by which we can secure a desirable position in Central Asia without extending our administration over any new countries, is by making the neighbouring khanats subordinate to us without entirely destroying their dependence.

For the final settlement of the question of the organization of the province, a committee was formed at St. Petersburg, other persons besides the members being invited to take part in the deliberations. The committee was composed of thirteen members*; all of them unanimously agreed on the necessity of establishing a regular and firm Russian administration in the province, and of giving the local Government all the means for conducting it. All the members, excepting the Governor General of Orenburg, were equally unanimous regarding the necessity of immediately separating the province from the Government of Orenburg and of forming a distinct Governor Generalship.

* President, General Miliútín, Minister of War; Members: General Kryjanovski, Governor-General of Orenburg; Count Heyden—Chief of the Etát Major, Privy Councillor Stremoukhof, Major General Romanovsk, Count Voronov Dashkof, both of his Majesty's Suite, Major General Cherniayef, State Councillor Mansurof, State Councillor Galkin, and four members of the Steppe Commission.

Confirming the opinion of the majority, His Imperial Majesty was pleased to command that *the late Turkistan region and a portion of the region of Semipalatinsk be converted into a new military district and into a new Governor Generalship of Turkistan, divided into two new districts called the Syr-Darian and Semirechensk districts.*

At the same time, from the projects prepared by the local authorities and the Governor-General the Steppe Commissioners drew up one of their own. In its construction, however, the Commissioners were chiefly guided by their own opinions. The principles of this last project were approved by the Council of Ministers. It was, however, resolved not to make it compulsory on General Kaufmann, the newly appointed Governor-General of the Turkistan Province, to act up to the project of the Commissioners, but to reserve to him the liberty of following those of the recommendations it contained which, after giving due consideration to this as to the other projects, it might seem to him more expedient to adopt.

Thus, we may, say with reference to the Central-Asiatic question, we have now seen the beginning of the end. Adequate means and powers have been granted to the local authorities. There is no doubt but that it will cost the local Government some time and trouble to bring the province into a satisfactory condition, and in one way or the other to establish durable relations with our neighbours. With respect to this the local administration will find guidance on the spot. Having myself left the region about a year ago, and being now far away from the theatre of action, I do not feel justified in touching upon these points of the subject.

There are, however, other sides of the Central-Asiatic question which may be greatly benefited by public discussion. There is no doubt that the province will be more quickly developed, and that it will become more speedily a source of profit to Russia if the lines of communication are perfected, and if Russian trade is more rapidly increased.

There have been up to this time, and are still, only two known ways of communication with the new province, and there are three other routes which have been proposed. Each of these has its advantages and disadvantages.

Of the two existing routes,—one proceeds by way of Samara, Orenburg, Fort No. 1, and then along the valley of the Syr-Daria; the other goes from Kazan to Omsk and Fort Vernoë. The first is the shortest, but it lies, for the most part, across Steppes, and having been more recently established than the second is on the whole the least convenient of the two, although it offers no extraordinary difficulties.

Of the three newly proposed routes, one lies from Kresnavodsk bay, on the Caspian, along the old bed of the Amu-Daria (Oxus) to its present estuary, another traverses the Ust-Urt from Mertvi-Kultuk bay to Chernishef bay in the Aral Sea, and the third runs from Kazala (Fort No. 1) across the Baziakúksands to the mouth of the Emba.

All these three new routes offer undoubted advantages,—*firstly*, because during summer they considerably shorten the overland transport, for when the roads are opened and steam-boat-communication is established the whole overland transport, for instance from Nijai to Khodjend, by the second of these newly proposed roads across the Ust-Urt, will be

no more than 300 versts; *secondly*, because they facilitate and shorten the communication between the new province and the Caucasus,—which is in many respects of very great importance.

There is no doubt that whilst on the one hand it will be necessary for a long time to come to keep a large body of troops in the Caucasus, on the other, we shall also for a long time to come with a small number of soldiers be able to do a great deal in Central Asia. Experience has proved to us that it now takes two years to move troops from the Volga to the Turkistan district. But it would take only a few weeks to transport troops from the Caucasus if a road were laid down in one of the new directions, and considering the immense force in the Caucasus, the detachment of two or three battalions—quite an army in Central Asiatic—from there, would be a matter of no inconvenience, so that with easy communication there would be no necessity of maintaining a special reserve in the new province.

The first of the newly proposed routes along the old bed of the Amu-Daria offers, we are informed, no natural obstructions for laying a road, and is perhaps preferable to either of the three. But there is no doubt also that, with the increase of caravan traffic, we should have to maintain along this road a considerable military force for the protection of trade against the Turkmen who are the most warlike and numerous race of people in those parts. The second route being the shortest, offers every advantage; only the artificial improvements in this direction would probably have to be greater than in the two others.* Lastly, the third route from Kazala to the mouth of the Emba has, as far as we know, no natural impediments; only it is more circuitous than the others, and would also cost a great deal in improvements.

Whichever one of the old or new routes may be chosen as the most convenient and best, the cost of making a good road will nevertheless be considerable. Therefore, the sooner the choice is made, the sooner shall we derive practical benefits from the result.

Commercial relations with Central Asia, as with Asia generally, offer to Russia so many advantages that they have existed and developed even under inauspicious circumstances, but especially since we first felt the benefit of the cotton supply from that country. Thus, for example, from 1825 to 1850 the increase of trade between Russia and Europe represented 43 per cent., whereas with Asia it increased more than 300 per cent. Circumstances being now still more in favor of the Central Asiatic trade, we may expect to see it increase to a very important degree. These expectations are in a measure justly based on the discoveries and acquisition made in the region during the later years. For example, it has been found that American cotton may be grown in Turkistan, and there is no lack of suitable land for raising cotton crops, some expenditure being of course incurred for irrigation. Khodjend and the

* This route engaged the special attention of General Field Marshal Prince Bariatsinski during his administration in the Caucasus. A railway for this part was even then projected. But, as I was personally informed by the prince, his main object was a speedy and minute survey in this direction.

† In 1866 I commissioned Major Mikhailoff to proceed to collect information of the country in this direction: that officer, without even a convoy, profiting only by his knowledge of the Kirghizes, succeeded in making his way to Fort Kazbek on the Emba,—70 versts about its estuary.

district beyond the Syr-Daria are rich in silk. There are hopes, too, of finding gold and silver ores; coal beds have already been discovered not far from the Syr-Daria.

Thus, there is reason enough to expect that, notwithstanding the remoteness of the region, or the fact of its being yet very little known, Russian trade will become permanently established within it, and will develop. And there is all the more reason for these expectations because the Government, solicitous in the cause of the speedy promotion of Central Asiatic trade, contemplates, it is said, the adoption in a short time of some very judicious measures.

There is a talk of the total abolition of the customs as regards the Central Asiatic khanats, and of an imposition of guild-dues, which Central Asiatics do not as yet pay in Russia.

These measures would now be very opportune. The profits to the exchequer, from the Orenburg customs line, are insignificant, whilst the formalities, the loss of time and other drawbacks to which Asiatic caravans are liable in passing through our custom houses, produce a very bad impression on the natives. Those who have chanced to converse with Central Asiatic merchants who have conducted caravans through our custom houses, have, of course, observed the dread with which the latter have referred to our searchers and to the custom house drum. There is no doubt but that this impression alone, exclusive of other considerations, would operate very injuriously against our Central Asiatic trade, if the earlier scheme of removing the customs line to the Syr-Daria and to Tashkend were carried out. This, however, seems to be abandoned, and the intention is to abolish the Orenburg customs line altogether.

The permission granted to Central Asiatic merchants to trade in Russia without paying guild-dues was perhaps beneficial in its time, but now, when our merchants can themselves freely go to Tashkend and Khodjend, and even farther, there is, it seems, no necessity for continuing this exemption, whilst it is now an injustice to our own merchants.

Besides this, in concluding a treaty of peace with the Emir, which will probably not be long delayed, our Government will, doubtless, not overlook the interest of our merchants, but see that all they have long, and justly desired, with reference to Bokhara, shall at last be conceded to them.

After that it will be hardly fair to wish the Government to exert itself any more for the promotion of Central Asiatic trade. It is very desirable that our mercantile class should itself co-operate to this end, to the utmost of its own endeavours. Our merchants will certainly find the means to do this if they set to work with a good will. The arrangements in this matter made by the Government in 1865, which met with the active support of the Moscow merchants, will greatly conduce towards success. On the strength of this arrangement some of the leading commercial houses of Moscow formed themselves in the beginning of the year 1866 into a Moscow-Tashkend trading society, whose object was to open direct relations between Moscow and Tashkend, and to supply the latter, with all articles of trade that are required by native as well as by Russian residents at the most moderate prices. The

operations of this society would confer a real blessing on the Russian people thrown into that remote country where they are obliged frequently to pay fabulous prices for utterly worthless commodities; but what is still more important, by establishing a regular trade this society would undoubtedly cause the demand for Russian productions to increase immensely, and would thus powerfully aid in extending our trade throughout Central Asia generally. A society like this would have no need for conducting its business in secrecy; it might court the fullest publicity in its operations. In our time it is hardly necessary to prove that publicity in trade, as in every other business is the best safeguard against erroneous interpretations and serves best to obviate temptation, and speculation which are prejudicial to every affair.

Far from considering myself a competent authority in matters of commerce I touch only on those sides of the question on which I have had the opportunity to rectify my former opinions by consulting those people better informed than myself. It is very likely there are many other more serviceable measures which might be applied for the promotion of trade.

In this respect, and throughout the whole of this sketch generally, I have preferred to confine myself merely to an indication of certain facts and projects, a proper consideration of which may lead to a speedier practical solution of the whole question.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

Report of Colonel Zimmermann Commanding the Troops in the Trans-Ili District, to the General in Command of the Detached Corps of Siberia, August 28th, 1860.

I have the honor respectfully to report to Your Excellency that, on the 23rd August, the force under my command moved in two columns in order to pass the ridge which separates the Trans-Ili District from the river Chû. The left column, under Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanoff, composed of 300 Cossacks, two mountain guns, one rocket apparatus and a commissariat train of 250 camels, ascended the valley of the river Kastek, then proceeded through that of its affluent, the Syr-djaz, and further over a pass at the head of the river Karakunas; this was the shortest route and the most abundant in fodder and water, not having such an ascent as the Bish-Mainak route, and in convenient for wheeled carriages, only on account of the narrowness of some parts of the defiles, where even the mountain artillery had to be carried on the camels' backs. The right column, under my own command, composed of all the infantry of the force, two field battery guns and four light field pieces, three rocket stands, an engineer and artillery park and a field hospital, crossed the Bugû-Mayus and then proceeded over the Bish-Mainak Pass.

The passage over the mountains was exceedingly difficult. The country very much resembles Daghestan, and only differs from it by a total absence of wood and by its small supply of water, which rising in mountain springs, only flows in small rivulets through the defiles.

On the 23rd August, the right column halted for the night at the spot where the Bugû-Mayus issues from the defile on to a plateau, and on the 24th, it made a very difficult march of 15 versts to a locality called Baladjian-Saz. A company of pioneers under Sub-Lieutenant Hakkel was sent on in front to clear the more difficult parts of the road. It was more particularly difficult to bring the battery guns down the mountain slopes and to get them up steep inclines. In some places the mountain paths along which the detachment proceeded wound along ledges of rocks. Battery guns would hardly be taken in the Caucasus along such paths. The two 20-pr. howitzers which accompanied the detachment, were attended by fifty foot soldiers, who lowered them with ropes. The Baladjian-Saz locality has probably an elevation of 6,000 feet; at night the thermometer fell to 20 Reaumur. I left there for the day a part of the force, consisting of two companies of infantry, and the field battery which was led by Major Ekeblad, and the camels that showed most fatigue, while with the remainder of the force went over the pass on the 25th August, and performing a march of about thirty versts, descended to the plateau at the spot where the Karakunas issues from the defile. Along the whole of this road, although it was less difficult than the preceding stage, there was no water, except two very poor springs.

The artillery, and particularly the light horse division, performed this march in the most brilliant manner, owing to the zeal and energy of the officers, and I may more particularly mention the services rendered by Staff Captain Obukh.

On the Karakunas we formed a junction with the column under Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanoff who had reached that river a few hours earlier. This column crossed the mountain without a single case of sickness and with the loss of only one camel, a result which I have much pleasure in attributing to the care and discretion of Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanoff.

The right column did not lose a single camel. During the halt on the banks of the Karakunas, the son of Djantai, the Manapof-Sary-bash, came into camp to tender submission.

On the 26th August, the force moved towards the ford over the river Chû. The Cossacks formed an advanced guard with two light pieces of artillery and two mountain guns. The passage of the river presented no difficulties, for the water was only knee-deep.

When bivouacking on the Karakunas I received information that Tokmak was occupied by the enemy. On crossing the Chû this intelligence was confirmed. I pushed on with the advanced guard without halting, having sent ahead a few Kirghizes to the Kokand fort, which, according to information received, had a garrison of 100 men with two small guns. On the previous day I had sent to Khankula, the Kokand Officer in command of Tokmak, the proclamation which I had the honor of submitting to Your Excellency on the 19th August. When we were within a mile of Tokmak, our Kirghizes returned with intelligence that some men had left the fort to treat with us. Two Sarts soon came up to us, who, on being required to surrender the fort, humbly entreated us to grant them a delay of two days in order that they might get an answer from Atabek-Datkha, the Commandant of Pishpek. They were told that we should open fire unless they surrendered within an hour. In the meanwhile, Titoff, Krishtanofski, Hakkel, and Kamenogradski,—Officers of Engineers, took an observation of the fort approaching within a distance of thirty fathoms. Receiving no answer from the garrison, I sent forward the Kirghiz Kuvat, who riding up to the ditch of the fort, tried to persuade the Commandant to surrender. The latter replied that "he dared neither to surrender the fort nor to defend it," and actually during the whole affair only a few muskets were fired, without effect, from its ramparts. I ordered a battery consisting of five mortars and one gun to be put in position on a mound a little more than 200 fathoms from Tokmak. At 6 in the evening we opened a fire which was continued for about an hour, discharging fifty shells, under the superintendence of Staff Captain Obukh, Sub-Lieutenant Loginof, and Your Excellency's Aide-de-Camp Blumenthal. On the approach of night firing was discontinued, and a man issued from the fort and called out for mercy. We afterwards learnt that although our fire had been feeble (for we did not fire from our nearest point), it had nevertheless done considerable damage within the fort. Our vertical fire had more particularly made an impression upon the Sarts, of whom the greater number concealed themselves. The Commandant, however, according to the reports of his subordinates, remained sitting on the wall, determined to die; but the cries of the women, of whom fifteen were found in the fort, compelled him to agree to a surrender. Some of the women had children at the breast, and one woman was wounded slightly by the fragment of a shell. She was attended to next day by our Medical Officer.

When the Sart who had come out of the fort was brought before me, he declared that the garrison was ready to surrender, and asked me to send, according to eastern custom, a musket bullet as a token that the people should be spared. Having complied with the request of the Sart and called upon the Commandant to come immediately to me, I sent forward Some Sappers to throw up epaulements for guns, close up to the fort.

But within half an hour Khankula came into my camp and made an unconditional surrender. I ordered him to quit the fort with the whole of his garrison, which he immediately complied with, leaving Tokmak in our possession. We found in it a standard which I forward herewith, two small cast iron guns, eleven wall pieces, forty-seven ordinary muskets, thirty-five swords, seven pikes, a few drums and thirty-two and one-half puds of gun-powder, besides a quantity of lead, some small shells, bullets, &c.

The garrison had originally consisted of 200 men, but the Kirghizes who belonged to it had run away together with twenty Kokand soldiers, leaving only seventy men in the place, many of whom had their wives and children with them. Khankula declared that if he returned to the Kokandians they would take off his head, and he therefore asked to be allowed to settle on Russian territory. On the following day I permitted the garrison to return to the fort in order to fetch such of their property as may have been left in it, after which I ordered the fortifications to be demolished.

The Sarts were much astonished at our humane treatment of prisoners of war and at our taking only their arms from them, Khankula expressed his own astonishment on the subject to the interpreter, and candidly said that according to their customs, the prisoners, if spared, would have been despoiled of everything they possessed. It was explained to him that Russians carried on war differently.

The fort of Tokmak, of which a detailed plan made by Ensign Strehukof, of the Topographical Corps, is herewith annexed, stands on an escarpment of the left gradient of the valley of the Chû river. The site has been well selected. On the north and south it abuts on a ravine. There were two walls within the fort; the outer wall crenelated was from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 fathoms high and from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 fathoms in thickness at the base, while the ditch in front of it was from 2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms deep and from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 fathoms broad. The crenelated wall of the second inclosure, or citadel, was 3 fathoms high and $1\frac{1}{2}$ arshins thick. The turrets (of which there were six in the citadel but none on the outer wall) were four fathoms high built of clay, in some places they were of considerable strength, although shots from a 10-pr. howitzer went through the walls of the citadel. The ditch had no flank defence. The works were exactly like those formerly constructed in Turkey. The gate opened into a dark corridor, and there was a similar entrance to the citadel. Stones had been heaped on the walls ready to be thrown on a storming party, and there were also found enormous bludgeons and spikes.

On the next day, the 27th August, we began to demolish Tokmak. A portion of the citadel was blown up in the evening. The towers, under which a mine of Kokand powder was laid, blew up amidst the shouts and to the astonishment of the Kirghizes. On the 28th August, the whole of the outer wall was pulled down; at midday the remaining three turrets were blown up, and towards evening the demolition of the inner wall was complete. On the approach of darkness the buildings within the fort were set on fire. Lieutenant Titof of the Sappers, was in charge of these works.

On the morning of the 27th August, Major Ekeblad joined the force.

We found a sufficiency of fodder throughout our march, and there was such an abundance of hay, millet, wheat and clover at Tokmak that precautions were taken to prevent the horses from being overfed.

The health of the force is excellent, and a rest of two days in front of Tokmak has refreshed the men after their difficult passage across the mountains. We have eleven sick, but only one serious case. We have as yet only lost one camel and two horses.

Yesterday evening we were joined by Lieutenant Colonel Kolpakofski with 90 Cossacks and 150 Kirghizes, including Sultan Tezek.

To-morrow, the 29th August, we move forward, and on the 30th we shall be close to Pishpek.

Khankula states that Pishpek has a garrison of 500 men, which has lately been reinforced by Alashir from Fort Merké with 200 men.

At Tokmak we found a letter addressed to Khankula by the Commandant of Pishpek ordering him to defend the fort and not to surrender it to the Russians. Our previous information to the effect that the garrison of Tokmak had been ordered to evacuate the fort in case of the approach of a considerable force, and to fall back on Pishpek, has therefore proved incorrect.

This report will be delivered to Your Excellency by Ensign Griaznov, who has acted as Commandant of Tokmak.

APPENDIX II.

Report of Colonel Zimmermann, Commanding the Forces in the Trans-Ili District, to the General in Command of the Detached Corps of Siberia, 5th September 1860.

I have the honor to report to Your Excellency that on the 4th September the Kokand fortress of Pishpek surrendered unconditionally with the whole of the garrison after a siege of five days.

On the 29th August, I left the ruins of Tokmak with the force under my command, and after a march of 28 versts, in excessively cold and unfavourable weather, halted for the night on the banks of the Issagata river. On the next day we had to perform a march of 25 versts to Pishpek. At two in the afternoon the advanced guard consisting of cavalry with horse artillery and mountain guns came within range of the guns of Pishpek and began to cross the Alamedin, a mountain stream flowing on the eastern side of the fortress.

A rapid fire was at once opened from the fortress. The shells had a range of almost two versts, but caused us no harm. Having halted the force on the Alamedin, two versts above the fortress, I advanced at once with the Officers of Engineers and Artillery to make a reconnaissance. The fortress proved to be of much larger dimensions than we had expected according to information obtained by Captain Veniukof, during a reconnaissance made last year, the fortress of Pishpek was supposed to be a quadrangle, measuring 60 to 65 fathoms on each face. It proved, however, to have a face of 105 fathoms, and it was, therefore, three times as large as we had expected to find it. It appeared in every way stronger than Tokmak.

It was useless to think of taking the fort by assault. The walls of the outer defences were lined with men, many of whom wore the scarlet uniform of the Sarbaz or regular troops of the Khan of Kokand. I resolved to lay regular siege to Pishpek, seeing no other means of obtaining possession of it.

The reconnaissance which I made showed that the western face of the fort presented most facilities for attack, as the gardens which fronted it for 250 fathoms afforded sufficient shelter for the commencement of works.

The force immediately took up a new position on the Ala-archi rivulet beyond the gardens, two versts in front of the western face of the fort.

Notwithstanding the distance which we had marched on that day, the preliminary siege operations were commenced that night, and towards daylight the three following pit batteries were completed: (1), 2 battering guns and 2 light pieces; (2), 4 18-pounders and 3 mortars; and (3), 2 light guns with 6 rifle pits.

The enemy fired in all directions throughout the night. At daylight our works were discovered, and assailed by an increased fire from guns and wall pieces, of which the projectiles carried as far as 400 fathoms. At 5 o'clock our batteries opened fire, which was continued till night. We fired 400 projectiles which did visible damage to the walls of the inner and outer defences. The Kokandians fired more frequently. In the afternoon their artillery fire became slacker; but the wall pieces continued to be discharged with particular rapidity. We lost one man and two horses. On the approach of night firing ceased on both sides, and I sent out a working party with a guard. During the night 100 fathoms of trenches were opened and a new mortar battery with 4 more pits for rifle men were dug. On the next day (the 1st September) our fire was slacker and we only expended 150 rounds. I ordered the projectiles to be economised with a view to employing them at a shorter distance. A volunteer party of 250 men was formed under Lieutenant Vrochenski for service in the trenches in the same order as at Sebastopol.

The fortress continued a heavy fire at intervals from guns and wall pieces (called "Jurks").

During the night of the 2nd September the trenches were pushed forward 84 fathoms, and a breaching battery for 4 guns was constructed within 5 fathoms of the wall of the fortress.

In the morning the trenches were strengthened and at mid-day the battery was fully armed.

On the 2nd September a stream of water which flowed into the fortress was diverted. But some wells and a pond still remained within Pishpek, on the northern side of which the Alamedin rivulet approaches almost to the very ditch.

The breaching battery opened fire in the afternoon and only fired 100 shots which damaged the outer wall of the fortress, and particularly the south-western corner turret. During the night of the 3rd September, the works were pushed rapidly forward, notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress; the men laboured at only 85 to 30 fathoms from its walls, and under a continuous fire from guns, wall pieces and muskets. The trenches had to be cut in very hard rocky ground. The enemy increased his fire, but did not do us much harm, for we had only three men wounded. At daylight we advanced within 30 fathoms of the south-western projecting angle, and at the extremity of the works we raised a new battery for 4 mortars (leaving 3 18-pound mortars on the other batteries) while on the breaching battery two more embrasures were opened. The volunteers in the front serving a cover performed their duties with great zeal, cleared the ground all round the fortress from lurking foes, crawled up to the ditch and seized three Kirghizes and one Indian (either from Khunduz or Afghanistan) who were making their way into the fortress. The soldiers of the line had now smelt a good deal of gun-powder and became far more courageous. A constant fire of musketry

was directed against the fortress from the trenches. The batteries were all ready in the afternoon, and at 4 o'clock an intensified fire was opened from the breaching battery along the wall of the fortress to the left of its projecting angle and upon the half turret. The enemy, after first attempting to reply, soon became silent. By the excellent fire of the breaching battery the crest and breast-work of the outer wall were soon knocked down and the whole of that part of the turret which faced us was destroyed. I ordered this fire to be slackened somewhat towards night, and that from the mortar batteries to be increased. On the approach of darkness, a working party was sent forward to push on the trenches by flying sap towards the projecting angle and to crown the glacis. Sub-Lieutenant Kamenogradski was wounded in the arm by a musket ball. The Engineers pushed on the works very boldly, and successfully, notwithstanding the closeness of the fortress walls, from which, however, the musketry fire became slacker. The enemy now began to hurl stones. Our fire from mortars and muskets was increased. Both shells and grenades fell thickly into the fortress, when at 10 p. m. two men issued from the gate crying out: "Aman!" "Aman!" They were immediately seized and brought to me. They declared that the Commander in Pishpek, —Atabek Datkha (Colonel) and Alashir Datkha asked for mercy and were ready to surrender the fortress, in proof of which they sent a letter under their joint seals, a translation of which is herewith annexed. Having sent to this camp for an interpreter, I ordered the firing to be suspended, but the works to be actively pushed on. After reading the letters of the two Datkhas I sent to summon them to surrender unconditionally with the entire garrison, to whom I promised security of life and property.

I demanded at the same time that one of the Datkhas should immediately come to me in the trenches. At 1 a. m. I received answer that at daylight both the Datkhas would come to the trenches. In the meanwhile the senior Commander, Atabek, sent me his sword and three hostages. The fortress was now closely guarded on the East and North sides by a chain of Cossacks. By day light the glacis was successfully crowned opposite the projecting angle of the fort. Two men were wounded in the early part of the night.

When day broke, Atabek and Alashir issued from the fortress and declared that they surrendered unconditionally with the whole garrison and threw themselves on the clemency of the Russian Czar. I ordered the garrison to evacuate Pishpek at once, leaving within it all their arms, powder and other military stores. A bridge was thrown over the ditch by our Sappers, and the garrison at once left the place.

The total number that surrendered was 627 (including five Russians, who are under arrest), of these 84 are traders and labourers. There were also sixty-three women and thirty-eight young children. They were camped in a garden near the fortress and surrounded by Cossacks. They took all their property with them.

Our troops took possession of the fortress as soon as it was evacuated, and Lieutenant Titof of the Sappers was appointed Commandant.

We found within the fortress the scimitar of Atabek, three standards which are forwarded herewith, the red one being that of Atabek and the white one that of Alashir; 5 brass guns of which 4 five-pounders are mounted on carriages, and 1 small one not mounted; 11 small cast-iron cannons of 1 and 2 pounds, without carriages; 49 wall pieces, of which some are of incredible lengths (10 feet) and of heavy calibre; 367 flint muskets and matchlocks, including many ancient English and Dutch pieces; 6 pistols, 366 swords, 206 pikes, 16 shields with silver ornaments and one with gilt ornament, sent herewith; 1 helmet of chain armour, 5 drums, 4 trumpets, 114 puds of powder, many shells, cast-iron bullets for wall pieces, lead, &c.

I beg to forward a plan of the fortress with a short description of it by Lieutenant Krishtanofski.

Pishpek is considered one of the strongest frontier fortresses of Kokand, it is three times as large as Akellechet, taken in 1853, and has two walls while the latter had only one.

The garrison had 20 men killed and 50 wounded. The more serious cases were attended to by the Medical Officer.

We fired 954 projectiles, a few rockets and 12,869 cartridges. The enemy fired more shots, but his aim was so bad that our loss only consists of one superior Officer wounded, and one soldier killed, 5 wounded, and one contused.

The enemy would have continued to defend the place, had he not run short of projectiles, and had it not been for the severe damage done to the south-west angle of the fortress and for the approach of our works to the very ditch. The Kokandians knew, from their experience at AkMechet, that we should have blown up the walls and stormed the place. Atabek Datkha had hanged three men from the garrison of Tokmak, who had been sent to tell him of its capture. A gallows stood on a mound to the right of our trenches, and the mound itself was covered with the graves of the men who had been executed. I ordered the gallows to be taken down and burned.

In the anticipation that the siege would have lasted longer, I had despatched Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanof with 200 Cossacks to Tokmak, and ordered 50 Cossacks with 100 camels to be sent to Kastek for artillery ammunition, which was to have been despatched to that place from Vernoo by preconcerted arrangement. I shall now get Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanof back to Pishpek.

On the 2nd September about 400 Dikokanenni Kirghizes made their appearance at the mouth of the Alamedik defile.

They were driven back into the hills by the Kirghizes under Sultan Tezek and two sotnias of Cossacks under the Esaul (Colonel) Butakof and Lieutenant Baron Wrangel, Your Excellency's Aide-de-Camp. In this affair one Kirghiz was killed.

Many Kirghiz tribes are now sending in their submission.

The weather continues very fine; the health of the troops is excellent; only 8 men on the sick list.

I intend to remain about five days longer at Pishpek. To-morrow we shall begin to demolish the fortress.

The orders of your Excellency have thus been carried out, and the object of this expedition has been attained, in accordance with your Excellency's indications.

The report concludes by bringing to the notice of the General the officers and men who had distinguished themselves during the siege.

APPENDIX III.

Statement of the Strength of the Trans-Chû Force.

	Staff Officers.	Commanding Officers.	Civil Officers.		Sergeants.	Orderlies.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Non-Combatants.	
			Staff Officers.	Superintending Officers.					Sergeants.	Privates.
1.—INFANTRY.										
The 8th and 9th Siberian Battalions of the line	1	19	61	21	913	...	20	...
Attached to the baggage train, the camels and hospital, included	1	7	...	27
2.—CAVALRY										
The 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments of the Siberian Cossacks of the line	1	12	27	8	578
Including:—										
Attached to the rocket Company	27
To the baggage trains and camels	1	35
3.—ARTILLERY.										
Battery Troop	1	4	1	47	1	1	...
Light Horse Division	2	3	2	67	...	3	...
Mortar Company	1	...	11
An Officer sent from St. Petersburg with rockets	1
4.—ENGINEERS.										
...	...	4	2	...	5
5.—TOPOGRAPHERS.										
...	...	2	2
6.—NON-COMBATANTS.										
Police-master	1
Officer in charge of Artillery Park	1
Attached to Camp Hospital	1	2	6	...
Chief Medical Officer	1
Surgeon of Battalions	1
Hospital Dresser	1
Dresser's Assistants	2	...
Kirghiz Militia	7	225
Interpreters	1	...	1
TOTALS ..	3	49	1	4	100	32	32	1,914	4	35

The force is accompanied by two battery guns, four pieces of the light horse artillery and two mountain pieces; four 20-pounder and three 6-pounder mortars, and four rocket stands.

The train consists of 485 camels, 68 draught horses, and 182 Kirghiz horses.

APPENDIX IV.

Translation from the Kokaniandese.

To the respected and highly exalted Commander of the Russian troops, we send the following words: Coming with your troops, you took Tokmak, and then you have come against us; for about five days we have proved ourselves worthy of the salt given to us by our Khan, and we fought; but we became convinced that we should be conquered, and therefore being unable to resist, we send you an envoy and beg you not to do all our *djigts* harm, and if you will let us depart in safety we shall evacuate the fortress and surrender it to you.

We send you our agent, the Mollah Abdrâhim; send also to us an agent of your own. (Sealed with the seals of Atâbek and Akshir.)

APPENDIX V.

Return of the Strength, &c., of the Trans-Chû Force under the command of Colonel Cherniagof.

May 14th, 1861.

DESCRIPTION OF TROOPS.	Number of companies, sotnas, and divisions.	NUMBER OF MEN.									HORSES.			
		Staff Officers.	Commanding Officers.	Civil Servants.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Incapables.	Non-combatants.	Servants.	TOTALS.	Artillery.	Cossack.	Draught
No 8 Battalion of Western Siberia	5	2	21		83	16	1,029	4	10	11	1,206	...		51
Battalion composed of the Rifle Companies of Battalions Nos. 3 and 5, and of the 4th Company of 9th Battalion	3	1	15	..	30	11	487	...	12	..	556			27
2nd Division of No. 21 Battery Horse Artillery	1		5	..	7	2	71		5	..	90	...		3
1st Division of Siberian foot Battery	1		2		8	2	90				102			13
Troop of Mountain Artillery	1		1		4		48		53	35		...
Mortar Company	..		1		2	...	41		44	1		..
Rocket Company	...		1		2		27		30		30	..
Cossacks of Siberia	3	1	8		27	3	316	...	10		365		117	..
Sappers of the Guards	...		1		1
Cavalry of the Army Corps	...	1	2		3
Galvanic Company	2		2			...
From the Engineers' Departt.	2		3		5			...
Industrial Corps No. 15	1	..	19		...		20
Sappers of 9th Battalion	1		8		..		9			...
Topographers	...		2	..	4			6			..
Medical Officers	4	4		8			..
Purveyors	...		2		1				...		3
TOTALS	15	6	59	6	177	31	2,138	4	67	11	2,563	265	117	94

pursue the Kokandians any further, for the men were tired, and it was necessary to make preparations for the passage of the artillery and waggons across the rivulet, which runs between excessively high banks.

On the 9th instant, crossing the Karaichik, the force advanced along the road leading to the town of Turkistan, about 9 versts distant. We could see the gardens which encircle the town of which only the high cupolas of the mosque of Azret Sultan were visible. When within about 3 versts of the gardens, the force was once more formed in order of battle. The centre was occupied by the infantry with the artillery in the intervals; the Ural Cossacks formed the right flank and the Orenburg Cossacks, the left flank; the baggage train followed behind in a close column under cover of a Company of Infantry. Both horse and foot could be seen moving behind the garden walls; our skirmishers, advancing to within 800 paces, opened fire; this was replied to with balls from muskets and falconets from behind the garden walls. Two 10-pr. howitzer and one 12-pr. were unlimbered, and opened fire; the first shot fell into the midst of a crowd outside the gardens, which at once withdrew behind the walls. After the sixth round, there was not a single man opposite our centre outside the garden walls.

Our Skirmishers then ran up to the walls, and with a loud cheer threw themselves into the gardens; the walls were immediately broken down in several places; then the whole of the Infantry followed. At the same time the Ural Cossacks, commanded by Major Rukin, having taken up a flank position, menaced the rear of the enemy and threw them into complete disorder with two rockets. Driven back and afraid of being cut off from the fortress, the Kokandians threw themselves into it with great haste, leaving a few dead, whom they had not been able to carry away.

On reaching the inner margin of the gardens, a reconnoissance was at once made of the ground which stood between us and the fortress and a front was selected for attack, after duly taking care that the roads leading from our camp to the batteries should not be enfiladed from the fortress, and consequently that there should be no waste of labour in establishing our communications.

Taken aback by our energetic advance, the Kokandians ceased fire for some time, and indeed our skirmishers prevented a single man from showing himself on the battlements. They soon, however, rallied and opened a heavy fire from muskets, falconets and guns. During a heavy fire that lasted two hours we only lost one man. The firing was kept up with less spirit for the remainder of the day.

During the night of the 10th, cast-iron shells, six lbs. in weight, were thrown from the fortress; many shells fell into our camp, but without occasioning any loss. The siege works were commenced the same night by 102 men under the command of Lieutenant Tarasenkof, of the Engineers. They were covered by a Company of Infantry under Staff Captain Redkin, who, taking up a position behind a garden wall at some distance from the right flank of Battery No. 1, kept up a fusillade with the Kokandians at rare intervals during the whole night, and thus diverted the attention of the enemy, which permitted the works to be pushed on very successfully without any loss. The works were ready at daybreak; the following batteries were mounted: No. 1 two 20-pr. howitzers and two 12-prs.; No. 2 two 20-pr. mortars; and No. 3 two 20-pr. and two 6-pr. mortars. The Kokandians finding at daybreak that our batteries were completed opened a strong fire upon them, but their shots did us no injury.

During the course of the 10th an almost continuous fire was kept up from our batteries; by well directed shots the upper crest of the walls was in

many places destroyed, but on the wall itself, owing to its thickness, no impression was produced. After the first few shots from our Artillery, the guns of the Kokandians were silent for a long time, probably because of the people repairing damages. Our vertical fire produced several conflagrations in the town, which, judging by the incessant swinging of the well poles, the inhabitants were very active in extinguishing. Of the guns firing upon us two were silenced altogether by 1 o'clock p. m., but the third gun of large calibre, notwithstanding all our endeavours, could not be put *hors-de-combat* owing to its being placed deep in a thick walled turret of small dimensions from which it shot vertically.

The engineering works this day consisted in the preparation of gabions and fascines.

A few days before, it had been rumoured, not without some cause, that the Beks of Suzak and Tashkend intended to come to the assistance of Turkistan. On the 10th of the month, these rumours were in a measure verified by Sadyk's entry into Turkistan with 120 men in armour, being the combined garrisons of Suzak and Chulak-kurgan. In consequence of this it was determined to proceed with the attack as energetically and as rapidly as possible.

Sadyk, crossing the Djamantas, first marched to Kurnak, but on learning near the latter place of our commencement of the siege, he turned off to the left, and passing round the southern slopes of the mountains, struck the Tashkend road. The Esaül Savin sent out with a "Samia" against him could not cut him off from the Tashkend gates, Sadyk, when the parties fell in with each other, being nearer to the gates than the Esaül Savin; moreover, when the Cossacks attacked him, he withdrew under cover of the fire from the walls of the fortifications, seeking to allure the Cossacks on.

It was determined to commence making the approaches from our batteries on the night of the 11th; 180 men were told off for the work, and Company No. 1 was appointed to cover them. Captain Yablonski directed the labours. It was a clear night, and whilst the moon was shining brightly, the Kokandians opened a severe fire upon our men as soon as ever they were distributed over the ground for the work, and at 11 o'clock they made a sortie against the head party; the affair was very animated. The Kokandians made three attacks, but were each time driven back with great loss. We had three men killed and sixteen wounded, besides nine who received contusions—one Officer (Ensign Rukin) and eight men. Our trench during this night was advanced a considerable way, and some of our men, notwithstanding the showers of stones, lumps of clay and sticks, from the walls, measured all its dimensions; we were, however, prevented from deepening and widening it by the alarm occasioned by the sorties.

At daybreak of the 11th we found ourselves at 80 fathoms' distance from the basement of the walls.

On the first alarm in the front, Ensign Tarasenkof was sent out from the camp to ascertain the condition of our works. After executing this commission he was again sent into the trench, and by my order, profiting by the confusion in front, took twenty labourers from the nearest trench and erected Battery No. 4 for two light howitzers. It had been intended earlier to erect this battery, but the sorties had hindered this during the previous evening. By daybreak the men here had some cover, working in a sitting position and on their knees. By 9 o'clock, owing to the zeal of the workmen, and notwithstanding a severe fire, the battery was completed, and at 10 o'clock the howitzers opened fire.

During the 11th the firing from the fort and batteries continued, and some conflagrations ensued in the town from the vertical firing. The two Kokand

guns, silenced on the first day, now again opened upon us, but were soon again disabled. Two hundred men were sent into the trenches to work; during the day the entire trench was widened and deepened to the necessary dimensions.

On the evening of the 11th two Companies were sent into the trench; one for working, the other as a cover, under Captain Kahovskoi of the General Staff. Captain Kahovskoi volunteered for this service, and performed it with true heroism. The battery was covered besides by a Company of Rifles.

As soon as the workmen reached the spot, Ensign Tarasenkof, directing the works, distributed them in the direction of the lodgment to the right of the trench; on the left there was a considerable elevation, under the shadow of which although the moon was shining brightly, eight of our workmen could be perfectly concealed, but the ninth man was visible, and our operations were detected. A great noise was raised within the walls, and shots were immediately fired at our works; regardless of the strong fire, however, the lodgment was effected, and in a short time our men succeeded in sheltering themselves behind their diggings.

Captain Kahovskoi, expecting a sortie, at once threw out a chain of men along the elevation, where the men could shelter themselves behind some small mounds; but for the better protection of this chain some gabions and spades were thrown up to them from the trenches.

At the same time there arose sounds of alarm from where our detachment was stationed: during my absence whilst on a visit to the batteries, the troops were in command of Major Rukin.

Some Kokandians making their way through the gardens attacked the camp, but being met with a shower of cartridge and musket balls at a very short distance, were repulsed with immense losses in killed and wounded.

Profiting by the alarm in the camp, and seeing that our works could not be concealed, Ensign Tarasenkof determined on laying an approach along the edge of the mound by means of a flying sap and called out volunteers for the purpose. The volunteers speedily placed the gabions, and other workmen at the same time made a trench from the commencement of the flying sap to the head of the work of the preceding night. When the labour was being regularly proceeded with, a lodgment was made on the elevation to the left of the trench, which was intended for a battery to operate on the breach in the wall of the fort on the day on which it was to be blown up.

The alarm in the camp had no sooner subsided, when cries were heard to proceed from the rear of the right lodgment from an approaching body of Kokandian cavalry, and at the same time a large mass of people was discovered secretly crawling from the rounded corner of the fort. Here Captain Kahovskoi immediately, but with perfect coolness, made every preparation for a repulse; in the front of the approach, half of the men took to their muskets to meet the crawling enemy, whilst the other half continued their work without even being interrupted by the firing which ensued. Allowing the Kokandians to come up as near as possible, the men of the 3rd and 1st companies opened a telling fire, whereupon the enemy turned and fled towards the fosse in front of the fort; but a portion of the cavalry taking fright at a shot from our battery plunged to the left and stumbled upon our trench; hastily dismounting the Kokandians jumped in and fell upon our soldiers with their sabres and whirbats, but they were all bayoneted. On our side only one soldier was severely wounded in this encounter.

Almost at the same time an attack was made on our battery No. 3, where some of our riflemen were located. A fire was opened at a distance of 15 feet, and the enemy at the first volley turned round and fled leaving many dead on the ground.

This sortie was no sooner over, than a great mass of Kokandians, with a standard, determining again to try an attack on our works from the left side, appeared on the elevation. Here too a fire was opened upon them when they were very near; the standard fell at the first volley; the crowd thrown into confusion, turned round and, pursued by shots, returned to the fort.

In repelling all these attacks, my strict orders to the infantry were to reserve their fire until the enemy was quite close, in consequence of which the losses of the Kokandians, more especially in their best and bravest men, were so great, that they resolved to make no more open attacks, but disturbed our works only with a sharp fire from the walls. Thus Captain Kahovskoi was killed outright by a shot from a falconet and one man was wounded.

Whilst the men were working in the trench, six infantry soldiers and sergeant Zlobin of the sappers, were wounded.

By this time our head works had reached so near to the front fosse that the labourers apprehending there were concealed enemies in it advanced hesitatingly. Ensign Tarasenkof then proposed that Captain Wulfert, sent from battery No. 3 to replace Captain Kahovskoi in the command, should occupy the fosse in front. The latter at once acted on this suggestion, and followed by the skirmishers rushed with a cheer across a perfectly open space of 15 fathoms under a heavy fire, and took the fosse, driving the enemy out of it. After this our works advanced rapidly to the front fosse and a mantelet, prepared before hand, was brought forward for the purpose of commencing a sap.

After this the fire from the fort which had been very heavy before day-break considerably slackened, and some of our men transported the gabions to the main force for the construction of a passage. There were now rumours of an intention to surrender the fort, and the fire from the walls ceased altogether. This was taken advantage of to make a covered way to the town.

Murza-Davlet, frightened by the rapid approach of our siege works to the very walls, and apprehending an immediate explosion and a storm, and having moreover experienced an immense loss from the desperate attacks on the camp, batteries and trenches, issued from the fort with 330 men of various ranks who were most attached to him personally, under the pretext of a sortie, and disappeared by the Tashkend road; on learning this the inhabitants sent a deputation to me at 8 o'clock in the morning announcing the surrender of the town and citadel.

All the works were thereupon stopped, the guns were withdrawn from the batteries, and a Russian garrison was placed in Turkistan at 10 o'clock at night.

The garrison of the fort consisted of no less than 1,500 men, exclusive of the armed citizens who took part in the defence, but a large number of these deserted during the sorties. Three hundred and thirty men, as stated above, went off with Murza-Davlet by the Tashkend road; more than 550 men, all *Sarts*, indicated by the inhabitants, were conducted under escort out of the town and sent across the Arys, and as many Kirghizes were sent off to their Auls under guarantee of their Biis.

Within the fort we seized 4 guns, more than 200 poods of powder stored in the Mesjid Azret Sultan, 100 poods of lead in pigs, 20 falconets, 17 garrison muskets, more than 100 ordinary fowling pieces, and a quantity of pikes and sabres; but all the best arms had been taken off by Murza Davlet and his party.

Our loss during the whole of these proceedings was as follows:—

1 Officer	}	killed.
4 Men	
24 do.		wounded.
1 Officer	}
8 Men		contused.

*Projectiles expended on the 9th 10th 11th 12th
21st 22nd 23rd and 24th of June.*

Ordinary shells from $\frac{1}{2}$ pood howitzers	216
Grape shot	2
Ordinary shells from $\frac{1}{4}$ pood "howitzers	10
Grape shot charges	"	"	5
Vertical shots	109
Shot from 12-pr. guns	190
" 6	4
Ordinary shells from $\frac{1}{2}$ pood mortars (vertical)	672
Shells with fire balls	"	"	17
Ordinary shells from 6-pr. mortars (vertical)	217
Rockets 2"	53
Total						1,495
Cartridges with minicé balls	32,618
" French	10,560
Total						43,208

Although a flying column of Cossacks and Kirghizes was sent in pursuit of Davlet, it returned after following the road for 25 versts, without having come up with him. From information received it appears that Murza-Davlet with a band of not more than 100 men (the rest dispersed by the way) is in the vicinity of Chemkend. Sadyk also left him, and withdrew to his encampments; he has since sent his sons to us with assurances of submission and with a request for forgiveness.

Here Major General Verefkin proceeds to make special mention of all the officers of his detachment who distinguished themselves in the affair.

APPENDIX VIII.

Formation of the new Kokand line.

His Imperial Majesty has been pleased on the 18thth 30th of July last to command that all the forts erected in the newly-occupied extent of country from the river Chù to the Syr-Daria as far as the Kokand fort of Yany-kurgan, inclusive, be considered as temporarily forming a new *Kokand line of frontier*, to the command on which His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Major General Cherniayef, who is to have chief command of all the troops along it,—those of Western Siberia as well as those of the Orenburg region.

APPENDIX IX.

Abstract of a Communication from General Cherniayef, dated 25th September.

The troops located in Turkistan, being placed under my command, I moved two columns from different directions, as follows: one, led by myself,

from Turkistan, composed of $6\frac{1}{2}$ companies of infantry, 6 battery guns, 2 light pieces of horse artillery, $2\frac{1}{2}$ pood mortars, 1 rocket-stand, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ "sotnia" of Cossacks, the other from Auliéta, composed of 4 companies of infantry, 2 battery guns, and 2 light pieces of horse artillery, 1 mountain gun, 2 rocket-stands, 1 2-pood mortar, $2\frac{1}{2}$ pood mortars, 2 pood, 6lb mortar, one "sotnia" of Cossacks and 1,000 Kirghiz militia; this latter column was placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lerché who was directed to be at Mankent on the 18th; the Turkistan column, as the strongest, reached Chemkend on the same day.

On the 19th of September both columns united, and a reconnoissance of the citadel and fortifications of the town was at once performed.

On the night of the same day a battery for four guns was erected, which opened fire at day-break; to this the Kokandians replied with a fire from 7 guns and 2 mortars.

The enemy's fire, throughout the whole day on the 20th September evidently showed that the Kokand artillery, directed by no native technologist, had immensely improved, and it was only by extraordinary good fortune that we sustained small loss from their fire. Having convinced myself that the enemy's fire reached farther than our own, I calculated on having the advantage in rapidity and accuracy at a shorter distance, and therefore ordered a battery for 6 guns and 4 mortars to be raised 300 fathoms in advance of the first. The extreme firmness of the soil and a sortie made by the enemy during the night of the 21st of September prevented the completion of this battery before day-break. The Kokandians, however, encouraged by the delay occasioned to our siege works, commenced aggressive operations by means of trenches, gradually advancing batteries and even throwing out skirmishers in front of their works. Lieutenant Colonel Lerché, taking advantage of the circumstance, led the majority of the troops in the trenches against the forward body of Kokandian infantry whom he overthrew, and following close upon them, he ran up to the town gates, where he cleared the opening with his bayonets and broke into the town over the corpses of the Kokandians.

This took place under a galling fire from all the enemy's batteries on the eastern side of the fortification and citadel.

On receiving the first intelligence from Colonel Lerché of his advance, I sent out to him from the camp a support of 2 companies with a troop of horse artillery, and then myself followed with 2 companies of infantry and 2 battery guns. The soldiers, hearing the cheer in front, rushed forward, and in an hour's time the citadel and fortress were completely in our hands.

Our loss during this storm was 2 killed, 7 wounded, 19 men suffered from contusions, but during the whole of the siege 6 were killed and 14 wounded and hurt.

The most important trophies captured by our troops were—11 horse-hair banners, 4 flags and 26 pennons, 19 large cast-iron guns one of which was rifled* (brass), 4 brass guns, 4 mortars of large calibre, a great number of falconets, garrison muskets and other firearms and weapons with bayonets, besides a variety of military accoutrements, &c., such as mail armour, drums, bugles, &c., &c., &c.

* On closer examination of the gun this was not found to be the case; there were, it is true, some kind of grooves, but not like those in rifled cannon; the Kokandians are yet unacquainted with the use of such an arm.

APPENDIX X.

Extract from General Cherniayef's Report.

It appears from General Cherniayef's report on the capture of Chemkend that two columns were advanced against it for its seizure.

One from Turkistan, composed of $6\frac{1}{2}$ companies of infantry, 6 battery guns, 2 pieces of light horse artillery, $2\frac{1}{2}$ pood mortars, 1 rocket-stand, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ "sotnia" of Cossacks.

Another from Auliéta composed of 4 companies of infantry, 2 battery guns, and 2 pieces of light horse artillery, 1 mountain gun, 1 2 pood mortar, $2\frac{1}{2}$ pood mortars, 1 6-pr. mortar, 2 rocket-stands, 1 "sotnia" of Cossacks, and 1,000 Kirghiz militia.

Thus, there were employed against Chemkend—

10½ companies of infantry. 1
8 battery guns.
4 guns of light horse artillery.
1 mountain gun.
6 mortars.
3 rocket-stands.
2½ "sotnias" of Cossacks and 1,000 Militia.

2nd November 1864.

APPENDIX XI.

Abstract of General Cherniayef's Report of the 14th October 1864.

After the capture of Chemkend the intelligence received concerning the portion of the garrison that had fled was both vague and contradictory. The Kushbegi of Tashkend who commanded in Chemkend was by some accounted to have been killed during the storm, and by others he was said to be still alive; his fugitive troops had, it was affirmed by some, entered into the composition of the garrison of Tashkend; by others it was stated that they had been refused admission into that town by the inhabitants. At last, as I have already had the honor of acquainting your Excellency, information was received, which has subsequently been confirmed, that Tashkend had entered into relations with the Emir of Bokhara. Therefore, for the purpose of bringing about a solution of affairs, and of ascertaining the amount of resources still left to the enemy, I made an advance towards Tashkend on the 27th September with $8\frac{1}{2}$ incomplete companies and $1\frac{1}{2}$ "sotnia" of Cossacks or 1,550 men, altogether with 12 field pieces. This detachment was accompanied by 400 Kirghiz militia-men.

The number of troops here being so small in proportion to the population of the region, I did not contemplate the seizure of such an immense town as Tashkend, where, within an area of 40 versts, there are about 100,000 residents, but I was, from the very beginning of the present campaign, constantly informed, as during my last year's expedition to Chulak, that this population was peaceful and industrial, lived principally by trade with Russia, suffered very much from the consequences of the present military operations, that in all things the people blamed the ruling Kipchaks in Kokand, and desired peace, and that the majority of them, moreover, were inclined to be made subject to Russia. I consequently meditated taking advantage, if possible, of the impression produced by the storming of Chemkend, whereby the Khanat had lost almost

all its artillery, to turn the Kokand garrison out of Tashkend, and afterwards, in case the inhabitants declared themselves in our favour, to send a deputation from amongst them to St. Petersburg, and in the interim leaving the civil administration of the town in their own hands, whilst I guarded against all external influence pending further orders from Government.

It was evidenced during the two first stages that there was a Kokand garrison in Tashkend besides the troops defeated at Chemkend, and that these Kokand troops even domineered over the population; between the two above-named towns, the habitations, stores, corn and hay along the road were all abandoned.

On reaching the last stage but one, on the way to Tashkend, I sent four men into the town, who had connexions there by trade, commissioning them to enter into communications with the Aksakals of the town and with the more influential residents who were known to them, in order to ascertain the feelings of the inhabitants.

These emissaries were detained by the Kokand patrols; they were not allowed to pass into the town, but were put into pits, and in a day's time returned with very indefinite and unsatisfactory written replies, bearing no signatures, to the effect that, without taking counsel with some of the Kokand statesmen, nothing could be resolved upon.

After this, on the 1st October, having passed round to the eastern side of the town, I took up a position at its south-eastern angle within 5 versts of the Kokand gates.

On the following day, I removed the troops to this road and undertook a survey of the citadel. The Kokandians appeared on the walls and opened a musketry fire upon the officers executing the survey; they then commenced to fire upon our approaching troops from 3 guns (of very small calibre), placed upon the earthworks.

Answering their fire, I occupied the heights, commanding the citadel at a distance of 350 fathoms, with 8 battery guns and pushed forward from the right along the Kokand road and under cover of the gardens which extended to the very walls of the town, two companies with a mounted division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Obukhof of the artillery, who was to open fire from this side and to report to me on his proceedings.

After a very accurate fire from our artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Obukhof reported that a breach was made in the wall and requested permission to storm it. Knowing the experience, the presence of mind in action and the judgment of this excellent staff officer, I sent him one more company with Lieutenant Colonel Lerché who had distinguished himself at Chemkend, replying—"if possible, go and God be with you," and myself advanced to him with two companies. Lieutenant Colonels Obukhof and Lerché then led on their men with a cheer to the wall; the walls of the barbet at the Kokand gates were destroyed, but the Kokandians had from the inside blocked the gates, and had succeeded in removing the bridge across the moat in their front. On nearing the moat, Lieutenant Colonel Obukhof was mortally wounded; Lieutenant Colonel Lerché was wounded in the hand and in the left side; they both headed the troops on foot. Ensigns Reichard and Konopelski were also wounded.

On losing their officers and finding it impossible to clamber up the steep escarpment of the moat, the troops halted, got into the moat and began replying to the enemy's fire.

Approaching with two companies to within 100 fathoms of the town wall, and on perceiving the state of affairs, I was obliged to abandon the siege, which it was possible to carry on without siege works.

In order to enable the troops to withdraw from the moat, all our 12 guns opened fire upon the enemy on this side, under cover of which the men returned to our batteries. At the same time the line of skirmishers was strengthened on the left flank of our position where the gardens also extended to the wall; but after a detailed inspection of the enemy's fortifications from this side as well, an immediate assault was found to be impracticable.

The fire from our artillery continued until the enemy's fire ceased. One of the Kokand guns was dismounted, and the three barbets from which they fired were seriously damaged. The accurate aims of our skirmishers, at close distances, occasioned the garrison a heavy loss of not less than 200 men, almost every turban that appeared on the walls was knocked over by our riflemen; but the killed were replaced by fresh foes.

Our loss has also been considerable, *viz.*, 16 killed and 62 wounded. Two out of the 4 wounded officers, *viz.*, Lieutenant Colonel Obukhof and Ensign Reichard, soon died; I beg your Excellency to make special application for relief in behalf of their families.

After this affair all the troops were anxious for a fresh engagement, considering they were beaten not by the enemy, who had suffered a greater loss than ourselves, but by the depth and steepness of the moat. But seeing the enormous extent of Tashkend,—as many as 15 versts in length and 8 in breadth inside the town walls, exclusive of the outskirts,—I did not consider it expedient to attack it on any other side than that of the citadel, which commands the entire town, and this would have required more means than were at my disposal. Besides, after the affair of the 2nd of October to jeopardise the detachment under Tashkend (for the formation of which I was obliged to retain only the garrisons in Auijéta, Turkistan and Chemkend, in the midst of a population of half a million), to risk the only reserve of the whole region for a fresh assault, was to stake the very security of the new Kokand line on a card.

Therefore, notwithstanding the animation of the troops who were desirous of giving the Sart a lesson and of taking Tashkend at any price, I satisfied myself with the reconnoissance made and returned to Chemkend, leaving Tashkend on the 4th and reaching the former on the 7th of October.

The enemy, after suffering a defeat even beyond his walls, did not so much as dare to appear within our view.

APPENDIX XII.

Extract from General Cherniaïeff's Report of 27th December 1864.

On the morning of the 4th December, three Kirghizes came to Lieutenant Colonel Jemchujnikoff, the acting Commandant of Turkistan, and announced that the Kokandians had invested Chilik on the evening of the 3rd December. They were not able to state the strength of the enemy even approximately. Having received my despatch respecting the movement of Sadyk with a band of 400 men from Tashkend to the Arys, Lieutenant Colonel Jemchujnikoff thought that the Kokandians before Chilik could not be numerous, and he therefore despatched to Ikan the Ural *sotnia* of Cossacks armed with rifles, and having a double supply of cartridges, under the command of Esaál Seroff. They also took with them a mountain howitzer. The detachment had just left when another Kirghiz came in (this time from Ikan), with a request for assistance. An order was thereupon sent to Seroff to halt at a distance of about 10 versts from Turkistan in case he should see large masses of the enemy, whose movements he was at the same time charged to

observe. But the man who was sent with this order returned and reported that Ikan was already surrounded by the enemy, and that the detachment had halted at about 4 versts from the village. In the meanwhile, Seroff having received information that the enemy was in the vicinity of Ikan led his Cossacks on at a trot. Neither the advanced guard, nor the patrols on the flanks, saw any enemy. Towards evening at about 4 versts from Ikan, large fires became visible in the neighbourhood to the right. Concluding that these were the camp fires of the Kokandians, Seroff halted the detachment and sent one of the Kirghiz guides in front to ascertain the strength of the enemy and the distance to their camp, but the guide returned at once, having fallen in with a Kokandian patrol. Seroff had scarcely time to fall back on a position which he had meanwhile discovered, before he was surrounded of a sudden by immense masses of the enemy who rushed on the detachment with wild cries. As it was impossible to retreat, Seroff hastened to shelter his detachment in a small ditch, on the open sides of which a breast-work was made of the commissariat and forage bags. The howitzer was placed behind this breast-work. The enemy advanced at once, but having been allowed to come within a very short distance, was received with a discharge of grape shot and musketry that compelled him to retreat in disorder. Subsequent attacks were repelled with the same success. Falling back to a considerable distance, the enemy formed in dense columns, and remaining within range of our rifles, opened a vertical fire of shells from three pieces of artillery and continued it throughout the night. The fire was increased on the following morning. Shells fell continuously in the midst of the detachment; while the besiegers were receiving large re-inforcements and were increasing their musketry fire. The detachment was continually suffering loss, but kept its ground with great gallantry, and, by a well-directed fire, aimed principally at the enemy's gunners, prevented the enemy from advancing further, and compelled him to move his artillery frequently.

Seeing the utter impossibility of approaching the detachment, the Kokandians began to bring up quantities of reeds for the construction of shields and mantelets.

Meanwhile firing had been heard in Turkistan from 5 o'clock of the 4th December in the direction of Ikan, and as it was continued throughout the night and on the following day, Lieutenant Colonel Jemchujnikoff, who had not received any intelligence from the detachment, resolved to send out a company of infantry with two guns.

This detachment was placed under the command of Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko, with orders to fall back in case he met with the enemy in great force. After marching for about 15 versts and consequently when within 4 versts of Seroff's *sotnia*, Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko met large masses of the enemy, and without making any attempt to form a junction with Seroff, began to fall back.

At 4 o'clock, six close columns of the enemy came up to Turkistan and invested the town on three sides. By this time also Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko had regained the town, without incurring any loss during his retreat.

Seroff's detachment heard firing in the direction of Turkistan, and learned subsequently that a detachment had been sent to his relief. As soon as the latter began to retreat, Alimkul sent Seroff a letter informing him that the relieving party had been driven back, and proposing that he should surrender and throw himself on his mercy. Receiving no reply from Seroff, Alimkul opened fire again and continued it until night. The detachment did not lose spirit, and, strengthening its position with the carcases of horses and camels, and encouraged by the example of its fearless chief, awaited death with heroic firmness.

During the night some of the Cossacks volunteered to make the position of the detachment known in Turkistan, and two of them, with a Kirghiz, actually made their way through the enemy and reached Turkistan in safety.

Early in the morning of the 6th, finding that the Kokandians had finished the mantelets and shields, under cover of which they were already beginning to advance in several directions, and wishing to gain as much time as possible in the hope of receiving assistance, Seroff went out in front of his trench and gave the Kokandians to understand that he wished to parley. A Kokandian came forward, and in reply to Seroff's request for an interview with Alinkul, was informed in pure Russian that his requests could not be complied with.

After talking to this Kokandian for about an hour Seroff returned to the detachment, and was the first to open fire upon the enemy. The incensed enemy replied very quickly and with great accuracy. Four times they rushed from behind their mantelets to assault our position, but each time they were driven back. The detachment had by this time lost all its horses, and 37 men killed.

Seeing that his position was most critical and that he could not hold out any longer, Seroff spiked the howitzer (one of its wheels having been broken), broke up the spare muskets, and with a cheer threw himself, with what remained of his *sotnia*, on the enemy, determined to fall, or to reach the detachment which he hoped had been sent to his relief.

He was not mistaken, for it had that very day been decided by a council of war to send a detachment out from Turkistan under the command of the same Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko.

The retreat of Seroff lasted about four hours over a distance of almost eight versts (six miles), and all that time under a heavy cross fire of musketry. The enemy frequently cut the detachment off in front, dismounted and fired their rifles within close range. The greater part of the men were wounded. With the blood pouring from their wounds, harassed physically and morally, those fearless men who had not had anything to eat or drink for 48 hours, and who had thrown away everything except their shirts and muskets, fell back undaunted, leaning on each other, and leaving a stream of blood to mark the line of their retreat.

At last they effected a junction with the relieving party at about seven versts from Turkistan. By that time there was not a man able to walk any further. They were carried in carts into Turkistan. The enemy ceased to pursue as soon as the two detachments met.

The losses in Seroff's detachment were as follows: killed 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, 50 Cossacks, 1 hospital dresser, and 1 man of the baggage train; wounded 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 36 Cossacks, 4 artillerymen, and 1 Kirghiz guide.

APPENDIX XIII.

Order of the day of the Minister of War,—(No. 56, dated 12th February 1865).

With the view to a better organization of the Orenburg Region and Western Siberia, His Imperial Majesty has been pleased to order as follows:—

1. The advanced line established last year in the Trans-Chú Region to be connected with the line of the Syr-Daria, and one province to be formed, under the title of the Province of Turkistan, of the whole of the territory bordering the Central Asiatic possessions, from the sea of Aral to Lake Issyk-kul.

2. The administration of the new province to be entrusted to a special Military Governor, who shall at the same time command the forces stationed within the province.

3. The Military Governor of the Turkistan Province to be subject, in military matters, to the commander of the troops of the Orenburg Region, and in civil affairs, to the Governor General of Orenburg.

4. The province of Samara to be detached from the Orenburg Region and annexed, in a military respect, to the Military District of Kazan.

In making the above order known to the military branch of the service, the Minister of War adds that the Official List and Estimate of the new province (subsequently approved by His Imperial Majesty on the 6th August 1865) will be published separately.

APPENDIX XIV.

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Extract from the Report of General Cherniayef,—dated 2nd May 1865.

The forces of the Emir of Bokhara, collected some months ago at Samarcand, began to move in the direction of Ura-Tiubé, while their advanced posts penetrated further within the limits of the Khanat of Kokan.

This movement could only be interpreted as a desire on the part of the Emir of Bokhara to take advantage of the difficulties of the Khanat, and to mix himself up in its affairs.

Taking into consideration that the public feeling in Tashkend was far from being in favour of the Kokand Government, and that its inhabitants had long been groaning under the despotic rule of Alimkul, the Regent of the Khanat, I could not remain indifferent to the proceedings of the Emir, and was therefore obliged, without waiting for re-inforcements, to move forward at once along the road to Tashkend.

As I did not consider it convenient, under present circumstances, to occupy Tashkend by force, and finding it at the same time necessary to place that town in a position of immediate dependence upon us, I determined to occupy the fortress of Niazbek, which commands the waters that supply Tashkend, in order to have the latter at any time under command.

Leaving the direct roading to Tashkend on the 27th April, I reached Niazbek on the following day, and summoned the commandant to surrender. Receiving a refusal, I entrusted my assistant, Major General Kachaloff, with the duty of taking the place.

After making a careful reconnaissance, General Kachaloff selected a position for batteries, which were raised during the same night.

The fortress of Niazbek lies on the open and perfectly level left bank of the Chirchik River, 25 versts north-east of Tashkend. It is built in the form of an irregular quadrangle with faces 35, 38, 39, and 47 fathoms long and 3 fathoms high. The faces are flanked by towers slightly raised above the battlements, with armed barbets and tall embrasures. On three sides of the fortress is a ditch three fathoms in width and depth; the fourth side faces the Chirchik and stands on its bank; the ditch can be easily filled with water by means of canals dug in front of the north-west face. The walls are five fathoms thick at their base; the slopes are almost perpendicular. Embrasures for musketry run along each of the faces, and partly in two tiers; the gate at the south angle is protected by a strong *traverse*, and it has a covered way for infantry facing the river.

Both from its position and profile, the fortress must be considered one of the strongest in the whole of the Khanat.

A siege battery was erected against the north angle, at a distance of 215 fathoms and another against the western angle, within 170 fathoms. The works were completed by day-break, and armed, the first with two 20-pound mortars and the second with two battery guns.

Our batteries opened fire at day-break. The enemy replied very energetically with a fire from guns, muskets and falconets, but our batteries placed within such short range destroyed the two barbets within a few hours, and forced the enemy first to weaken his artillery fire and at last to cease it altogether. The musketry and falconet fire were continued for some time longer, but likewise ceased a considerable time before dusk.

Although the disastrous effects of our artillery prevented the garrison from doing us much harm, while it inflicted great losses on the enemy, yet it did not appear to daunt their courage, for a second summons to surrender was rejected, probably in the expectation of speedy relief from Tashkend. Indeed, at about 3 p. m., information was brought to me that a force of 3,000 men, with two guns, was marching to Niazbek from Tashkend and that our pickets had met those of the enemy.

On receiving this intelligence I left the camp immediately with five half companies and four guns, and at a distance of three versts encountered the enemy who had occupied the gardens in the neighbourhood. Our artillery fire drove the enemy from his position, and a hot pursuit over a distance of six versts turned his retreat into a flight.

The bombardment of the fortress had been meanwhile renewed with vigour. Not wishing to spend much time or ammunition in this siege, and seeing the remarkable determination of the garrison, it was considered necessary to strengthen the batteries with two more guns and with a rocket apparatus, in order to be able to invest the fortress the same night and take it by storm. In the course of a few hours, the north-west face was entirely demolished and admitted of storming parties ascending the wall.

The garrison, knowing that the fortress would be at once stormed and that the relieving force had been driven back, at last consented to capitulate, and surrendered the fortress by 10 p. m. of the same day (the 29th).

Our trophies consist of 370 prisoners of war, 6 guns of large calibre, 7 falconets, 315 muskets, 105 swords, and a quantity of bombs, shells, grape-shot and powder.

Our loss consists of 7 rank and file slightly wounded and 3 contused.

After the occupation of Niazbek, our relations with Tashkend acquired a more settled character. This point is in all respects of no ordinary importance, and I have reason to expect many no less important results from its occupation.

(The General proceeds to mention the names of the officers who distinguished themselves on the occasion).

APPENDIX XV.

Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of May 11th, 1865.

Although our relations with Tashkend acquired a more definite character after the capture of Niazbek, yet, as the Russian party in Tashkend, notwithstanding their numbers, were unable to elude the vigilance of the Kokau

garrison and declare themselves in our favour, I found it indispensable to press the city as much as possible, and to place it in direct and immediate dependence upon us. With that object, immediately after the occupation of Niazbek, I turned off the waters of two of the principal branches of the Chirchik, which supplied Tashkend and its neighbourhood, and compelled the inhabitants to declare anew, although not officially, their readiness to submit to us.

In consequence of this assurance, I left a garrison in Niazbek, and on the 7th May took up a new position, 8 versts from Tashkend.

On the 8th instant, a reconnoissance was made of the N. E. part of the town, and by agreement with the inhabitants, the latter were to fall upon the garrison as we approached the town, and to open the gates of the fortress to us; but on the same day, Mullah Alimkul entered Tashkend with 6,000 men and 40 guns brought from Kokan, and by his presence in the city, prevented the contemplated movement from being carried into execution. I returned into camp after making the reconnoissance, and determined to remain in the new position until I could obtain more precise information respecting the state of affairs in Tashkend.

While moving towards Tashkend, as well as on our way back to the camp, small bands of Kokandian cavalry tried to harass the detachment, but they were in every case driven back with some loss, without inflicting any loss on our force.

On the next day, our pickets reported the movement of long columns of the enemy in the direction of the camp. At 6 o'clock in the morning, about 7,000 of the enemy were in view of the camp, within a short distance.

Not knowing as yet the object of the movement, but presuming that Alimkul intended to attack the camp, I gave him time to form his troops on the neighbouring heights, while I made preparations for an attack.

At 7 o'clock the enemy opened a canonade on the camp from a battery of 12 guns, which had previously been marked. Notwithstanding the range (800 fathoms), the fire was remarkably well directed, for all the shells fell within our camp, although fortunately without doing us any harm.

I immediately sent four companies of infantry, with a battery division, under the command of Captain Borislavski, straight against the enemy's front. When within 400 fathoms, our artillery opened fire on the enemy's battery and the nearest columns, while two companies moving to the right, began to turn the left flank of the enemy.

The enemy's fire was now directed towards Captain Borislavski's force, but our artillery, by a well-directed fire, pushed back their columns and to some extent weakened the fire of their guns.

Taking advantage of this, two of Borislavski's companies were ordered to advance, and, under cover of the artillery, to attack the enemy simultaneously with the two companies engaged in turning the left flank. This movement was successfully executed with very great rapidity. As soon as our infantry began to ascend the heights, the enemy opened a sharp and heavy fire from all their guns, which proved to be 40 in number. Under this fire our columns gained the heights and at once threw the enemy into confusion. The Khan's guards were the first to fall back, and they were followed by the cavalry. When our troops reached the position, they found the enemy in full flight. Throwing themselves on the rear of the retreating enemy, they seized two guns, and then pressed forward, destroying a body of infantry which they overtook, while the enemy's cavalry galloped away. The pursuit was kept up to the very walls of the town, in which Alimkul, with the remains of his host, took refuge.

Although the town might have been then occupied, yet, as I could not run any risks with the last of my reserves, and as moreover the occupation

would in any case have cost us not a little, I gave up the pursuit and returned into camp, having resolved to remain in that position, in order to watch the progress of events within the city, and if possible to occupy it on the first opportunity.

In addition to the two guns, the enemy lost 300 men killed, and about 200 muskets.

Our loss consists of 10 wounded rank and file and 12 contused, including one officer.

(The General here praises the valour of his officers and men).

APPENDIX XVI.

Extract from the Report of General Cherniaief, — (No. 2085, dated 1st June 1865).

After the engagement of the 9th May, as already reported to your Excellency, I remained on the same position, 7 versts from Tashkend, for the purpose of watching events in the town and of occupying it as soon as an opportunity offered.

The death of Mullah Alimkul naturally brought about a crisis, not only in the town itself but throughout the Khanat also, but it is to be regretted that the crisis did not turn in our favor at Tashkend. The party for Bokhara gained the ascendancy. The ruler of the town was chosen by the people, and amongst them Atabek, the former commandant of Pishpek, who had been our prisoner, sent at once an embassy to the Emir, asking him to assist them and to take the town under his protection.

Although it appeared scarcely probable that the Emir of Bokhara would consent to give open aid to a town which we had invested, yet, as even the most insignificant succour arriving at Tashkend in the name of the Emir would have given great moral support to the inhabitants, I determined to quit the position which I had been occupying, and to pass round the town towards the Syr-Daria, to prevent the possibility of any relief from that side of the river. With the same object I ordered the steamers, which had brought our heavy baggage and material to Turkistan, to ascend the river as far as Tashkend, but the melancholy state of those vessels still deprives me of the important co-operation of a flotilla. Leaving at Sary-Tube, our last position which we had fortified, 3 companies of infantry and 4 guns under the command of Colonel Kruevesky, I took, on the 17th May, with the rest of the force, the road to Bokhara, and on coming up to the village of Zinchátá, was very cordially received by the aksakals and inhabitants. Our advanced guard captured in this village a Khivan envoy who had been sent to Alimkul, while the latter was still alive. At his own request, the envoy was sent back to Khiva by way of Fort Perofski, with presents to the Khan and with a letter, of which I beg to enclose a translation.

As reports were continually in circulation of the Emir being on the way to relieve the town, and as the inhabitants who escaped to our camp confirmed the fact that relief was actually expected, and that the current rumour was the only cause why they held out so long, notwithstanding the great want of bread and water (there being only one small spring in the town), I made a movement towards the mouth of the Chirehik, in order to take the fort of Chinaz, which commanded the passage of the Syr-Daria, and thus to prove to the inhabitants that the Emir of Bokhara would in no case be allowed to get as far as Tashkend.

Before we got within a march of Chinaz, the aksakals came to tell me that the commandant and garrison had fled across to the other side of the

Syr-Daria, and that the inhabitants had charged them to declare their submission to the Government of Russia.

Halting my force within 20 versts of the town, I sent forward a light detachment with two guns, under Captain Abramof, with orders to disarm the fortress, destroy the passage over the river, and quiet the inhabitants. This was done with perfect success. Five garrison guns of cast-iron and some large falconets were brought out of the fortress. The gunpowder and projectiles, which were found in great quantities, were thrown into the nearest branch of the Chirchik, and the means of crossing the Daria were destroyed.

The fortress of Chinaz lies at the confluence of the Chirchik with the Syr-Daria, on the high road to Bokhara, at a distance of 3 versts from the former river and 8 versts from the latter. Like all other Kokandian fortifications, it has the form of an irregular quadrangle, and stands on a height which considerably commands the town and neighbourhood. From its profile, the height of its walls, the depth of the ditch, and generally from its size, this fortress is considerably stronger than Niazbek, and is only inferior to Chenkend, because the latter stands on a greater elevation. The town adjoins the fortress and is also very little inferior to Chenkend in size and extent of population. As a strongly fortified point at the principal passage of the Syr-Daria, the position of Chinaz is of great importance.

As soon as the detachment returned from Chinaz I fell back on Tashkend, and in order not to lose sight of the Bokhara road, I took up a position on the south side of the town, at a distance of seven versts from its walls; while on the road to Kokan, in order to cut off communication and to prevent the passage of the Chirchik, I placed a detachment of two companies with two guns under the command of Captain Grobenkin. Invested on three of its sides, the town was reduced to great straits. The want of bread compelled the inhabitants and garrison to sally out daily to reap the corn, which had already ripened, and also to send their cattle to graze in the vicinity of the town. Always informed of this in time, our light detachment prevented the corn from being cut and the animals from being pastured. In these forages we always took some prisoners and cattle. The former invariably told us that the town was getting very short of bread and water, that our party were loud in favour of surrendering, and that in fact the town was only held by the garrison which occupied all the gates and prevented any demonstrations on the part of the inhabitants. Knowing, on the one hand, that the garrison was weak, and that it held out only because we had not yet taken any decisive step, and, on the other, having information that the Emir of Bokhara had sent envoys into the town to advise the inhabitants not to surrender, I determined to approach closer to the walls of the town, in order to induce the inhabitants to make a demonstration in our favour, and to prevent a complication of the affairs through any interference on the part of the Emir. With this view, during the night of the 6-7th June, I ordered Colonel Kraeveski, who had taken the command of the detachment posted on the Kokan road, to advance towards the Kokan gate; while with the main force, and leaving only one company with two guns to hold my position, I made a movement along the south side of the town in order to approach it from the other side.

Colonel Kraeveski having at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 2 in the morning come up to the Kokan gate and being observed by the enemy, opened fire with his four guns within a range of 250 fathoms. Under cover of this fire he made a reconnaissance of the Kokan and Samlia gates, which adjoin each other. Our battery destroyed one tower, knocked down a barbette, and considerably

damaged the gate. The main force which had advanced simultaneously was not able to come up to the walls of the fortress in its full strength, for at a distance of five versts it came across an immense ravine which entirely prevented the passage of our artillery. I therefore halted and caused a reconnaissance to be made of the walls by a light detachment. As soon as this was finished, I advanced the camp nearer to the town and took up a position four versts from the walls between the Bokhara road and the Syr-Daria.

(The General subjoins a plan of the camp and reports the death of Balynbai, a Cossack Officer, killed during the reconnaissance).

APPENDIX XVII.

Report from General Cherniaief, dated 17th June 1865.

During the night of 14th June, the town and citadel of Tashkend were taken by storm by means of scaling ladders.

Our loss consists of 125 rank and file :—25 killed ; wounded : 3 officers, 86 rank and file, and contused 24 rank and file.

Our trophies are—

Standards, large 16, and a quantity of pennons ; guns about 60, the great part brass, including a mountain howitzer which had been abandoned by the Ural Cossacks in the engagement at Ikan.

The reasons which induced me to take this decisive step and a detailed account of the engagement I shall forward by Lieutenant Makarov, of the Engineers, one of my principal coadjutors during the whole of the present expedition.

(The General then mentions briefly the names of the officers who had particularly distinguished themselves during the assault, and that a priest had marched in front of the troops carrying a cross).

Having mentioned those who specially distinguished themselves on this occasion, I consider myself bound to certify that each man of the force did his duty thoroughly, and that it is easier to be conquerors than the conquered with such troops.

The occupation of Tashkend has given us a position in Central Asia commensurate with the interest of the Empire and the power of the Russian nation.

APPENDIX XVIII.

Extract from Report of General Cherniaief, dated 26th June 1865, to the Officer Commanding the Troops in the Orenburg Region.

I have the honor to forward herewith, in the original, communications which have been received from the Bokharian camp in Khodjend, and to request Your Excellency will give orders for the immediate arrest of all caravans and subjects of the Emir of Bokhara within the confines of the empire.

APPENDIX XIX.

GOD IS GREAT.

To the Governor General Cherniaief.

Be it known to thee that the person sent by thee to our high person, has been told that without imperial instructions thou canst not give away

any dominion and also that thou hast no right of thine accord to leave it, and to go back; that thou shalt report this first to thine Emperor, and until receipt of instructions remain where thou art. We, therefore, not crossing the Chirchik, shall protect the bank opposite to thee and shall act according to the reply which thine Emperor shall make. As thou art agreeable to this, we—high personage—have also written a letter from ourselves to thine Emperor sending it to the Supreme Court by one of our servants, and trusting in our former friendship await an answer, on receipt of which we shall commence to act according to its contents. But until then, desirous that the inhabitants of this country may be secured from danger, we have appointed headmen from among them, whom we have commanded to maintain a watch and not to allow any one to cross the river Chirchik; therefore, thou, too, order thy subordinates to keep in like position until the receipt of the expected intelligence. This our gracious message is despatched with our faithful servants, Inan-Hodja and Seid-Hodja, who will deliver it to you.

Inscribed "Emir Seid Muzafer" on the seal, month of Safur 1282, translated by Colonel Counsellor Bekchurin.

TRANSLATION FROM THE PERSIAN.

To the Governor General Cherniajev.

We present you with a black shawl for the waist and a khalat made from a Cashmere shawl.

Inscribed on the seal "Emir Seid Muzafer."

APPENDIX XX.

Abstract of General Cherniajev's Report of the 7th July 1865.

The inhabitants of Tashkend, pressed to the utmost by a continued and strict blockade, and suffering from entire lack of provisions and more especially of water, trusted solely in the Emir to whom at last they sent an embassy composed of the chief representatives of the town. The Emir did not refuse assistance to the Tashkendians, but demanded that they should first send him the young Khan as a hostage. In the nights of the 9-10th or 21-22nd of June, the Kokand Khan, with 200 of his followers secretly left the town, and a small party of Bokharians with Iskendenbek, who assumed command of Tashkend, as secretly entered into it. The Emir's main forces, long assembled at Samarcand, began to make their appearance at the Kokand forts on the frontier, along the left bank of the Syr-Daria.

All these circumstances, with the positive information received through a succession of run-a-ways from Tashkend, to the effect that the town was in a most critical position, and that it was only the garrison and a trust in aid from the Bokharians that kept it from surrendering, obliged me to resolve on the final step, in order to anticipate the open interference of the Emir and to avert collision with him.

It was impossible to undertake the siege of a fortified town 24 versts in circumference with a population of from 150 to 200,000, and possessing great means of defence. To oppose a handful of men numbering 1,951 with 12 guns and one complement of ammunition against a town which could concentrate, at the point attacked in a very short period, at least as many as 30,000 men with 50 guns, and at the same time expecting a demonstration

by the Emir of Bokhara, was evidently out of the question. Yet to retire from before the town was to give the Emir a great reputation in Central Asia, and to strengthen him with all the military resources concentrated in Tashkend. I therefore determined to take the town by open force, the following considerations entering into my calculations on success :—

1st.—The garrison of the town, owing to the great length of the line of defence, was scattered over a large area, for which reason it was very probable to seize the works before it could be collected at the point of attack.

2nd.—The enemy's artillery, although very numerous, but scattered over an area of 15 versts, over the whole of the southern extremity of the town, could not also at any given moment operate unanimously.

3rd.—The inhabitants of the town were divided into two parties, and the one devoted to us was by agreement to aid us in the event of our taking the defences.

It was found after a series of surveys of the works of the town, performed by Lieutenant Makarof, of the Engineers, during the blockade of the fort, that Tashkend might be attacked by one of the gates on the south-eastern side; an attack on this quarter of the town had also this advantage, that on obtaining possession of it we should gain the whole town, because the right side or Bas-Su, where all the wealthy and mercantile classes of Tashkend resided, was inclined towards us; whereas the whole side of the town which was attacked was exclusively occupied by the military class and the party of the Emir of Bokhara. Besides, in an attack on the south-eastern side, the military class alone would suffer from the consequences of the storm and not the peaceful citizens who were devoted to us.

Repeated reconnaissances of the walls, in greater strength, conducted by the same officer who approached as near as the counter scarp of the fort trench, convinced me that the most advantageous point of attack was the Komelan gates.

In the night of the 14 to the 15 it was determined to storm these gates in the following order :—

The main detachment under my own personal command quitting its position at 11 o'clock at night was to attack the Komelan gates at day-break by means of scaling ladders, and a special contrivance of Captain Yablonski, of the Engineers, consisting of *arbas** with folding ladders to be employed in crossing the trench.

Simultaneously with the attack by the main detachment a demonstration was to be made by Colonel Kraevski's detachment, stationed at Kiumuk, on the side of the Kokand gates (six versts from the Komelan gates), but without undertaking anything decisive it was to support the attack by bombarding the town.

After occupying the outer defences it was proposed that the foremost troops should immediately advance to the right along the street running round the town wall and on reaching the Kokand gates open them to Colonel Kraevski and then capture the citadel.

The main detachment advanced in three columns. The volunteers and 2½ companies chosen for the purpose of effecting the storm marched ahead.

The volunteers were commanded by Captain Wulfert and Ensigns Shorokhof and Lapin. But the whole of the storming column was commanded by Staff Captain Abramof, of the artillery. The storming column was followed at a distance of one verst by two companies with two light guns under Major de la Croix, and these at one verst again by a reserve

*Arba two-wheeled carts.

of $2\frac{1}{2}$ companies with four battery guns under Lieutenant Colonel Jemchujnikof.

This order of advance was necessary, because there was only one road leading to these as to most of the other gates of the town.

At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 2 o'clock, on the approach of the storming column under Captain Abramof to within one and half verst of the gates, the men took the ladders from off the camels' backs, and carrying them in their hands marched along both sides of the road through the gardens; a small line of skirmishers advanced at their head; this movement directed by Lieutenant Makarof, acting with the column as a staff officer, was performed with remarkable silence.

The chain of skirmishers profiting by the darkness of the night and the cover of the gardens came up to the very walls without being observed by the enemy's watch, stationed in front of the walls.

The day began to break. The volunteers with the ladders were within about 100 paces of the gates and the skirmishers on the outskirts of the gardens under the very walls, when our advance was discovered by the guards, against whom our men stumbled with the ladders; in a moment a simultaneous cheer arose in front, and before the garrison had time to recover their surprise, our foremost men were upon the barbet, from which they hurled down both the enemy and the guns that were there.

The first to mount the wall by ladder was Sergeant Khmelef, the second, Captain Wulfert, and the third Junker Favodski.

The priest Molof walked in front of the attacking body, carrying the cross.

After taking the wall a portion of the men commenced at once to throw open the gates, and the rest proceeded to occupy the adjacent houses and gardens.

Captain Wulfert mounting the wall with a few men threw himself along it, and notwithstanding the desperate resistance of the Kokandians drove them off the nearest barbet at the point of the bayonet and seized a gun; he was, however, wounded by a shot in the hand. In the meanwhile our reserves were already running up to the walls, and as soon as the foremost of them came in sight, with 250 men Captain Wulfert proceeded up the street on the right along the town wall in order to admit Kraevski's detachment. On the first barbet Abramof was met by an artillery fire from four guns covering 200 sarbazes ensconced in the turrets. A rush was made, with a cheer, and the guns were spiked by our men and hurled down into the trench; they went on further. On coming up to the second barbet they were again greeted with an artillery fire, but these guns also fell into our hands like the last. Two more barbets were then taken with the bayonet, and the rest, along the whole extent (14 versts) of the wall traversed by Abramof, were abandoned, so that he had only to spike the guns and throw them off the barbets. Amongst the guns taken was a 10-pounder mountain howitzer abandoned by the Cossacks in the action at Ikan.

Passing along as far as the Kara sarai gates, commencing from which the inhabitants of that part of Tashkend were in favour of our cause, Abramof entered into town. In the very first street he encountered barricades defended by strong musketry fire; they were all broken through, and the detachment advanced to the principal bazar.

There the resistance was still greater; besides barricades, at every turn all the houses were filled with musketeers. Leaving the bazar, the detachment now found several barricades strongly defended in every street, so that each one had to be taken with the bayonet. After traversing thus nearly the whole of that half of the town, Abramof entered the citadel which he found already occupied by de la Croix and Jemchujnikof.

So soon as Abramof turned off to the right, the enemy recovering himself began to concentrate opposite to our left flank, occupying the nearest houses and gardens, and when the soldiers were clearing these with their bayonets, large masses of the enemy's infantry, assembled in two of the adjacent streets leading to the bazar, fell upon our troops calling out "Allah!" and sounding their drums. I sent Lieutenant Makarof to attack them with 50 riflemen and a rocket company. Two well-directed 36-pounder rockets followed up by a bayonet charge compelled them to turn and to clear the streets, which they did with great loss. From this moment our left flank was perfectly secure, although the firing from the occupied portion of the walls and from the trees and furthestmost houses was continued until the evening.*

Almost simultaneously with Abramof's advance, I led into the town two pieces of horse artillery and three battery guns, which opened fire upon the town. A short time after I despatched Major de la Croix with two companies and one gun in the same direction as that taken by Abramof, and following upon these, two more companies with two guns, under Lieutenant Colonel Jemchujnikof.

Notwithstanding that Major de la Croix was sent almost immediately after Abramof, he fell in with fresh barricades along the same road, which the enemy constructed with remarkable rapidity of "arbas" and felled trees. While de la Croix was driving the enemy from the barricades, Jemchujnikof came up, and combining their forces they both marched to the citadel, which they took at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7 A. M. Here also the artillery was at once brought to fire upon the town. The enemy driven into the centre of the town ceased the musketry fire, but our detachment was obliged to evacuate the citadel, as the Kokandians fired the offices of the Khan's palace, and the fire spreading very fast might have caused an explosion of the powder stored there.

Colonel Kraevski's detachment leaving its position at Kuiliuk moved towards Tashkend at midnight. To prevent him from giving the alarm, and from thus allowing the enemy time to assemble on the walls, he was ordered not to open fire until he was himself discovered, or until he heard the firing from the main column.

The enemy on discerning Colonel Kraevski's detachment, opened fire with nine guns, to which Colonel Kraevski replied with four light pieces of artillery; the cheer behind the walls was soon heard, and Kraevski's infantry, assisted by the men of the main column, commenced scrambling up by means of their muskets.

At this time Kraevski was informed of the appearance of the enemy on the right flank in the act of escaping from the town. He at once galloped off with his Cossacks and with four pieces of horse artillery to intercept them. Some well-directed discharges of grape at a short distance, made the crowds run; a party of 39 Cossacks rode after them; other bodies of Kokandian cavalry which followed were not less successfully received, being also turned to flight.

The whole of this numerous cavalry, more than 5,000, pursued by a mere handful of brave men, scattered their banners along the road, and galloping to the Chirchik rushed into the river, where they trampled each other in forloring.

In the meanwhile the infantry having scaled the wall, joined Abramof and proceeded with him along it. Kraevski himself on entering the town joined Jemchujnikof, who had then left the citadel, and in obedience to my

* At this time three of our officers were wounded, Lieutenant Mesiatsef (mortally), Eusigns Lapin and Soltanovski, besides several men killed and wounded.

orders placed himself in a position between the Kokan and Kashgar States on the site of the Khan's habitation.

When the half of the town was cleared and the musketry fire had ceased, the main column took up its quarter at the Komelan gates.

The Aksakals of the portions of the town favourable to us presented themselves with assurances of complete submission, and promised on the next day to appear in camp with ten elders and the foremost citizens of the whole town, whom they hoped to be able to convince of the utter impossibility of resisting us. But in the evening the enemy again got into the adjacent houses and opened a musketry fire on our lines. Communication between the main column and Kraevski's detachment was nearly cut off. Barricades re-appeared in all the streets and at all the crossings. The resistance to us was still more desperate. There were instances of a single man with a halbert falling upon a company and dying on their bayonets without asking for mercy.

The small parties of men sent to secure the neighbouring streets had to struggle against fearful opposition. Each house had to be taken with the bayonet, and was cleared only after all its occupants were put to death.

The most obstinate resistance was encountered in the street leading from the gates to the principal "Kosh" or bazar.

"Sotnik" Ivanof, of the Cossack artillery, whom I sent with 50 men to clear the above street, found barricades defended with artillery. As his fire had no effect on the Kokandian musketeers he rushed on the first barricade, and notwithstanding their desperate defence of it, drove them away at the point of the bayonet and took possession of their gun; there was another barricade a little farther on armed with two cannon; in front of it was a deep "aryk" (canal) which served as a trench. A cross fire from the two-storied houses in the vicinity afforded a strong additional defence; the handful of brave fellows having only just taken the first barricade after a hard fight, and before having had time to remove it, were met with a shower of grape from the second. Seeing the difficulty of his position and the impossibility of keeping up any fire of musketry, Ivanof was the first to make a rush with a cheer inciting his soldiers to follow him; the guns and the barricade were taken; here he received a contusion and was taken back to the camp; Lieutenant Makarof was sent to fill his place.

Bravely acting in common, our courageous troops cleared the streets a second time. The artillery advanced one verst towards the interior of the town and opened a fire which continued all night. In the evening our grenades had set fire to some houses in the adjacent quarter of the town, and the conflagration lasted till the next day. For the night all the troops assembled at the Komelan gates. On the morning of the 16th, Colonel Kraevski with three companies and two guns was commissioned to collect the enemy's cannon and to blow up the citadel. All along the road he fell in with barricades and encountered the same fire from the adjacent houses as the day before. The barricades were, however, destroyed, the houses taken, and the detachment safely entered the citadel, where he was again resisted; all the nearest houses and gardens were occupied by Kokandian musketeers who opened a frequent and very accurate fire upon the detachment, but owing to Kraevski's good management the detachment executed its task and returned to camp without any great loss.

By the evening the streets were free, and before sunset the natives sent by the Aksakals at length made their appearance, requesting permission for all the elders of the town to present themselves on the next day.

On the 17 all the Aksakals and leading citizens actually presented themselves before me, declaring their complete readiness to submit to the Russian Government.

The town surrendered unconditionally, and orders were immediately given to disarm it. All the Aksakals and many of the inhabitants took the most energetic steps in searching for arms in the town, and by the evening they themselves brought in 20 brass cannon and about 300 muskets. The town became perfectly quiet; not a single shot was fired. Tashkend was finally conquered.

Our trophies were 16 large banners, including one Bokharian banner, a great number of pennons, 63 guns of various calibres, of which 48 were brass, and remarkably well cast, besides a number of muskets. Among the brass guns was an 8-pr. mortar.

There were found about 2,000 poods of powder and about 10,000 various projectiles.

Our losses were.—	Killed	Wounded.	Contused.
Officers ...		3	4
Men	25	86	24

The enemy's garrison was reported to have consisted of 5,000 "Sarbazes" and 1,000 Sepoys, the majority of whom fled when the storm commenced.

The total number of defenders, according to the most moderate accounts, was about 30,000.

In the course of time it may be possible to leave Tashkend to itself, but as yet the presence of Russian troops here is indispensable. There is no doubt that on the departure of our troops from here differences would arise between the party favourable to us and that inclining to Bokhara, and the position of the Khan nominated by us would be very difficult.

Besides there is no guarantee that Kokand will not begin a war with Tashkend when the latter is abandoned by the Russian troops, and that the Emir of Bokhara will not again assert his right to the town.

Bearing these circumstances in mind, and taking into consideration local conditions and my own resources, I have determined to leave in Tashkend a garrison of one battalion of infantry with ten guns (eight batteries and two rifled guns) and two "sotuias" of Cossacks, selecting for a fortification the height near the Komelan gates (the citadel being too far from the centre of the town and its defences being too feeble).

For the purpose of establishing perfect tranquillity and for the defence of the newly conquered country, I propose to place garrisons in Niazbek and Chinaz. The latter by its position by the ferry across the Syr-Darna, on the great caravan road to Bokhara, is of great importance.

But for the accomplishment of all this the actual military resources of the Turkistan region appear insufficient, and I am compelled to request your Excellency to recommend the immediate despatch hither of one more battalion of infantry and two "sotuias" of Cossacks.

Upon this, in my opinion, order and tranquillity will be temporarily secured in the newly occupied country; but as experience has proved that reinforcements cannot arrive in due time from either Orenburg or Omsk, it will be necessary next year, so as to be prepared for every emergency and to avert it, to send here, early in the spring, a regiment of infantry.

The countries occupied last year and this possess all the means for independent existence, so that nothing but powder and shot will be required from Russia.

Reverting in conclusion to the occupation of Tashkend, I cannot refrain from observing that this feat could be performed only by troops fully

experienced in and accustomed to victories, like those I have the happiness to command.

I consider it my duty to beg your Excellency to bring before the gracious notice of his Imperial Majesty this handful of untiring, fearless warriors who have gained for the Russian name in Central Asia a prestige proportionate to the dignity of the empire and power of the Russian nation.

[Here follows honourable mention of all the officers who took part, and distinguished themselves, in the siege and capture of Tashkend.]

APPENDIX XXI.

Extract from General Cherniaïef's Report of the 6 August 1865.

The accompanying correspondence will acquaint Your Excellency with the course of the negotiations which I entered into with the Emir of Bokhara relative to our occupation of Tashkend.

My first letter to the Emir was despatched immediately after the action of the 9 May, when, on the death of Mullah Alimkul, the inhabitants of Tashkend applied to me for assistance.

The concentration of the Bokharian troops at Samarcand, and their advance within the limits of the Khanat of Kokand, induced me to make an attempt to divert the Khan from any interference in the affairs of Tashkend and to give another direction to his movements, which would be more compatible with our interests.

Knowing that the same Emir had in 1863 been to Kokand with the intention of placing his own son-in-law, the late Khudayar Khan, on the Kokand throne, I informed him of the conquest of the northern portion of the Khanat of Kokand, *and proposed that he should proceed to carry out his design*, in which, by the way, I could do nothing to thwart him.

∴ In order to lend more weight to my proposition, I promised the Emir that, in case of necessity, I would apply to Government for permission to give him aid, if his own powers were inadequate.

This proposition, made conditionally, did not bind me to anything.

This letter did not reach its destination, and the Emir, remaining in ignorance as to the object of our conquests in Central Asia, and, peradventure, somewhat apprehensive on account of his own possessions, amassed an enormous host, with which he marched to Khodjend.

By taking Tashkend I anticipated the Emir, and intercepted his approach to the Syr-Daria where it is crossed, and prevented a collision with him.

On arriving in Khodjend, the Emir demanded to know the reasons for which we had taken Tashkend, and, laying claim to that town, called upon me even to withdraw to Chirchik, pending the return of his embassy from St. Petersburg.

Having received in reply a letter which had been even previously intended for him, the Emir was apparently satisfied with it, and sent me another embassy, and this time with presents. All his demands were to the effect, that we should not cross the Chirchik, on the pretence that the whole of the population in that part of the country had submitted to him, and he desired that in future that river should be our mutual boundary.

Having reason to suppose that, if the Emir brought his affairs to a satisfactory conclusion in Kokand, he might again bring forward his pretensions to Tashkend, I considered it necessary to prepare for all eventualities, and to gain as much time as possible, until the arrival of the reinforcements destined for this province.

I therefore gave no definite answer to the Emir. Having told his envoys that I must refer them to my previous declaration until I received further commands from His Imperial Majesty, I dismissed them with presents, in exchange for those which they had brought.

The envoys stated that their master was offended at our not sending a single embassy while he had already sent two missions, and they entreated me to comply with the wishes of the Emir in this matter. I excused myself on the ground that I could not take such a step after the letters which I had received from Khodjend, and with which my Government would not in all probability be satisfied.

They gave no positive answer to my question as to the object of the embassy sent by the Emir to St. Petersburg, and they confined themselves to insisting that I should not cross the Chirchik until its return. When I told them that, if even the embassy were allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg, it could, in no case, return for four or five months, and that it would be far more convenient if the Emir would convey his wishes to me, in order that I might submit them to my Government, they replied that the Emir would agree provided my Government informed him that I had been furnished with the necessary full powers.

In conclusion I consider it my duty to submit to your Excellency the data on which instructions might at the present time be supplied to the local commander.

1. Although I submitted last year the necessity of forming Tashkend into an independent Khanat without the presence of our troops, yet I must acknowledge that, after studying both the state of affairs in the place itself and the character of its population, I have become convinced of the practical impossibility of carrying out such a scheme. I was induced to suggest it mainly from a consideration of the difficulties, which I supposed would attend the establishment of a police and the keeping of so populous a city in subjection. Considering the number of troops that are required to mount guard in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the immense sums which are spent in the maintenance of the police, I could never have imagined that Tashkend, with its Mussulman population of 200,000, assembled for purposes of trade from the extremest points of Asia, would require so few troops and such little expenditure for the purpose of being kept in peace and order.

Experience has shown that, if self-government be accorded to the inhabitants, peace and perfect submission can be secured by one battalion and two "sofnias" quartered in the citadel, which stands apart from the town. The police management can be left to the inhabitants.

Within a week after the town had been taken by storm, complete tranquillity and order were introduced without scarcely any interference on our part. The deep respect of the inhabitants for order and authority is most remarkable, and can only be found elsewhere in the most civilized states. The police is so good that few cases of theft or other crime remain undetected.

I therefore would recommend the application of the principle of self government, and that our interference be limited to a supervision of those who may be placed in office, reserving to ourselves the right of dismissing them should they not justify our selection.

It is, therefore, only necessary to have a Governor and Assistant Governor at Tashkend, with two interpreters and two writers. Two officers should also be attached to the Governor for the purpose of controlling the taxes and customs' duties; each to have the assistance of an interpreter and a writer. The salaries of all these officials should be paid out of the town revenue. The neighbouring villages should also be placed within the jurisdiction of the Governor of Tashkend.

2. I do not consider that it would be desirable at the present moment to establish an independent Khanat at Tashkend subject to the supremacy of Russia. The Khan that might be named by our Government would in the eyes of the people still be the same Russian official by whom they are at present ruled, with this difference that the authority of the latter is recognised because it is backed by a force, whereas the power of the Khan can never be more than nominal. In order that he should have some weight with the people, it would be necessary to support him by military force, and the result would be that we should only lose that part of the revenue which would be appropriated to the maintenance of the Khan.

Moreover, the conversion of Tashkend into an independent Khanat would deprive us of that important political position, which we have acquired by the occupation of a town which is the capital of the whole of Central Asia.

With reference to the frontier which should separate us from the neighbouring Khanats, I am convinced that it ought to run along the Syr-Daria for the following reasons :—

1st.—The valley of the Chirchik is uncommonly fertile. Agriculture is more especially developed on the left side of the valley, which is exclusively occupied by the Kurama tribe of settled Kirghizes, who sow immense fields of rice which they sell almost entirely at Tashkend.

Under present circumstances, while the Emir of Bokhara holds Kokand and Khodjend, the supply of corn from beyond the Chirchik has ceased, and this has become very apparent from the prices in the bazaar of Tashkend.

2nd.—Among the Trans-Chirchik population are two very warlike tribes, the Kongly and Chaishkly. During the whole of our operations in front of Tashkend, the Kirghizes of those tribes made constant raids on this side of the river, robbing the population which had submitted to us. These incursions still continue, although much less frequently, and, owing to the waters of the Chirchik being at present very low, admitting of the river being forded at any part, it is quite impossible to keep those robber bands properly in check.

3rd.—A frontier along the Syr-Daria would completely and definitely open the river to our steamers, which could then ascend as far as the river is navigable, whereas with a frontier along the Chirchik, the navigation of the Jaxartes would be in our hands only as far as the mouths of the Chirchik.

Moreover, by taking possession of the whole course of the Syr-Daria, we become close neighbours of the Khanat of Kokand, and place ourselves in the rear of its capital, at a distance of only 40 versts, which will enable us to watch events, while with another fortified post at Namangan or Kurka, we might establish our influence over the Kipchaks, and thus open a road to Kashgar for our caravans.

Independently of the above considerations, it is impossible to foresee all the inconvenience of a frontier so close to Tashkend, many fields belonging to the latter town being situated on the opposite bank of the Chirchik.

In view of this fact, I begged your Excellency to send into the province in my charge, another battalion of the line and a regiment of three battalions, as our present means are insufficient for the complete military occupation of the whole of the territory which we indispensably require, and for keeping peaceful possession of a country which cannot expect timely aid from any quarter whatever. Moreover, our advanced fortresses being separated by great distances, require garrisons entirely independent of each other, and even our reserve must be sufficiently strong to support at any time our demands on Kokand and Bokhara.

If my request for the despatch of more troops be complied with, I shall be able to take into the field a force of five battalions, with two and a half batteries, after leaving sufficient garrisons in all the fortresses. With such a force the Government will be able to dispose at pleasure of the fate of Central Asia.

I now turn to our present relations with the Emir of Bokhara and to the future organization of the Khanat of Kokand.

The pretensions to Tashkend which the Emir brought forward at Khodjend, where he has halted with all his immense bands, are of considerable importance to us for being esteemed the head of the Mahomedan world in Central Asia; and possessing great material resources, he is the only ruler that can oppose our views.

His request that we should evacuate Tashkend proves that he places great reliance on his own strength; and if he is apparently satisfied with my answers, it is only because of his present unfavourable position in Kokand, and also because the Bokharian caravans have not yet returned from Russia.

If, contrary to expectations, the Emir should succeed in improving the state of his affairs, it is very probable that he will not allow an opportunity to escape of renewing his pretensions, in which case the question will have to be solved by arms.

The present is the most favourable time for finally compelling him to renounce his pretensions and even to open his dominions to our trade, and I regret that I cannot avail myself of so favourable an opportunity.

In the first place, re-inforcements destined for the frontier line have not yet arrived, and they are urgently wanted in case of military operations against the Emir; secondly, all the troops are at present occupied in preparing quarters for the winter; and, thirdly, we are collecting provisions for the troops, and in case of a rupture with the Emir, this operation cannot be conducted with any rapidity, for the local population always maintain a strict neutrality in such cases until the crisis is over.

These circumstances do not permit me to insist more decidedly on the satisfaction of our demands by the Emir, and they compel me to seek to gain time.

Considering, that the Emir of Bokhara can scarcely retain the Khanat of Kokand for any length of time, although even he should succeed in putting down the Kipchaks, I am of opinion that it would be more advantageous to us if Khudayar, the son-in-law of the Emir, were to be placed in possession of the Khanat.

Khudayar is not distinguished either by his ability or character, and he does not possess the confidence of the people, particularly that of the Kipchaks, who, in such a case, would always be our tools against the Khan. The Emir of Bokhara, bound by such an arrangement, would attach importance to our friendship, especially since he would not always be able to support his son-in-law alone; and as the latter would be considerably nearer to us than to Bokhara, he would inevitably submit to our exclusive influence. In order to satisfy the vanity of the Emir, the appointment of Khudayar might be made to appear as if it had been the result of a mutual understanding between us.

In consequence of intelligence just received respecting the state of affairs in Kokand, circumstances will perhaps give us the opportunity of taking at once the side of the Kipchaks, and of co-operating to the elevation, not of Khudayar, but of some other Chingizide to the Khanat. In any case the person who shall be elected to the Khanat will adopt the views of our Government, as laid down in Your Excellency's instructions. Events follow

so fast and so unexpectedly in Asia, that in most cases, it is impossible to foresee them.

APPENDIX XXII.

To His Highness the Emir of Bokhara.

The constant disorders in the Khanat of Kokand have at last turned the attention of my great sovereign to that country.

He has sent me to give peace and tranquillity to an oppressed people, and to bring it under his high protection.

Your Highness is aware that last year I conquered half the Khanat, and that my only reason for not proceeding further at that time was my being then occupied in organizing the government of the country. I had hoped that the Kokand Government would come meanwhile to its senses. But the incursions made by Alimkul on the villages of Ikan and Chilik have convinced me of the contrary.

I am now under the walls of Tashkend, and on the 9th May fought a battle with the Kokandians at a distance of seven versts from the town.

The Kokandian troops suffered a general defeat, they lost several guns, and Mullah Alimkul himself, the Regent of the Khanat, was killed. The disorders and intestine strife consequent on his death will accomplish the ruin of the country.

Although I have the orders of my sovereign not to cross the Syr-Daria, yet His Majesty desires, nevertheless, that the remaining part of the Khanat, which cannot, for certain circumstances, be incorporated with the empire and enjoy his protection, should be reduced to a state of order and tranquillity such as is enjoyed by the subjects of my great sovereign and by those of Your Highness.

As the Emirs of Bokhara have the honor of being in friendship with my mighty sovereign, the emperor, I consider it my duty to acquaint Your Highness with the present state of affairs, in order that you may judge whether it be advisable to bestow the throne of Kokand on its lawful Khan Khudayar.

If Your Highness should require the aid of Russian troops, I will at once, on being informed thereof, request the permission of the emperor to that effect.

I beg Your Highness will not fail to order that I should be informed of the decision which you may have been pleased to take in this matter.

I shall await such answer under the walls of Tashkend.

I consider it necessary at the same time to communicate to Your Highness that the whole of the country from the sea of Aral to the fortress of Vernoo has now been formed by the will of my sovereign into a distinct province bearing the name of Turkistan, and of which I have been appointed Military Governor; I am also Commander of the Forces which are stationed within the province; as well as of those which are on the way to join it.

I have the honor to express to Your Highness my sentiments of perfect devotion and respect.

APPENDIX XXIII.

To His Highness Muzafer Bagatur Khan, the highly exalted Emir of Bokhara.

I had the honor to receive Your Highness's letter, but I was obliged to ask your envoys to await my answer at Tashkend, while I went to Aulicéa to inspect the troops which have arrived from Siberia.

Your Highness's letter was at once forwarded to my mighty sovereign, and I have at present nothing to add to what I have already had the honor of communicating in my previous letter.

While gratefully acknowledging the presents which you sent, I beg Your Highness to accept the accompanying articles of silver-plate in testimony of my deep respect.

APPENDIX XXIV.

Address presented to the Governor General of Orenburg by the inhabitants of Tashkend on the 18th September 1865.

Translation from the Tartar.

Firstly : in the Name of the Maker, &c.

To Aide-de-Camp General Kryjanovski, Governor General of Orenburg.

On Friday, the 6th day of the month of Safar, in the year 1282 of the Mahomedan era, we, the inhabitants of Tashkend, having called in the power of the great sovereign, placed ourselves under his protection.

It was graciously announced to us at that time that, although we had submitted to the rule of the Russian Government, yet that it desired that the administration should, as heretofore, remain in our own hands, and that with that object we should elect a Chief from amongst ourselves.

Although we were much rejoiced at this gracious proposal, for which we beg to express our gratitude, yet we must be pardoned for stating that the appointment of a Chief from amongst our own people for the service of the great sovereign would be on our part an act of too much self-confidence and would also be out of place. While fulfilling the commands of the authorities, we beg to report as follows :—

It has come to our knowledge that in Russia all matters relating to the Mahomedan religion are under the direction of a Mufti. We would therefore wish that all similar matters concerning our *Sharigate* should be under the direction of our Kazy-Kilian, on condition that no one should interfere with his arrangements, excepting the person who, by appointment from the higher authorities, shall have the functions of an arbitrator and afford us protection, in which case, it will not be necessary to elect a Chief from amongst ourselves, and we even fear that such an election might give rise to great disorders among the people and originate evil and injustice.

We have therefore resolved to ask that all matters relating to the *Sharigate* should be entrusted to our Kazy-Kilian; that the appointment in Tashkend to offices subordinate to him, of *Kazis*, *Aglians*, *Myftis*, *Riaises*, *Mutavallies* (!) and *Imams* be left to the discretion of the same Kazy-Kilian, subject to confirmation by General Cherniayef, and that the appointment of *Zaketchis* (tax collectors), *Kurbashis*, *Aksakals* and other similar officials, be left to General Cherniayef; moreover, that the chief government over this population be also confided to General Cherniayef, as he has already been two years in this country, and since he has been so condescending to the inhabitants of Tashkend since the capture of the town as to return good for evil, and no Tashkendian has yet suffered wrong at his hands. *At the same time General Cherniayef knows well every one here from great to small, the bad as well as the good.

Leaving General Cherniayef at the head of the Government of Tashkend, we beg that to his authority and government may be also made subject such places as once formed part of this territory, and of which the boundaries were—on the east, the Issyk Kul, Ili, Utch-Kurgan, to the

very river Syr-Daria; on the north, the same Ili Ak-Mechet, to the fortress of Raim; on the west, the whole extent, from the beginning to the end, of the course of the Syr-Daria, with its left bank, and with the fortification of Chardara; on the south, the same extent from the beginning to the end, along the river Syr-Daria.

Being desirous of freeing the inhabitants of Tashkend from all such taxes as are not imposed by the *Sharigate*, we beg that no imposts be levied on houses within the town of Tashkend or on lands acquired with the knowledge and confirmation of the Kazy-Kilian. As regards the Government lands let to us, we engage, in compliance with the *Sharigate*, to pay one-tenth part of the profits, partly in produce, partly in money.

We further ask that no inhabitant of Tashkend be made a soldier or turned into a Cossack; that we shall not be required to quarter troops, and that we shall be freed from the money-exactions formerly made on the decease of members of the community (succession duty); that the marriage ceremony of maidens be performed by the Kazy-Kilian, and that of widows by the Riases; that all immoveable property known as Vakf made over by any one as a free gift, and wherever situated, *i. e.*, whether in Tashkend or outside the town, be exempt from all taxes, and that we be allowed freely to apply the revenues from such property to the objects for which the Vakf was originally bestowed.

We beg that all the acts of grace and the privileges which may be bestowed upon us by our great monarch be extended to such of the people of Tashkend as may at present be in other towns.

While subject to the administration of Tashkend, all persons holding office in the province, whether high or low, should receive their appointments solely at the will and by the confirmation of General Cherniayef. This is necessary, in order that such persons should be personally known to the Chief Governor of Tashkend and that no disorder should ensue.

Whereupon, by the resolution of our Sharigate, we are bound constantly and everlastingly to pray God for the health and welfare of our great sovereign.

If we have any shortcomings, we pray that the same may be forgiven. 1282.

(To the original are affixed fifty-eight seals bearing the names of the most respectable inhabitants of the town of Tashkend.)

APPENDIX XXV.

Extract from General Cherniayeff's Report of the 12th January 1866

In laying before your Excellency the enclosed correspondence between myself and the Bokharian Government respecting our embassy to Bokhara, I beg to state the circumstances which gave rise to it:—

The first news of our embassy brought to Tashkend by some Bokharians was favorable, namely, that it had been received with honor and welcome at Samarcand and Bokhara, and that it had been received by the Emir; but a report was circulated later to the effect that one of the envoys had died (which proved incorrect), and that the Emir kept back their letters.

Receiving no reports whatever, I wrote to the Emir on the 7th December, demanding an explanation of the reason why he had not sent back the mission within the stipulated period of thirty-five days.

Your Excellency will see very distinctly from the letter of the Emir that his displeasure, which resulted in the detention of the mission I had sent, was evoked by the news of his envoy at Orenburg.

The change of tone in his letters from supplication to insolence, can only be explained by the return of his caravans from Russia, and by their having been allowed to leave Orenburg and Troitsk under the pretext of their being Khivan, Tashkendian, or Kirghiz caravans.

In order to support my enclosed answer to the insolent letter of the Emir, I have this day moved forward, as a demonstration, a rifle battalion with four guns, towards the passage of the Syr-Daria at Chinaz, and in order to replace these troops, I have sent to Tashkend for four companies and four guns.

At the same time, in view of possible eventualities, I humbly beg your Excellency to send with all possible despatch, mounted on camels, one of the battalions destined for the Turkestan province with a double supply of cartridges.

In order to hasten their march, they should only be halted at fortified places, for the desert and arid nature of the country affords no rest to the troops, and they are only harassed by halts in the steppe. By following this plan, the 4th Siberian Battalion (now the 1st Orenburg), which marched on foot from Omsk, arrived at Aulieta (2,260 versts) on the 14th June, whereas the 6th Orenburg Battalion from Troitsk only came up in the middle of October. The battalion I ask for will find provisions here, but it must be supplied with money for pay and other necessities, particularly since two battalions have already arrived without a single copeck between them, and as the finances of the province of Turkestan are in a more than desperate position. My frequent representations, now of old date, and personal statements to your Excellency, have not yet met with any result. ●

The 100,000 Roubles which I have received will be far from sufficient for defraying the past expenditure of the force under my command; there is nothing wherewith to pay for the provisions and forage purchased on credit; our credit in the country is shaken, and my quittances are no longer accepted.

In such a condition of our credit, paper money cannot enter into circulation until its value is raised, and I therefore beg that specie only should be sent and in sufficient amount to defray the expenditure of the troops which are to be sent here up to the 1st January 1867.*

In frankly reporting the exact state of affairs, I am persuaded that your Excellency will afford me all possible co-operation for the maintenance of the honor and dignity of Russia in Central Asia. All is quiet in the province and at Tashkend.

APPENDIX XXVI.

Letter addressed to the Emir of Bokhara by General Cherniaieff.

Receiving no intelligence from the envoys whom I sent to your Highness a month and a half ago in accordance with your desire conveyed through Imaum Hodja, and being informed that one of them had died on the road, I sent a messenger to them with a letter, in which I required them to state why they had not informed me of such an important event, since they must know that I am accountable to my master for each of his subjects. ●

My messenger was stopped on the way, and told that my envoys were detained at Bokhara under guard, and that no one was allowed to come near them.

* Paper money was not only still taken by the inhabitants in 1866, but it was in that year even found possible to increase the quantity sent to Turkistan for Government purposes as compared with specie. This was due to the extension of our frontier, the abolition of immunities from taxation, the institution of offices where the paper money could be exchanged, &c.

As I do not understand the meaning of these rumours, and having as yet received no intelligence from my envoys, while your own, when at Tashkend, were not prevented from despatching messengers, I consider it my duty to acquaint your Highness therewith, believing as I do in your friendship towards my mighty sovereign, and I beg at the same time to request that you will explain the present misunderstanding.

APPENDIX XXVII.

To Michael Cherniagoff

Be it known, you have asked about your envoys, they are in good health. We likewise sent a mission to your Czar, and I now hear from persons who have returned from Russia that my envoys were not admitted to the Czar, but were detained somewhere on the road, which is not a friendly act, and I have therefore detained your envoys also. Envoys have hitherto never been molested, and those you sent are in no way treated ill. Your envoys will, however, remain here until mine appear before your Czar and obtain an answer. As soon as friendly news shall have been received from your Czar, then will I allow your envoys to depart with the greatest pleasure. *Month of Tagban.*

APPENDIX XXVIII.

General Cherniagoff to the Emir of Bokhara.

After five centuries of friendly relations between Bokhara and mighty Russia, the pretensions advanced in Your Highness's name to Tashkend, already taken by the Russian troops, gave rise to misunderstandings, in consequence of which, by the orders of the White Czar, your caravan and mission were detained at Fort No. 1 until the circumstances were cleared up.

Your Highness will have seen from my letters the constant desire of the Russian Government to clear up these misunderstandings as quickly as possible, and to renew our friendly and commercial relations.

Requiring no conquests, and desiring peaceful commercial relations with the countries which border his empire of half the globe, the All-powerful White Czar gave authority to the Governor General of Orenburg to bring the misunderstanding to a conclusion by means of negotiations.

The Governor General of Orenburg was prevented by circumstances from remaining any length of time in the province of Turkestan and therefore made over his full power to me.

On the strength of such powers, I stated to your envoy Imaum Hodja the conditions which might lead to the speedy re-establishment of our friendly relations. To these conditions Imaum Hodja gave assurance of your Highness's full acquiescence, stating at the same time that it would be agreeable to you to see a Russian embassy in Bokhara and promising that it should return in 35 or 36 days.

Believing you would agree to the conditions which I mentioned to Imaum Hodja, and putting faith in the words which he spoke for you, I despatched an embassy to your Highness, in the desire to please you.

Calculating that the envoys I sent would return in 35 days with a reply from your Highness, that friendly relations would in this wise be restored,

and that your embassy would consequently be allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg, I made arrangements for sending it on its journey.

Now your Highness informs me that the envoys I despatched have been detained by you, and will not be suffered to leave Bokhara until your own embassy is forwarded to St. Petersburg, and brings back from my All-powerful Emperor the answer you expect.

But your Highness may conclude from the above that the admission of your embassy into St. Petersburg, and the delivery of the caravans is closely connected with the return of my envoys from Bokhara with a friendly answer.

Thus the accomplishment of your desires rests entirely with you ; as regards myself in my further proceedings I shall obey the will of my All-powerful Ruler.

APPENDIX XXIX.

General Cherniayeff's Report of the 31st January 1866.

On the 21st of January the detachment assembled at Chinaz began to cross the Syr-Daria on native boats drawn by ropes. Through the energy with which Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs carried out the arrangements for the transport of the troops, the whole of the detachment composed of 11 companies, 6 sotnia and 16 guns,* with the artillery park and engineer train, and with supplies for a month,—was by the 28th of January on the left bank of the Syr.

On the 28th January a man arrived at Chinaz from the Bek of Jizakh, accompanying the dead body of one of our Cossacks who conveyed the envoys sent by me to Bokhara. It was found on examination that this Cossack died of fever, and the letter from the Bek of Jizakh showed that the body was forwarded by request of the envoys to Bokhara. With respect to our advance the messenger from the Bek of Jizakh had no instructions, and seeing that even on the 29th January no answer came from the Emir to the demand made for the release of the envoys, I advanced on the 30th January with the whole of the detachment to a position by lake Uëtiubé, within 13 versts from the Syr-Daria on the road to Jizakh.

Reporting to your Excellency this advance to the confines of Bokhara, I will add that I shall not fail to acquaint your Excellency with my further operations.

APPENDIX XXX.

Extract from General Cherniayeff's Report of the 19th February 1866.

On the 31st of January the troops were brought to a halt for the day for the purpose of making final arrangements for their further progress, and on the 1st February they marched towards Jizakh across the hungry steppe which the Bokharians considered to be the most reliable bulwark, believing it to be quite impassible for troops.

* Battalion of riflemen, 2 companies of No. 6 and 2 of No. 7 battalions, 3 companies of No. 3 and 3 of No. 4 battalions, a siege battery, a division of rifled artillery, a company of lightened, and a company of light horse artillery of No. 1 battery, 1,200 camels.

While making the second march from Uëtiubé I received a letter from the Emir, wherein he informed me that he had summoned the envoys to Samarcand and would send them back to me on his own arrival. Calculating that this letter was written under an influence of fear produced by our movement and that on the withdrawal of the menace his promise might not be kept, I replied to the Emir that his letter had found me in the middle of a waterless steppe, that it was for that reason alone, instead of turning back, I would march on to the first water where I should wait for the return of the envoys, after which I should retire at once.

On the 4th of February I reached the river Uëtiubé, 8 verts from Jizakh, and stopped. On the next day a letter arrived from the Emir stating that the Russians, whom he had detained, had departed from Bokhara, and on the 5th would be in Samarcand whence they would be sent out to me. In addition to this the Emir on his part requested me not to undertake any hostilities pending the return of the envoys. In reply to this letter I again promised to withdraw immediately on the fulfilment of his engagement, repeating once more that I had no other object in my advance.

On the strength on what appeared to be the clearly expressed relations of the Emir towards us, I applied on the 6th February to the Bek of Jizakh with a request that he would send out to our pickets, natives with wood and hay for sale. The Bek at first was willing, but when I demanded an immediate compliance with my request as a proof of friendly feeling, he answered that as he had not received from the Emir any orders on the subject he could not comply. After informing the Bek that unless on the next day, the 7th February, wood and hay were not sent out, I should be obliged to order the employment of forcible means for obtaining them. I sent on the 7th a detachment to the town, composed of 2 companies, 4 sotnias of Cossacks, with foragers and 2 guns, under Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs. Colonel Pistolkohrs was instructed to repeat the demand for wood and hay, and in case of refusal, to seize a supply of both in the vicinity of the town, without touching anything else, and not to have recourse to arms except in the event of their being first employed by the other side. On nearing the town crowds of armed Bokharians issued out to meet the detachment, which, while parleying with Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs, gradually drew back into the suburbs, and when the detachment drew into the town they suddenly opened an obstruction raised across the street, and from behind they met our troops with a volley. The obstruction was immediately carried, and the troops pursuing the Bokharians penetrated to the market place in the town, during which course the foragers gathered all the wood and hay they could find in the yards of the houses and in the bazaar, without touching any other property of the residents, or the merchandize. When the obstruction was carried a fire was opened from the fort, but the cannon shots did us no injury, first because of the wrong direction of their fire, and then because when our men were close to the fort the shot flew over their heads. With the first volley fired in the town a simultaneous attack was made on the 'sotnia' of Cossacks left at the entrance to the suburb to cover the retreat, by the Bokharians who, up to that moment, were in friendly converse with them. The Cossacks, taken unawares, were quickly surrounded on all sides, but 2 companies with 2 guns sent out by me from the camp when the firing commenced, forced the Bokharians to retire; at this time the troops having collected a sufficient quantity of wood and hay emerged from the town and joining the companies outside returned to camp. In this affair 8 soldiers and Cossacks were killed and 19 wounded. According to Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs's report there were about 6,000 armed Bokharians; the loss of the latter was more than 100 killed on the spot. I immediately acquainted the Emir with the conduct

of the Bek of Jizakh, which was not in accordance with the Emir's letter, and added that a continuance of similar behaviour would compel me to take Jizakh which, as I was only marching to the encounter of our envoys, I would otherwise be unwilling to do.

On the morning of the 8th of February crowds of Bokharians made their appearance within view of the camp at no great distance. I twice warned them that I should take their approach as a mark of hostility, and at last after a third intimation I gave orders to fire at those crowds that were within reach of gun shot. The crowds at once dispersed, and of my having been compelled to fire I at once sent to inform the Emir.

In the evening a messenger from the Bek of Jizakh came to me with an expression of regret for the fire that had been opened upon me which he attributed to a misunderstanding, and with the intimation that the Emir's sanction having been received, inhabitants of the town would come next day with wood and hay for sale.

On the 9th February, foragers were sent to the outposts, but the inhabitants did not appear, excusing themselves on the ground of their fear for the great number of men sent to the pickets.

Seeing by their behaviour that the Bokharians were only trying to gain time I resolved to withdraw. I desired that the expedition should be regarded as one undertaken merely to urge compliance with my demands. Moreover I had obtained two letters from the Emir in which he abandoned his former pretensions, and in addition, the want of fodder for the horses would not admit of a longer stay while the 9th of February was the very earliest possible day by which the Russians could reach the camp from Samarcand. It was also possible that circumstances over which the Emir could have no control, might delay them still longer, or that the Emir counting on the speedy arrival of all his reinforcements and artillery, intended to back with force conditions that I could not accede to.

Having determined to withdraw I ordered another foraging excursion to be made on the 9th. Two companies with two guns, under Lieutenant Colonel Fovitzki sent out with this object obtained a supply of wood and hay and returned to camp without a shot having been fired on either side. On the evening of the same day two other companies with 2 guns, under Major Nazurof performed an equally successful foraging excursion; on this occasion although the Bokharians put in an appearance, those who approached near were fired at and driven away.

On the 10th of February a third letter reached me from the Emir, by which he again engaged to send back the Russian envoys.

The messenger verbally informed me that the Emir had given orders to send us wood and hay for sale, which was confirmed by a letter from the Bek of Jizakh.

Adhering to my resolution to withdraw to the Syr-Daria, under the impression that the Bokharians would still raise difficulties and delay, I began to retreat on the 11th of February, acquainting the Emir, that as a proof of the absence of any other intention than that of seeking the release of the envoys, I withdrew to the Syr-Daria where I should wait for, and expect them, on the strength of the promise given by him in his three letters.

APPENDIX XXXI.

Général Cherniayeff to the Emir of Bokhara.

Beginning the transport of the troops across the Syr-Daria, I consider it necessary to inform your Highness, out of respect for the five hundred years'

friendship of Bokhara with powerful Russia, that it depends upon yourself to avert war.

I come not for the purpose of conquest, but because Russian Officers are detained in Bokhara, which is an injury to the White Czar himself and to all his 76 millions of subjects; I am compelled to march until I meet my envoys, and shall return back when I have met them.

APPENDIX XXXII.

Report of the Chief of the Staff of the province of Turkestan, to the Officer Commanding the troops in the Orenburg Military Circuit, dated the 7th (19th) March 1866.

Information has been received that the Emir of Bokhara has assembled at Jizakh as many as 40,000 men with 16 guns, and that he has applied to the Khan of Khiva for assistance, which, according to reports from Khiva, he is likely to obtain.

The Military Governor has desired me to report this to your Excellency, and, independent of his report, humbly to request you will arrange for the quickest possible dispatch from Orsk of a battalion of men on camels.

At the same time Major General Cherniayeff has ordered me to beg you will expedite to the utmost the departure of the two remaining battalions from Orenburg.

APPENDIX XXXIII.

Report of the same to Colonel Count Voronov-Dashkoff, II. I. M's Aide-de-Camp, dated the 14th (26th) March 1866.

According to information received from the Syr-Darian detachment, the Emir of Bokhara having assembled a force with 10 guns, intends advancing in three columns, one of which joining with the Kokandians, will march on Khodjend, another against our detachment stationed on the left bank of the Syr-Daria opposite to the mouth of the Chirchik, while the third crossing at Chardary (within 60 versts of Tashkend) will be directed to the line of communication between Chemkend and Tashkend.

I am requested by Major General Cherniayeff to inform you of this, and humbly to request you to proceed to Tashkend, only in the event of your being able to arrive here not later than on the 19th (31st) of the present month of March; but otherwise to remain at Chemkend or in Turkestan according to where this communication may find you.

I shall, in due course, acquaint you of the possibility of pushing forward in safety.

APPENDIX XXXIV.

Journal of Military operations and events on the Central Asiatic Frontier, from the 14th (26th) February to the 10th (22nd) April.

The detachment operating at Jizakh returned on the 11th (26th) February to the Syr-Daria, and camped as before on the left bank of the river by the ferry, 5 versts below the mouth of the Chirchik.

Here the detachment remained until the 10th (22nd) of March. The Bokharians alarmed at the advance of our troops, hastened to collect their cavalry, of whom about 10,000 assembled while the detachment was stationed before Jizakh. This cavalry *en masse* followed the detachment to the end of the first march from the town.

A few days afterwards the Bokharians established a strong picket beyond Sardaba, 40 versts from the camp (on the Jizakh road), and from time to time sent out small parties to molest the detachment.

The following were the occasions for attacks :—

On the 24th of February (8th March) two soldiers of the 3rd Orenburg battalion strolled away 3 versts from the pickets for the purpose of having some sport in the jungles, they were suddenly surrounded by ten mounted Bokharians, the soldiers united together and keeping off the Bokharians with their fire safely returned into camp.

On the 26th February (10th March) ten armed Cossacks were sent out to gather wood. At a short distance from the camp, four Cossacks detached themselves from the party, in pursuit of wild ducks, the rest proceeded on their way. Soon after two more detached themselves. When the latter had gone about 300 fathoms, the remainder were suddenly set upon by a party of 100 Bokharians, who jumped out of the reeds and surrounded the Cossacks. The two Cossacks who had just left on seeing this, galloped off to the camp to give information. The body of cavalry sent out under Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs came up with the Bokharians and pursued them till night by moonlight, but they were not able to rescue the captive Cossacks, because our cavalry horses had not yet recovered from the tedious and difficult, but quick, march to Jizakh, and still suffered from want of forage. The Bokharians had fresh horses, and the majority of them had even two apiece, by which means they were enabled to send their prisoners quickly on to Jizakh. Our cavalry, consisting of 300 men, took 4 prisoners, a quantity of muskets and 6 horses.

For the better protection of the trans-Chirchik country, a special force was organized towards the end of February (O. S.); it was composed of 5 companies of infantry, 1 sotnia of Cossacks, and 4 guns, placed under the command of Colonel Krayevski and stationed in the neighbourhood of Kereuchi.

On the 24th of February (8th March), this Kereuchi force, in consequence of alarming reports relative to the appearance of Kokandian bands under the leadership of Rustam-bek in the Kurama Hills, advanced in that direction. The Kokandians on discovering the movement fled, and the force marched on 40 versts, but did not come up with them.

In order to secure a better communication with the Kereuchi force and to protect the ford across the Chirchik, the camp of the main detachment was on the 10th (22nd) March, removed to the mouth of that river, where a new ferry was established across the Syr-Daria, while for the protection of this ferry, against the event of the detachment leaving, two forts were constructed, one on the left bank of the Syr in the shape of a *Tête de pont* and the other in that of a redoubt on the nearest island.

On the 11th (23rd) of March some mounted Bokharians killed one of our soldiers who had strolled away beyond the cordon of the new camp. The soldier was decapitated within sight of our camp; the body was left, but the head taken away.

Small parties began to appear in the month of March along the line of our communications. Thus on the 20th March (1st April) a Cossack courier emerging from the gardens on the outskirts of Tashkend, on his way to Chemkeud, was attacked by several men; the Cossack was wounded, but made his escape.

On the 24th March (5th April) a party of 30 men from the Bokharian Garrison of Chordara made their way to the Tashkend road for the purpose of plundering, and within 25 versts of that road attacked a post of our militia men. The attack was made in the night, the Kirghizes dispersed, and 10 of them were taken prisoners.

The chief den of the gangs which showed themselves on our lines of communication, was fort Chordara, where the Bokharians held a small garrison of 100 men.

For the destruction of the place, and at the same time for the purpose of inflicting a punishment on the Kirghizes of the Kungrad tribe, who camped along the Arys, and who, in the month of January of the present year, had passed over to the number of 600 tents (Kibitkas) into the Bokharian limits beyond the Syr-Daria, a column of 3 corps of infantry, 1 sotnia of Orenburg Cossacks with two batteries, guns and 2 pieces of horse artillery under Captain Abramof, was sent on the 22nd March (3rd April) to Chordara. The 75 versts distance was marched in 2 days, and on the morning of the 25th or 26th the troops neared the fort. The Bokharian garrison quickly evacuated the fort, and we at once proceeded to demolish the works. At the same time we seized from the Kirghizes camping on the grounds, under protection of the Bokharian garrison, about 2,000 rams, 150 head of large cattle and camels. In the struggle with the Bokharians we had 3 Cossacks and 1 artilleryman wounded. The loss of the Bokharians consisted of 10 men. The whole of Captain Abramof's force then camped on the Syr-Daria, 3 versts from Chordara. A post of 10 militia men was established on the right bank of the Syr to keep up communication with the main detachment.

On the 26th of March (7th April) a small party of mounted men was seen from Captain Abramof's camp descending from the hills on the right side of the river. Fifteen Cossacks and as many foot soldiers were at once sent down the stream, some in the ferry boat and others swimming. These with some militia men from the other side pursued the Bokharian party and rescued 6 Kirghizes who had the day before been seized from the post between Chemkend and Tashkend. Three of the enemy were killed. On the 29th March (10th April) Captain Abramof's force returned to the main detachment.

On the 27th March (8th April) the command of the chief detachment, as well as of all the troops of the province of Turkestan, was handed over by Major General Cherniayeff to Major General Romanovski.

During the whole of the month of March reports were frequently received of the intention of the Emir to commence decisive aggressive operations against us in conjunction with Kokand and even with Khiva. The alliance with Khiva was not very probable, as owing to the cessation of the trade between Bokhara and Russia the Khivans now derive great benefit from that circumstance. But the intelligence relative to the aid obtained by Bokhara from the Turkomans of Khiva, received repeated confirmation in communications from the Syr-Daria line as well as in letters from Bokhara. The alliance between Kokand and Bokhara was the more likely, because, simultaneously with the increase of disturbances in the region occasioned by Bokharian horsemen in sight of the Kereuchi force, parties of mounted Kokandians were observed in that quarter. Our spies described the dimensions of the Bokharian forces as something enormous, stating the figure of the Emir's troops at 100,000 with 100 cannon; at the said time they said that while the Emir marched on Chinaz and Chordara, Khudoyar Khan was to march into the trans-Chirchik country with a separate army of 40,000 men with 50 guns.

Information to the same effect was received on the night of the 27th March (8th April). The spy affirmed that the Emir's advanced army of

100,000 with 20 guns had reached the Syr-Daria and had encamped within 40 or 50 versts of our chief camp, and that the Emir himself with the remaining mass of his troops in the vicinity of Oura-tiubé was expected to follow.

Major General Romanovski being informed on his way to Tashkend of the disturbed state of the province, made arrangements *en route* for two companies of the 5th Battalion from Fort No. 1, and a company of rifles and Cossacks from fort Perovsky, besides a portion of the troops in the Alatau district, to proceed to Tashkend.

On the strength of preliminary instructions from the minister for war, the authorities of Western Siberia were ordered to send to the Turkestan province, in case of a demand for reinforcements, a portion of their troops. Upon this the Chief of the Alatau district was requested to forward two companies of infantry, 2 sotnias of Cossacks and 2 guns for the occupation of the posts on the left flank, and the commander of the left flank was instructed to despatch those of his troops so detached from the garrison to Tashkend. By these arrangements the main detachment as well as the Kereuchi force and our communications were considerably strengthened. But still two or three weeks' time would necessarily elapse before all this was carried out, therefore, in order to guard against the depredations of marauding parties which always attended the aggression of Central Asiatic Rulers, on receipt of the intelligence respecting the advance of the Emir, orders were at once issued for the formation of a militia in Tashkend, Chienkend, and Turkestan, of trustworthy Kirghizes.

At the same time stronger measures of precaution were taken in the camp, and on the next morning a reconnoissance was undertaken.

The reconnoissance was deferred till 29th on account of very bad weather.

On this day, and on the 29th and 30th following, a small force examined the country around the camp, within a circuit of 20 versts, but no enemy was anywhere discovered. At the same time some spies who could be relied on, and who were sent to obtain correct information, returned with more tranquillizing news. Although all this confirmed the intelligence of the assembly of a considerable quantity of Bokharian troops in Oura-tiubé, and on the road from Khodjend to Chinaz, yet the number of these was shown to be only half of what had been previously stated. They also doubted that the Khan of Kokand intended co-operating with the Emir.

The earth huts in which the troops had so long lived in Tashkend, and the difficult winter march to Jizakh, had very much exhausted our men, and bred typhus fever, scurvy and ague. On some days the number of men falling sick was 25. Among the 14 companies, 8 sotnias, and 18 guns which composed the main detachment, the *personnel* was only 2,000.

As there were a great many besides the garrison men attached to the office of the Staff in Tashkend, one more company was demanded from thence.

On the 1st (13th) of April the foundation of a fort was laid on the right bank of the Syr-Daria opposite the ferry, on a site in every respect more advantageous than that of old Chinaz. This was done with the object of obviating the necessity of leaving garrisons in old Chinaz, 6 versts from the camp, and in the new forts by the ferry. As soon as the works are completed, it is intended to transfer the garrison from Chinaz into this new fort.

On the 2nd (14th) of April two militia posts were established to facilitate communications between the main detachment and that at Kereuchi.

On the 3rd (15th) of April the Tashkend militia, organized by the Cossack Elder Serof, was sent out to reconnoitre the neighbourhood of Tashkend, and the roads from Tashkend to Chinaz and the Syr-Daria.

On the 4th of April a sotnia of Ural Cossacks was sent from the main detachmant to examine the right and left banks of the Chirchik and the right bank of the Syr for a distance of 30 versts from the camp, with the same object of clearing the country of small parties of depredators.

These parties of militia and Cossacks patrolled for 4 days up to the 8th (20th) April.

Gangs of 10 to 30 men were found hovering about, but these fled on the appearance of the patrols, and being pursued several of them were killed, the others being forced hurriedly to escape by swimming across the Syr, within sight of the Cossacks.

On the 4th (16th) of April news was received in the main detachment that large bodies of Bokharian horse were within 20 versts of the camp higher up the Syr-Daria, and some vague intelligence of the enemy's designs. A reconnoissance in the direction of Murza-Rabat, which is reported on separately, was therefore undertaken on the 5th (17th) of April.

APPENDIX XXXV.

Draft of a letter to the Emir of Bokhara.

YOUR HIGHNESS,—Having by the will of my Sovereign entered into fulfilment of the duties of Military Governor of the Province of Turkestan and of Commander of the troops situated therein, in the place of General Cherniayeff called to St. Petersburg on service, I consider it my duty to inform you thereof.

This appointment will afford you an opportunity for showing the considerations by which you are governed in your relations towards Russia, *i. e.*, whether you intend to wage war against us, or whether your actions spring from some misunderstandings with General Cherniayeff personally.

If you wish for war, then of course there is no need for negotiations; act as you know best. I, on the other hand, shall act in accordance with my duty as Military Commander, *i. e.*, in the same manner in which I was obliged to act towards your cavalry which presumed, when I was already here, to make an attack on my Sovereign's troops, causing thereby turbulence and disorder in the region under the supreme protection of the White Czar.

You will at the same time remember that by retaining the officers sent to you by General Cherniayeff you offer an insult to all Russians.

APPENDIX XXXVI.

Copy of a letter to Mahommed Yakub-bek of Jizakh.

Your messenger Sadyk has delivered your letter to His Excellency Major General Romanovski, the Military Governor of the province of Turkestan, and has been well treated by him. While commissioning me to thank you for your friendly letter, His Excellency has desired me to inform you that on the day before the arrival of your servant he despatched from himself to your Emir a notification of his assumption of his present duties, and of the punishment inflicted on your cavalry for daring to attack the troops of the White Czar.

Major General Romanovski while fully agreeing with you that good neighbours should above all avoid falsehood and duplicity, informs you that, pending the receipt of an answer to the letter sent to His Highness the Emir, that he does not consider it expedient to enter into any explanations.

APPENDIX XXXVII.

A copy of a letter from Mahommet Jacob-Bek of Djizakh.*

To Cherniayeff, who has lately returned from the White Czar, be it known that, thanks to the Almighty and the great kindness* of my Lord and Master, I am in the enjoyment of good health and happiness. And now I must inform you that last year, after the Emir had conquered Kokand, Michael Cherniayeff himself made an agreement to the effect that he would not cross either the Chirohik or the Syr-Daria, and it was also agreed that our people should not cross over these rivers. Our Lord and Master, desiring to secure the friendship of his ancestors, consented to Michael's terms, and to prove that he had done so, returned to Bokhara with his army.

It has always been the custom of our great Bokharian rulers to welcome their visitors with great warmth and hospitality, to entertain them liberally for six months, and to pay them every respect and attention on their departure. Michael, unwilling to wait for his ambassadors, who were then being entertained and feasted, according to custom, and for whom an answer was being prepared, broke the treaty he had made by crossing the Syr-Daria with his army and artillery and commenced hostilities; he marched up to Djizakh, suffered defeat, and then returned humbled to this side of the Syr-Daria. On learning this, our Emir with all the Mussulman troops crossed from the road of condescension to the road of a holy war (Hazavat), waiting at the same time for intelligence from the White Czar or from our ambassador before commencing active operations. We soon learned that Michael Tchernayef had been deprived of his post and had departed; thou hast replaced him, but we know not with what spirit thou comest here, warlike or friendly. I being thy nearest neighbour send thee this letter, entreating thee to answer, whether it is for the sake of war that thou hast come amongst us! We then shall know, according to thy answer, and with God's help, what steps to take. If thy purposes are friendly, and thou desirest the return of the ambassadors let me know; let me know, besides all that the White Czar has deigned to tell thee, but speak the truth, so that I may not appear a liar while mediating for the sake of peace and for the tranquillity of thine and our people. I will lay all before the Emir, and thy officials shall be well treated and returned to thee. For this object I send my well-tried servant Sadyk to thee with this letter; all that thou wishest to learn, ask of him, and all that thou desirest should be repeated to me in words, tell him. The month of Zilhadja 5-8th April 1282-1866. Written in the Djizakh Chancery, with Mahommet Jacob-Bek's seal prefixed.

APPENDIX XXXVIII.

An extract from General Romanoski's Report, dated 11-23rd April 1866.

On the 5th a strong reconnoitring party, under my personal command, marched towards the Kodjend road with the object of ascertaining whether there was any foundation for the often-repeated rumour, that a party of some thousand men was encamped between Irdjar and Mourza-Rabat, a place 30 versts distant from us. On the 4th of April our scouts repeating the same rumours, added others of the enemy, being bent on some great movement. The reconnoitring expedition had also for its object to clear the neighbourhood of

the camp of small parties, which, after disappearing for a few days, again returned in sight of the principal camp.

The reconnoitring column consisted as follows :—

- 2 Companies of Orenburg Sharp-shooters.
- 1 Company Sharp-shooters belonging to the 4th Orenburg Battalion of the line.
- 1 Company Sharp-shooters belonging to the 3rd Orenburg Battalion of the line.
- 1 Company Sharp-shooters belonging to the 7th Orenburg Battalion of the line.
- A Division of Rifled guns.
- One hundred Ural Cossacks.
- A Battery of Light Cossack Horse Artillery belonging to the Orenburg Brigade.
- A Rocket Company with its full complement of 30 Militiamen.

This column was placed under the command of Aide-de-Camp Colonel Count Vorontsof-Dashkof. For the purpose of taking the enemy by surprise, a part of the abovementioned regiment of Sharp-shooters, belonging to the 4th battalion with 10 horsemen, was ordered to march out before the dawn of day, two hours before the march of the remainder of the detachment, so as to join the cavalry at 10 versts distance from the camp. I led the latter at a trot, ordering the remainder of the infantry, with the division of rifle guns, to follow as close as possible.

The detached company had scarcely marched 5 versts from the camp when they noticed at some distance from the road a party of mounted Bokharians, 50 in number, making their way towards our advanced Cossack picket. The Cossacks on seeing the enemy dismounted, received the charge and killed one of them; the others seeing the advancing company, left the Cossacks and quickly disappeared. The only loss we sustained was a Cossack horse wounded with a lance.

Having passed the Uch-tiubé mounds, we overtook the company of Sharp-shooters of the 4th battalion, and here for the first time came in sight of the enemy, stationed at Ak-tiubé, numbering about 150 men; behind these were seen a large dark mass which we could not well distinguish. A hundred men sent in advance drove the enemy off the mound, from which could then plainly be discerned considerable parties of mounted horsemen advancing towards us. Collecting behind the mound all the cavalry and supported by a company, I moved forward at a trot to meet the enemy whose numbers were gradually increasing. The Bokharian cavalry at this time was 2,000 or 3,000 strong, 3 flags being stationed in front. These we subsequently learned from prisoners belonged to the Beks of Samarcand, Oura-tiubé and Djizakh, who had been sent out of the Bokharian force actually stationed on the Irdjar, with the object of attacking our camp, and also for the defence of an enormous flock of sheep which were partly the property of the abovementioned Beks, but principally tribute and gifts from the Syr-Darian tribes to the Emir of Bokhara, on the occasion of his celebration of the Kourban Bairam at Oura-tiubé.

As we advanced, however, the Bokharians began to retire, but after marching 7 versts beyond Ak-tiubé, and remarking the absence of infantry amongst us, without which we were only a tenth part of their own strength, they determined on attacking us, and having occupied a sufficiently advantageous position, they opened fire upon us from some falconets. But a Cossack battery, with a rocket company, rapidly pushed out in front, soon cooled their ardour, and then an impetuous onslaught of the Cossacks drove them from their position with great loss on their side, compelling them even to abandon their flocks and to retreat to a distance of 10 versts. Having stopped the cavalry and waited for the approach of the company of Sharp-shooters of the 4th

battalion which followed us, I sent a sotnia of Orenburg Cossacks under Kalougin and all the militiamen to collect together the cattle which had strayed away over the field and to drive them towards our reserve at Ak-tiubé. With the remaining troops under my command, namely a sotnia, a rocket company, and a company of light Cossack artillery, I established myself in position and remained stationed for two hours. In the meantime, the enemy almost disappeared and seemed to have abandoned all idea of an attack, as well as all attempt to get back the booty fallen into our hands; stopping, therefore, the advancing column of our infantry, I decided on marching with the cavalry in the direction of the Syr-Daria with the object of finding a convenient encampment for the night, as it would have been too fatiguing for the troops to return to the camp on the same day.

Leaving a Cossack picket in the same position to watch the enemy, and ordering it to join the infantry a little later, I led the foremost troops in the direction of the river. But we had scarcely got over 2 versts when we noticed that our picket Cossacks were being gradually surrounded by a crowd of Bokharians. The sotnia of Ural Cossacks under Golounof was immediately directed against the enemy, and as the Bokharians were separated from us by a small ridge, they could not see all our movements; the brave Ural Cossacks were therefore able to overtake the enemy, to kill some of them, and to make one a prisoner. This circumstance was very important, as the prisoner could, to a certain extent, explain to us the contradictory reports of our scouts. The Cossacks pursued the enemy 5 versts.

After this last attack the enemy did not trouble us any more, and the entire reconnoitring detachment, with the exception of one company and Kalougin's sotnia, which had been sent to cover the retreat of the party and to drive in the flocks that had been seized by the former, encamped on the bank of the Syr-Daria, 7 versts below Mourza-Rabat; at this place the last of the scattered sheep were collected.

Leaving the detachment under the command of Count Vorontsof I returned with Golounof's sotnia to the Chinaz camp; my object in this movement was to protect the foremost lot of sheep which we had captured, and which could not reach the camp by night fall.

When day dawned the enemy again attacked Count Vorontsof's column, but this, however, was their last feeble attempt which cost them some men; four days have passed since then and nothing more of them has been seen by our troops.

On the 6th, at 1 o'clock P. M., the whole army returned to the Chinaz camp. The cattle taken were about 14,000 in number.

APPENDIX XXXIX.

Journal of Military operations and events which took place on the Central Asian frontiers, from the 10th of April to the 1st of May 1866.

On the 12th of April, the following intelligence was received:—

The steamer *Perovsky* accompanied by a barge and an iron ferry supported along the bank by 30 men of the 4th company 2nd battalion, proceeding from Fort "Perovsky" where it had wintered, to Chinaz, was on the 6th of April at 7 o'clock in the morning, at about 30 versts above the mouth of the River Arys, fired at from the dense reeds by a party of Bokharians consisting of several hundreds of men.

The fire of our Sharpshooters stationed along the sides of the steamer, and several discharges of grape shot from the guns, obliged the Bokharians to quit their position, and enabled the steamer again to pursue her way unmolested. Attempts of this kind on the part of the Bokharians were repeated several times during the day, but the same resistance being shown from on board the boat, and our shots telling on the Bokharians and causing them considerable loss, they at last kept out of reach of the guns. As the supply of Saxaul fuel prepared for the steamer had been burned by the enemy, the Captain was obliged to send his crew on shore to chop timber, protected by a line of Sharpshooters; a supply of fuel was safely taken into the steamer without any loss of life.

On the 14th of April, the steamer *Perovsky* arrived safely at new Chinaz, where it cast anchor. There was not a single man wounded among the crew or the soldiery. On the 7th of April, the overseer of the central population brought intelligence to the Commandant of Chemkend that a considerable band of Bokharians, under the command of Sadyk, had shown themselves on the left bank of the Syr-Daria opposite the mouth of the River Arys. According to the intelligence collected, the aim of this band of Bokharians was to destroy the fuel prepared for our steamers, and also to cut off our communications. With the object of opposing Sadyk's tactics, Lieutenant Colonel Gorodnichenko immediately dispatched to the mouth of the Arys, under the command of Ensign Kazin, a party of 70 Siberian Cossacks, 11 artillery men, with one rocket stand and 80 militiamen. After having reached the mouth of the River Arys and turned upwards along the right bank of the River Syr-Daria, Ensign Kazin, on the 14th and 15th of April, began to fall in with small bands of Bokharian Kirghizes, who retreated on his approach; and it was only on the 16th, near the Lake Sary-Kul, that he encountered a large party of them, numbering about 300 men, who opened fire on Kazin's detachment. But not being able to stand our fire, the enemy's band, together with their leader Sadyk, fled across to the left bank, bearing away their wounded. Taking advantage of their flight, Kazin called out some "Djigit" Volunteers and sent them across the river in pursuit of the enemy, from whom they seized one horse and then returned in safety. Having driven away Sadyk to the other side of the Syr-Daria, Kazin marched along the river towards the ruined fortress of Chardara. Ensign Kazin was informed that Sadyk's band was being reinforced, in consequence of which intelligence he requested the Commandant of Chemkend to strengthen his detachment, which was done on the 20th of April by a reinforcement of 18 mounted men with one under officer, 6 Cossacks and 16 militiamen under the command of Ensign Ahmerof. Taking advantage of this reinforcement, Kazin decided on attacking Sadyk's band which was encamped on the left bank. Throwing out some Sharpshooters, Kazin, accompanied by 40 Cossacks, crossed to the enemy's side, and, under cover of the fire from our band, fell on the enemy, and without any loss on his side drove away Sadyk and took possession of a good-sized boat. Sadyk and his band fled upwards along the Syr-Daria. On the 22nd, Kazin learned that Sadyk had, according to hearsay, strengthened his band to about 2,000 men and was marching towards us down the River Syr-Daria with the object of acting on our communications. In consequence of these rumours Kazin with his detachment marched likewise towards the mouth of the Arys.

In the trans-Chirchik region Colonel Kravfsky received intelligence that a band of marauders had been seen in a north-easterly direction from Kereuchi, in the village of Oishun, for the dispersion of this band on the 8th of April Sotnik Voljintsof was sent there with 21 Cossacks and 5 militiamen. At sunset, on the same day, Voljintsof reaching Oishun actually fell in with a

considerable band, numbering about 500 with 4 flags; not daring with so small a force to run the risk of attacking the enemy, Voljintsof took up a convenient position and immediately sent intelligence to Kereuchi that he had fallen in with a considerable band much stronger than his own detachment. The enemy in the meanwhile fell upon the Cossacks, but were repulsed by a fire of musketry; noticing that the enemy possessed no fire-arms, Voljintsof assumed the offensive, and after gradually driving the enemy back, was obliged, owing to the approach of night, to take up a convenient position, where he spent the night of the 8th-9th April. All through the night the enemy did not give a moment's rest to our small detachment, but when morning dawned they had disappeared, and Voljintsof, without any loss whatever, returned to the camp, meeting on his way thither a sotniâ of Cossacks who had been sent to his assistance. The loss of the enemy in this encounter, according to eye-witnesses, was not slight.

Colonel Kraefsky having ascertained that the band against which Voljintsof had operated had not dispersed, but only retired into the deepest recesses of the mountains, sent on the 12th into the mountains a sotniâ of Cossacks and 50 Sharp-shooters mounted on camels, under the command of the same officer, with the object of dispersing them, or at least gaining correct information as to the enemy's formation, objects, and movements.

On the 13th of April, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the detachment overtook the free-booters between Namdan and Parkent, but this time it was greeted with a volley of shots. But our return fire silenced their discharges, and the approach of the Sharp-shooters on their camels compelled them to abandon their entrenchments on the mountains and to retire higher and farther. After a long pursuit the men and horses were so fatigued that they had to return. After giving time for the troops to rest Voljintsof returned.

On the despatch of Voljintsof's detachment, Colonel Kraefsky with the remaining troops started on the 13th from the position they occupied near Kerys and marched to the Karaktau, so as to be near the scene of action in the mountains. Joining Voljintsof on the 14th, Colonel Kraefsky on the 15th directed his steps to Kereuchi, where he left his extra luggage. On the 15th Colonel Kraefsky gave up the command of the detachment to Captain Mihailofsky, having been summoned on service to Tashkend. At dawn of day, on the 16th, Captain Mihailofsky received intelligence to the effect, that a considerable band of Kokandians were descending the mountains, in consequence of which he immediately despatched in that direction 3 companies, 4 guns and 80 Cossacks. On seeing the approach of the Russians, the enemy turned and fled into the mountains pursued by the Cossacks to the very steepest ascents. The detachment took up the same position again before Kerys.

On the 17th news was again received that the same band was descending into the valley near Karaktau; Captain Mihailof, therefore, sent thither 40 Sharp-shooters and 40 Cossacks under the command of Ensign Sadiakin; Sadiakin's detachment profiting by a fog which had set in came up quite close to the enemy at dawn of day on the 18th without being seen; his sudden appearance so startled the band of Kokandians, which consisted of 400 men, that they fled in great confusion. The Cossacks and "Djigits" sent in pursuit of the enemy succeeded in capturing two prisoners.

On the 19th Colonel Kraefsky's detachment assembled again on its former position at Kerys.

From small expeditions into the mountains and from intelligence gathered from other sources we learned that the three principal ringleaders of these hostilities against us were to be found in the trans-Chirchik region: Roustambek, who since last year seldom quitted those parts, Ishpouta

(a Kirghiz), having a party of his own consisting of 500 men, and Irkary, one of the former Aksakals of the village of Ablyk. These ring-leaders were being joined by turbulent spirits incited and encouraged by the Emir. These are the people who chiefly cause all these disorders and commit petty robberies.

On the 6th of April, the principal detachment returned safely from a reconnoitering expedition under Mourza-Rabat without having seen anything of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the camp.

The troops were by turns sent across to the right bank where they were employed in raising earth-works for the fortification of new Chinaz.

On the 19th some envoys arrived at the camp from the Bokharian Emir with a letter for me. The contents of this letter as likewise my answer are known to your Excellency from the copy of the correspondence annexed to my report.

In the neighbourhood of Tashkend on the right side of the Chirchik and also on the roads between Chinaz and Tashkend bands of freebooters, although in small numbers, began to appear; these bands had the audacity to rob our post and attack the Auls which are subject to us.

On the 18th one of these bands, under the command of Ishputa, came up within 12 versts of Tashkend and carried off three men of the 6th battalion, who had been chopping wood in the gardens; the same band on the 19th overpowered our picket of dashing volunteer cavaliers attached to the fort of Niazbek. Owing to the small number of cavalry in Tashkend, 20 sharpshooters were mounted on horses and sent after the robbers, but after proceeding more than 25 versts from Tashkend, Lieutenant Skorenkof, in command of this detachment, was obliged to return without having overtaken the enemy. Ishputa's men, we heard, were mounted on excellent horses and most of them had a spare horse.

On the 20th of April, the steamer *Syr-Daria* arrived at Chinaz towing a barge laden with goods and two iron barges. The voyage of the steamer from Fort Perofsky to Chinaz was a prosperous one, save that a want of fuel had been felt. The Bokharians had also fired on this steamer on the 12th of April, but after exchanging shots for ten minutes they were obliged to retreat; out of 25 men who were on board defending the steamer, one sharpshooter received a slight contusion in the head.

For the object of keeping up communications between the Chinaz detachment and that of Colonel Kraefsky a column of infantry was despatched on the 19th, with some light guns and 50 Cossacks. This column was placed under the command of Major Baranof. Crossing the Chirchik, Baranof, after encountering great difficulties owing to the absence of roads and the overflow of canals, reached the river Angren from whence he sent Sotnik Kalougin with 50 men to join Kraefsky; he himself with the remainder of the detachment halted for a day on the Angren, and on the 22nd of April returned to the chief detachment. Volunteers of picked horsemen undertook to capture the robbers who had dared to plunder our post and to carry off our post guard. These picked horsemen succeeded in overtaking the robbers and re-capturing the post guard and the papers, as well as making two of the band prisoners.

One of the captured robbers was sentenced, in accordance with military law, to be hanged. An account of these proceedings is presented to your Excellency herewith.

To oppose the bands infesting the neighbourhood of Tashkend and the trans-Chirchik country, the commander of the region, Major General Romanovsky, determined to take advantage of the arrival of the reinforcement of two companies of the 5th battalion, a division of light battery from

Auliëta, and a flying column of 110 riflemen of the 5th battalion. Mounting them on horses hired from the inhabitants of the Tashkend, he despatched a detachment of 150 men under Captain Grebenki to Niazbek and to the other bank of the Chirchik.

On the 24th party of Bokharians fell unexpectedly on the detachment stationed at Kerys, and succeeded in cutting of a picket consisting of two Cossacks, which was stationed in front of the camp, and seized a drove of camels and horses belonging to us. As soon as this became known a detachment of Cossacks, headed by Kalougin's half sotnia, set off in pursuit of the freebooters whom they overtook at about one verst's distance from the camp and killing ten of their number. While pursuing the enemy over an extent of 8 versts, the Cossacks fell upon another band, consisting of about 300 Bokharians, whom they routed and dislodged from behind their stone defences, and pursued along the foot of the mountains. The pursuit continued over an extent of 30 versts. On our side, excepting the two Cossacks who had been seized at their pickets, we sustained no loss; the enemy, on the contrary, had 60 men killed.

On the 24th of April a company of infantry under the command of Captain Semenov was sent to meet Sotnik Kalougin's party of 50 men, who were returning to the principal camp; they met at the river Angren and returned safely to the camp on the 27th of April.

The principal detachment was reinforced by a company of infantry of the 4th battalion sent from Tashkend in exchange for one of the 5th battalion which had arrived there with a company of light horse artillery.

The light detachment commanded by Captain Grebenkin, which left Tashkend on the 25th of April, arrived at Niazbek on the 26th at dawn of day, and not having encountered any bands of freebooters on the way, took an upward course along the Chirchik until they reached the ford. After crossing over to the left bank with great difficulty, Captain Grebenkin marched towards Parkent where, according to intelligence received, a band was stationed. The detachment arrived at Parkent on the 27th. On the news of the movement of the Russian detachment, most of the inhabitants of Parkent fled to Samarsk (a distance of about 8 versts) where Ishputa and his band were encamped. Having left 62 sharp-shooters in Parkent with Lieutenant Symakof, Captain Grebenkin set out with the remaining 39 men at a sharp trot to Samarsk, but they met with no bands there, not even a single male inhabitant; all had retired into the mountains. Taking with him 39 of the best mounted sharp-shooters, Grebenkin set off with the utmost speed in pursuit of the retreating foe into the mountains, and having ridden 4 versts saw a band of the enemy numbering from 150 to 200 men on a high and steep hill; in dismounting and leaving the horses in charge of their attendants at the foot of the hill, Grebenkin commenced the ascent with the remaining men. The enemy opened fire on them, but with little success. The sharp-shooters who had remained in Samarsk, 22 in number, arrived at that moment on the scene of action, and on their approach the band began to retreat into the mountains.

After having pursued the foe for a considerable distance, Captain Grebenkin seeing the fatigue of the men, stopped the pursuit, and decided on returning to Samarsk and joining the troops left under the command of Lieutenant Symakof. But scarcely had the detachment commenced its return to Samarsk, when Ishputa, who had been joined by 200 men, surrounded the detachment on every side and opened a frequent fire upon our men, striving likewise to engage in a hand to hand combat; the road lay through a somewhat marrow defile and it was necessary to occupy the heights and to dislodge the enemy from behind the rocks at the point of the bayonet. In this order we

retreated almost to Samarsk; Ishputa and his band seeing the approach of Lieutenant Symakof's sharp-shooters at about one verst's distance from Samarsk, turned and fled. In this encounter we had four men wounded: two sharp-shooters and two "Djigits." The enemy's loss we must conclude was considerable from the fact that the bayonet was brought into play; Captain Grebenkin left Samarsk for Kersugi, which place he reached on the 28th of April.

In order to connect the Kereuchi and Chinaz detachments, two companies of sharp-shooters under command of Major Pistchemouka were sent to the river Angren on the 27th of April. The object of this expedition, besides the connection of the detachments, was to watch over the trans-Chirchik region and to protect the inhabitants against the attacks of pillagers, rendered of late especially necessary, the Emir's hordes had begun to assemble in considerable force on the Syr-Daria.

The overseer of the tribes in our centre, Sotnik Krymof, having learnt that the inhabitants of the Aïls belonging to the Kungrad tribe had omitted to prepare fuel for steam boats between Oush-Kaiük and the Arys, according to agreement with the Commandant of Turkestan, took 5 Cossacks and 40 "Djigits" and set out for the mouth of the river Arys with the object of forcing them under threat of a "Baranta" or paid to fulfil the orders of the Russian Government.

On reaching the spot, and finding the only convenient place for the preparation of fuel was the left bank of the Syr-Daria, and that the Aïls, subject to us since 1864, would not fulfil our demands, Krymof decided on sending some of the "Djigits" across to the left bank of the river for the purpose of carrying out a "Baranta" in the Aïls situated right opposite the mouth of the river Arys, the Bey of which, besides not fulfilling his lawful engagements, was supplying Sadyk's party with men and provisions. For the purpose of supporting the "Djigits" already sent, Krymof with the Cossacks and the remaining "Djigits" likewise crossed over to the Bokharian bank; his appearance there stopped their attempts at self-defence and the "Baranta" was carried out without any bloodshed. Taking advantage of the panic caused by the appearance of the Russians on the Bokharian side, Krymof obliged them with threats, which, however, he did not carry out, to fulfil their demands for the preparation of Saxaül. Proceeding along the left bank from the Arys to Oush-Kaiük and considering it dangerous to remain longer with a handful of men in the midst of the enemy, Krymof re-crossed the Daria and directed his steps towards Oush-Kaiük and by the end of April returned to Turkistan.

The result of such a bold and brilliant move was that Saxaül was prepared at the places specified.

APPENDIX XL.

We hereby declare to all and each for general information that the Russians are against no one, against no people, and still less against the peaceable Bokharians; they are animated by no hostile feeling, but have been forced into military operations through the obstinacy of the Emir of Bokhara, who, notwithstanding his repeated promises and assurances of friendship, has not up to the present moment permitted the Russian embassy (invited by himself to Bokhara) to return to Russia, and also takes the liberty of making raids on peaceable inhabitants living under the protection of the White Czar. The war, solely against the Emir, will continue as long as the Emir is not brought to a sense of justice. All peaceable inhabitants are desired to occupy themselves

with their own affairs and not to take any part in the hostilities. Their life and their property in this case will be respected by the Russians.

Signed by the Military Governor of the Turkistan district, Major General Romanofsky.

APPENDIX XLI.

General Romanofski's Report from the 11th of May 1866.

The continual appearance of more or less considerable parties in our rear as well as on our roads of communication, and the encampment of the Emir's principal army in the Irdjar locality, forced us to have recourse to offensive measures. Having established at the end of March a permanent ferry across the Syr-Daria and pitched two large encampments in the neighbourhood of this river, the enemy, so to say, was in possession of both banks, and could send out parties when they chose to the trans-Chirchik side. But the weakening of the army by sickness and death, the result of a hard winter's campaign, the great want of troops in Chemkend and generally on our communication with the Syr-Daria line, and our many various wants, as for instance, our great want of money, did not allow us even to think of a decided course of action until the end of April. Earlier than this we could not receive reinforcements from the Syr-Daria or from Western Siberia, as well as supplies for the various wants of the army; two steamers, the *Peroesky* and the *Syr-Daria*, were also expected to arrive about this time.

All these expectations were realized, not, however, in April, but at the beginning of May. The arrival of fresh reinforcements enabled us, without weakening our rear or the garrison of Tashkend, but on the contrary, helping rather to strengthen them, and to add considerably to the numerical strength of the principal detachment; and the fortifications of Chinaz having been by this time roughly completed, our advance was accordingly rendered easier.

In the mean time the expressed views of the Emir left no doubt that an engagement with his army would be the only means of forcing him to abandon his impracticable demands and put an end to the hostilities he had been the cause of.

The Emir's demands, among other things, were expressed in letters which I have had the honor to lay before your Excellency.

On the 5th and 6th of May intelligence was received from different quarters in the principal detachment encamped near Chinaz that the Emir, having returned from Irdjar after a journey to Samarcand, had strengthened his army with fresh reinforcements and was already contemplating an attack, for which purpose he had sent a portion of his army to the right bank of the Syr-Daria in the trans-Chirchik country. The scouts reported that the Emir's army amounted to the enormous number of 100,000 men and 30 guns. It was plain of course that these reports were very much exaggerated, but even allowing this, it was expected, as it subsequently proved, that the Emir's army was a very large one. This army consisted of Sarbazes (regular infantry), artillery and contingents contributed by the Beks of Samarcand, Oura-tiubé and others, and also gathered from the Kirghizes wandering on the confines of Bokhara. The Sarbazes and riflemen, about 5,000 in number, were very well armed; the artillery consisting of 21 guns (some of which were somewhat larger than our battery guns); the contingents and Kirghizes were not less than 35,000.

On the 7th of May the principal Chinaz detachment, consisting of 14 infantry companies, 500 Cossacks, 20 guns and 8 rocket stands, left its former

position at the dawn of day and marched towards Irdjar along the Mourza-Rabat road in the following order: first came the 500 Cossacks with the rocket company, a division of light horse artillery, and a company of rifle guns under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs; a column of infantry consisting of 4 companies of the 3rd Orenburg battalion; 2 companies of the 4th battalion, a division of rifled and a division of heavy battering guns; this column was under the general command of Captain Abramof; behind these columns came the active reserves and the trains, under the general command of Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky, formed of 4 companies of the rifle battalion, 2 companies of the 7th, 1 company of the 4th, and 1 company of the 6th battalion with a division of battery guns and a company of light Orenburg infantry. One of the reserve companies, namely the 4th company of the 4th battalion together with 30 "Djigits" under the command of Major Nazarov, was moved to the front before the army began to advance and subsequently closely followed the cavalry. The detachment was supplied with provisions for 12 days, each soldier carrying provisions for two days with him; the provisions for 10 days being transported in waggons. The park of artillery was laden with 200 charges for every piece of cannon, and as many cartridges for each gun belonging to the infantry, and 150 cartridges for each Cossack's gun. Besides this the steamer *Perofsky*, which left Chinaz on the same day, taking an upward course along the Syr-Daria, was stored with 10 days' provisions for the whole detachment, as well as with a portion of the war ammunition.

The remaining park of artillery and other heavy stores belonging to the detachment were left at Chinaz, which, as well as the troops left behind in the fort and in charge of the *Tête de pont*, were placed under Count Vorontsof-Dashkof, who, owing to a broken leg, was unable to take an active part in the approaching action.

As soon as the Chinaz detachment began to advance, the Kereuchi detachment under the command of Colonel Kraefsky was ordered to march along the right bank of the Syr-Daria to Irdjar, and to endeavour to reach that place not later than night-fall on the 8th of May. After the celebration of divine service, the Chinaz detachment began to advance halting for the first time at the Ak-Cheta Kurgan on the shores of a fresh water lake, at which place they similarly halted during the reconnaissance on the 5th of April.

The enemy's cavalry began to make its appearance at about 15 versts from our camp, but kept at a distance, a few shots only being exchanged. After a short rest the army marched towards the bend up the Syr-Daria, where it encamped some versts above Mourza-Rabat. The army thus made more than 30 versts on the first day, but in spite of this, and regardless of the heat, which rose to 40 degrees of Reaumur, there were no stragglers and no illness in the army.

From Mourza-Rabat to the Emir's first encampment on the Irdjar, there remained not more than 20 versts. A considerable band of the enemy came within sight of the camp at dawn of day on the 8th. For this reason the march from Mourza-Rabat, although made in the same order, was continued with every readiness to enter into an engagement at any moment, and the columns, therefore, kept in sight of each other, the baggage trains not being allowed to remain far distant.

At 9 o'clock in the morning, when the column approached the lake Aik-Chaganak, the enemy was found assembled in great force, and here the first skirmish took place between the Cossacks and the enemy's cavalry, which ended in the Bokharians having some men killed while we had only one Cossack wounded. When, however, the army at 12 o'clock at noon, were making preparations for a halt on the banks of the lake Yak-Kahan, masses of the enemy's cavalry began to press so heavily on the vanguard and luggage

wagons that the artillery had to be brought into action, after which the fusillade never ceased, both during the halt and during the subsequent advance until the end of the engagement.

After the army left its halting place, it advanced in the following manner: along the straight road to Irdjar, Captain Abramof's column marched first in the same complement as the day before and in the same fighting order; Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs's column advanced more to the right and on the same elevation with the other column. Immediately behind these two columns, somewhat to the right of the road, and in sight of the general reserve of the combative force, three regiments of the battalion of sharp-shooters and one battery division advanced under the command of Major Pichemouka. All the luggage train of the detachment guarded by the remaining four regiments and two guns under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky followed behind Captain Abramof's column.

Scarcely had the army left the halting place a verst behind when masses of the enemy's cavalry, concentrating their forces, attempted to surround us, so that it was necessary to throw out in advance and on our flanks a line of sharpshooters, while the cavalry was obliged to stop constantly and fire at the approaching masses of Bokharian cavalry with rockets and cannon balls. Under these circumstances, it can easily be understood how difficult it was for the luggage to follow the army; although it was reduced to as small a compass as possible, being limited to 600 camels and about 100 wagons, still an uninterrupted march of two days under a hot sun had exhausted the horses and camels, and rendered a halt unavoidable. I must here testify to the unusual energy which Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky displayed on this occasion. Even before the army left its halting place and when a speedy encounter with the enemy seemed inevitable, he found it possible to detach to the effective reserves, 3 companies with a division of guns, limiting the escort of the baggage trains to 4 regiments and 2 light guns, and in spite of all these difficulties, he led his column so rapidly that he scarcely detained the army at all; but besides the above-mentioned stoppages, he was obliged to halt also to resist the masses of the enemy's cavalry which surrounded him. The fact of the enemy's building hopes on the difficulties attending the march of the army from its halting places to the positions, proves how hard in general were the obstacles which we had to surmount.

Among the papers found in the Emir's tent was a report of the Bek of Samarcand, commander of the advanced forces of the Bokharians, sent to the Emir, as it is supposed, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. In this report, among other things, the Bek writes that the Russians had not yet reached their position and were already surrounded by his troops, and that he trusted soon to make them all prisoners.

At 5 o'clock the army neared the enemy's position, and at about one verst and a half's distance from it, were met with a heavy artillery fire from behind the trenches which the Bokharians had raised to defend their front; at the same time masses of the enemy appeared in front of our cavalry and baggage trains. The entire detachment, one may say, excepting the left flank, which was protected by the river, was surrounded by the enemy. For the support of the cavalry, and to resist the masses of Bokharians, which pressed upon us on the right, the reserve was advanced and the whole of our artillery was placed in a position for action. The enemy allowed our columns to advance within easy shot, and then operated with great rapidity and perseverance; the direction of the shot was very correct, but not calculating the distance, they gave such a great angle of elevation to their guns that most of their projectiles flew over the heads of our troops and lodged partly in our baggage train and partly beyond it; to this and to our unusual good luck can

alone be attributed the insignificance of our losses, considering that our troops had to hold out under this cannonade for about an hour before our artillery and fire-arms and several gallant cavalry attacks cooled the ardour of the Bokharian cavalry which pressed heavily on our flanks and rear. In face of these difficulties our artillery under the general command of Lieutenant Colonel Silverstvan rendered great service to us. No one could witness without admiration the unequalled skill and coolness with which our artillery men served the guns at the hottest period of the engagement. It may justly be said that not a single shot they fired was wasted; the enemy's position strewn with mutilated bodies, broken guns and waggons and heaps of dead cattle, presents even at the present moment a most hideous picture of the havoc made by our artillery.

When at 6 o'clock the attacks of the enemy's cavalry began to grow weaker, being fully convinced of the invincibility of our infantry, I ordered Captain Abramof to advance, and charged Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs to make a decided attack with the right flank. Captain Abramof advanced with uncommon coolness and skill, neither the accelerated discharges of the enemy's artillery and fire-arms, nor the intrenchments they had raised, could prevent the orderly advance of our storming column. All the movements were executed as on a review. In about half an hour our really invincible infantry were bayonetting behind the intrenchments, the Bokharian artillery men, while our own artillery, already in front of the intrenchments, was striking down fresh masses of the enemy who endeavoured to stop our advance with grape shot.

Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs gallantly moved his cavalry forward simultaneously with Captain Abramof's advancing column. Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs galloped boldly forward between the enemy's intrenchments, drove back in a moment the Bokharian cavalry, took up a position in front of the intrenchments, and opened a fierce artillery fire from 6 guns, partly on the flank of the enemy who were then endeavouring to prevent the further progress of Captain Abramof, and partly on fresh masses of cavalry and infantry which had again mustered in front. Then passing from one position to another, he pressed the enemy back more and more to the right and put them to disorderly flight. The pursuit was carried on hotly by the Cossacks over an extent of more than 5 versts.

The whole of the field between the first intrenchments, as far as the Bokharian camp, was strewn with the enemy's dead bodies struck down in hundreds by our brave Cossacks. It was for the first time that the Cossacks in Central Asia fought in regular order and *en masse* like regular cavalry, having their own artillery and rocket stands; it must be confessed that this first attempt was crowned with success. It was afterwards reckoned that on one field alone our cavalry had smitten down about one thousand men.

Our enemies fled so hurriedly, that they had even no time to enter their camp which we found with all the belongings of the Bokharians, as well as traces of its recent occupation: large cauldrons steaming with hot food, smoking kettles prepared for drinking tea, &c., &c.

It was already 9 o'clock in the evening. The approaching night, and the scattered condition of our small detachment over an extent of seven versts, obliged us to put an end to the pursuit. The troops that had been collected together encamped in front of the enemy's camp on the shore of the lake Maida-Djilgan, where all the columns were at last assembled at about 1 o'clock A. M. At dawn of day a small column was sent to take possession of the second Bokharian camp, which the Emir had deserted the preceding evening with almost all its belongings. Even the Emir's tent had been left exactly in the state in which it had been occupied by the martial sovereign of

Bokhara head of the Mahomedans in Central Asia,—with its carpets, divans, and kitchens and many other articles of Asiatic luxury.

In spite of the immense losses of the enemy, which, according to accounts received subsequently, amounted in killed alone to far more than 1,000 men, our loss, thank God, did not exceed more than 12 men wounded, but not a single man was killed. During the operations above described, Colonel Kraefsky, commander of the Kereuchi detachment, having spent the night of the 7th and 8th May with the principal detachment on a height, appeared suddenly on the 8th of May, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, opposite Irdjar on the right bank of the Syr-Daria. The ground did not permit him to take any immediate part in the action, and his co-operation was limited to a few well aimed shots from the rifled guns; but the appearance alone of Colonel Kraefsky's column could not but be conducive to the general success of the action, and most certainly prevented parties of the enemy from flying in the direction of the trans-Chirchik country, where their appearance would have been anything but desirable. Our trophies consist of six guns taken during the storming of the enemy's position (four of which are in Captain Abramof's column and two in Colonel Pistolkohrs' column), and four guns deserted by the enemy during the flight. Perhaps we may come across other guns after a further advance and a closer inspection of the enemy's position, as our prisoners assure us the Emir had only time before his flight to carry away with him two guns. They even assure us that he was obliged to leave these on the road to Ouratubé, from whence he turned off towards Djizakh with only 2,000 cavalry. In the camps were found, besides the belongings of the Bokharians, enormous stores of powder, and in general the entire park of artillery, which bears testimony to the warlike intentions of the Emir. Without reckoning the war *matériel* we found scattered over the roads the enemy fled along, which, not having the means of transporting, were partly destroyed and partly thrown into the water, there was found about 670 pounds of powder and about 220,000* cartridges and great quantities of shot and other artillery stores.

Having the good fortune to report such an important and fresh success of the Russian arms in Central Asia, I consider it a sacred duty to testify that the entire army, from the officer to the soldier, comported itself as brave Russian soldiers should do; all with one accord rushed into the battle and all conscientiously deserve the gracious notice of His Majesty the Emperor. They fully understand the dignity of bearing the name of Russians, and uphold it with honor. I do not consider myself justified in naming any one especially, excepting those to whose fate it fell to take a prominent part in these events: Captain Abramof and Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs and Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky, who in every respect performed the duties entrusted to them in the most exemplary manner; Sotnik Ivanoff, who performed the duties of the chief of the staff of artillery, proved also a most exemplary officer, and was a most useful assistant to me.

While humbly begging your Excellency to direct the attention of His Majesty to the services rendered by the army and by those persons who have been mentioned in this report; I would also request your Excellency's sanction to my making a special submission respecting the other 22 staff officers and superior officers who for their excellent services justly merit encouragement.

This report is sent by your Excellency's Aide-de-Camp, Major Kashkin, who during the movements of the army and during the engagements was always with me, and fulfilled most satisfactorily all the commissions he was entrusted with; he can verbally give a fuller account of all the events mentioned herein.

* Artillery charges without projectiles.

APPENDIX XLII.

Extract from a letter of General Romanovski, Commander of the Troops of the Orenburg District, dated the 30th May 1866.

As a detailed report of the recent actions will necessarily take some time in its preparation, and in order to acquaint your Excellency as soon as possible with the present state of affairs, which look promising, I hasten to send you a short account of all that has transpired here since the 8th May.

Our encounter with the Bokharians on the 8th May was, as it now proves, an unavoidable necessity, and was followed by results of far greater importance than we at first anticipated.

From the enclosures in this letter (the reports of the senior officer Seroff and the letters of the Emir to the people of Tashkend), one cannot but feel convinced that all the disturbances in our trans-Chirchik region were not only caused by the appearance of the Emir's detachments, but formed the results of a great conspiracy, the ramification of which extended as far as Tashkend. Thank God, we were enabled to put an end to this conspiracy in time. The disquietude in the trans-Chirchik region, as your Excellency will be pleased to observe from the detailed report, continued until the 10th May. A great multitude of the enemy surrounded even Kereñchi, but no harm was done, owing to the energetic measures of Count Vorontsof, who acted for me in the region, and to the detachment of a small force of cavalry from the main body. When, however, the news of the defeat of the Emir's army spread throughout the trans-Chirchik region, all parties fled across to the left bank, and from that time complete peace has reigned on the right bank of the Syr.

In order to profit by our success at Irdjar, and to attain the object with which the expedition was undertaken in the month of January on the right bank, *viz.*, to rescue our envoys and to punish the Emir for his treacheries, two modes of action were open to us: to pursue the defeated enemy, and to march to Oura-tiubé, Samarkand and further, or else to go on towards Naù and Khodjend.

The experiences of the last few years plainly showed that every decided advance of our troops in these parts, is, when successful, attended with the inevitable necessity of occupying the region, if not permanently, then at all events of leaving troops there for a considerable period. A triumphant arrival of our troops always forms a party of Russian adherents among the natives, whom we cannot possibly afterwards leave to the mercy of the half-savage rulers without loss of Russian *prestige*. Having this in view, I thought it in all respects more advisable to avoid, if possible, for a time, entering the limits of Bokhara, and to set out towards Naù and Kodjend, of which towns the first is a small, but very strong, fortress, and has an important strategic signification, being a point situated on the principal road from Bokhara to Kokan; while the second, independent of its commercial importance, was always the stronghold of turbulent people who were the cause of all the disturbances in our trans-Chirchik region. The loss of these two towns to the Emir, and the advantage of our occupying them with a view of pacifying the right bank of the Syr, is consequently evident. Besides, there was reason to hope, as it afterwards proved, that a movement on Naù and Kodjend, and a speedy liberation of our Envoys would sooner secure the attainment of our objects, as it would be less hurtful to the national feelings of the Bokharians and to the dignity of the Emir.

On the strength of these considerations, having allowed the troops at Irjar the required rest, putting the baggage-train into proper order, and having sent from thence by steamer to Chinaz all superfluous incumbrances and trophies, I marched on the 14th May to Nau; and as your Excellency already knows by my report sub-No. 627, we succeeded in occupying that fort without bloodshed; the 15th and 16th of that month were employed in strengthening the earth-fortifications and in occupying the fortress where we left 2 companies, 2 guns, and a detachment of Cossacks. On the 17th May I reached Khodjend with all the remaining troops of the Chinaz division, while Colonel Kraevsky's detachment approached the town simultaneously with me, and according to previous arrangement, along the right bank.

Notwithstanding that pacific proclamations (copies enclosed) had been sent from Nau to the inhabitants of Kokan and Khodjend, the latter town encountered our approach with shots, while the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, who welcomed us very warmly, and who apparently desired our immediate occupation of Khodjend, gave us information that the Kokandians were hastening from all parts to the rescue of the town, and that great numbers had already made their appearance in the neighbouring districts of Khodjend.

The 18th and 19th May were spent in reconnoitering along the right and left banks of the Syr-Daria, on which occasion some considerable cannonading took place and a brisk fire of musketry, which the defenders provoked.

These reconnoitings showed that the points most favorable for an attack on the town were situated on the north-eastern side, but that an attempt to seize the place, without preliminary arrangements, would be accompanied by great risks; the fortifications of Khodjend, as your Excellency will see from the plans and profiles which will be presented together with the report, are very strong, and are, according to the general opinion of persons present at the former capture of Kokandian towns, on a greater scale than those of the latter towns; the 20th May was therefore spent in bombarding the town from several sides, while the assault was fixed for the 21st. But as the troops were advancing to make an attack, a deputation issued from the town with a declaration of submission; the troops were therefore recalled to their former position. The parleys, however, which continued twenty-four hours, unfortunately led to no satisfactory result; the hostile party in the town, at the head of which was the old Aksakal, Khadjji-Enil, who was not only opposed to a surrender, but had already arrested the chief representatives of the peace party, *viz.* the Kazi-Kilian, the elder Kazi, and Khadjji-Gazamat, one of the most influential and rich inhabitants. The latter was sent to Kodjend with a second proclamation, a copy of which I here enclose. At the expiration of the term fixed by me, for the presentation of a definite answer by the inhabitants of the town, we commenced a bombardment which lasted from 6 o'clock in the evening of the 22nd until 2 o'clock on the 24th.

After the discovery of our nocturnal movement by the Khodjendians on the 21st May, we could not hope to carry out successfully a sudden assault at dawn, and consequently, though valuable as time was for us, in view of the danger threatening us from Kokan, it was however necessary to find some other means for the capture of the town. Adhering to the original intentions of directing the attack from the north-eastern side, I found it expedient to commence a false attack by digging approaches on the southern side, where the trenches were opened on the night of the 22nd and 23rd May. Besides this, in order to divert the attention of the defenders and for the greater security of the routes leading from Kokan, the blockading troops were divided into several detachments, and powerful Cossack pickets were placed in the

rear of the force. The general surveillance of the routes and the defence on the Kokan quarter were entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs, who, as usual, fulfilled the duties with which he was charged with great success. All these measures led, thank God, to very useful results; the arrival of fresh reinforcements from Kokan was entirely stopped, and the defenders directed their attention more especially to the eastern side.

In order to economise our ammunition, the bombardment of the town during the 22nd and 23rd, with the exception of two mortars firing day and night, was carried on twice a day, at mid-day and at 6 in the evening. Thus, on the 24th, at mid-day, a bombardment was made, after which followed the assault.

The troops were formed in two columns: one under the command of Mihailoff, Captain of Artillery, at the extreme end of the north-eastern side adjoining the river; the other under the command of Captain Buranoff, towards the Kelenau gates, the nearest to the river. Major Nazarov followed next in reserve with a special column, the object of which was to occupy the citadel after a successful assault of the gates, the remaining troops I kept by me in reserve for the support of the three above-mentioned columns.

Owing to the spirited behaviour of the troops and of their commanders, notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance on the part of the defenders, all my plans were punctually executed before night, and not only the town, but the citadel likewise, fell into our possession. A small detachment of Colonel Kravsky's column crossed the river in a boat and joined the troops who had occupied the town.

During the reconnoitring and the bombardment, and throughout the whole of the attack, the defenders fought with great obstinacy; they killed alone numbered 2,500 men. It will be easily understood that, under such conditions, our loss also could not but be very great, but, thank God, it does not, however, exceed 71 men killed and wounded, 63 contused, and 6 men missing. Out of this number only 1 officer is wounded and 6 are contused.

Our trophies, over and above a quantity of various fire-arms and flags, consist of 13 guns and a large Kokandian banner, belonging to the defenders of Kodjend, but which Khudoyar Khan refuses to claim, as your Excellency will subsequently see.

On the very first day of my arrival at Khodjend, I was waited upon by deputation sent to me by the Bek of Djizakh, which informed me of the readiness of the Emir to deliver up our envoys. But as this deputation was headed by a Bokharian, whom I already knew as a very suspicious character, and apprehending lest this letter should be one of a series sent during the march of the troops to Djizakh, I commissioned the chief of my staff to receive the commissioners with the usual hospitality, and after having written a civil answer to the Bek's letter, to inform the envoys that I would not receive them until our embassy had returned to our camp. On the evening of the 25th May, that is on the day following our occupation of Khodjend, Cornet Gerasimoff arrived at the camp with another very friendly letter from the Bek of Djizakh, and with a verbal message to the effect that the Emir was very anxious for peace, and was quite willing to send back our envoys, who had already been despatched to Djizakh, but that he wished to receive some guarantee on my side, that after our occupation of Khodjend, to which town the Emir withdrew every claim, I would not to enter the boundaries of Bokhara. Without loss of time, I sent, on the following day, a letter to the Emir, a copy of which I here enclose. Cornet Gerasimoff informed me at the same time that the Bokharians number their forces at Irdjar not at 40,000, as I wrote in my report, but at 60,000, and that they reckoned not 1,000 killed, but 5,000.

Envoys have arrived from Kokan this 28th May, from Khudoyar Khan, with a letter, the copy of which I forward, in which he congratulates me in the sincerest manner on our occupation of Khodjend.

Your Excellency will thus be pleased to see that our three weeks' expedition has not alone given us every reason to anticipate the safe return of our embassy and the conclusion of peace with our two principal neighbours, but has also been the means of our gaining, on the left bank of the Syr Naï and Khodjend, all claim which towns, the Emir and the Khan, their former possessors, have willingly relinquished; while at the same time this region, besides being a durable guarantee for tranquillity along the right bank of the Syr, has every attraction nature could bestow on it. Situated in a lovely mountainous country, Naï and Khodjend and the adjoining settlements which by the beauty of their situation, as well as by their fields and gardens, and the apparent opulence of the inhabitants, far surpass any of our possessions in Central Asia, including even Tashkend.

Independent of this, it is also expedient to draw your Excellency's attention to the commercial and political significance of Khodjend: both the one and the other are of the highest importance. In reference to its commerce, Khodjend, especially under a general state of peace throughout the country, has a future in store even brighter than that of Tashkend. Its political significance is still greater. Its strong fortifications and the warlike spirit of its inhabitants, have always given Khodjend the semblance of an independent republic, which, although ruled at times now by the Emir and now by the Khan, only yielded obedience according to its own wishes and under certain conditions. In this manner Khodjend subjected itself last year to the Emir. This was the first time, so said the inhabitants, that Khodjend had been taken by force. As we were approaching Khodjend, all the inhabitants of the adjoining settlements, who came to offer their submission, unanimously assured us that, in case of our occupation of the town, the whole population of that region would succumb to us, and that even Kokan and the Khan would hasten to enter into friendly relations with us. These predictions are actually being accomplished at the present moment. During the last few days, Aksakals have been arriving even from the Kokan districts; although I receive the latter as cordially as the rest, I inform them nevertheless that, entertaining hopes of friendly relations with Kokan, I could not place them under the protection of the Russian army, and therefore advised them to remain peacefully under submission to their rulers, and to place their entire confidence in us. If I am not mistaken, the inhabitants are beginning to appreciate our sincerity. The draft of my answer to Khudoyar Khan's letter, which I have the honor of presenting to your Excellency, I think of sending to-morrow.

At the present moment I am occupied in establishing civil order in Khodjend, and distributing the troops in conformity with existing circumstances. The management of the settlements of the Khodjend and Naï districts I entrust to Captain Mihailoff, a very trustworthy officer; the commandant is Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky, of whose great worth I have already had the honor to report to your Excellency.

The garrison at Khodjend will consist of 6 companies, 6 guns (4 smooth and 2 rifled), and 200 Cossacks, with 4 rocket stands. At the same time the garrison at Naï will be reinforced by 3 companies and 1 sotnia. The Khodjend garrison will be stationed in the citadel, which is in very good condition. The remaining troops have already commenced crossing over to the right bank, and a portion will remain, until the settlement of affairs, close to the town of Bouka, where they will have good pasturage, while another portion will return to Tashkend for engineering works.

APPENDIX XLII.

Extract from the report of V. M. Seroff, Controller of the Native Settlements of the Tashkend District, and Commander of the Troops of the Turkistan Region, dated 10th May 1866.

Previous to the departure of the head detachment from Chinaz, reports were being diligently spread throughout Tashkend by the Emir and Roustembek, that the latter had crossed over to the right bank of the Daria with a large band of followers, and that he purposed going to Tashkend in order to create a rebellion amongst the inhabitants there, and to act in unison with them against the Russians. Throughout the whole town, and at all the town gates, most active measures were taken which secured the tranquillity of the inhabitants. On the 8th May Roustembek with his band advanced at night and halted near Parkent, which is not more than 17 versets from Tashkend, and on the night of the 9th he sent a scout into the town with a letter from the Emir, with which proceeding I was, however, immediately acquainted by one of our most faithful adherents, and requisite measures were accordingly taken to prevent the admission of the scout and the delivery of the letter to any one of our trusted Mussulmen. Certain natives thoroughly devoted to us executed this commission with exemplary punctuality; the envoy was so cleverly watched that he did not succeed in delivering the letter, while on the 9th May, at early dawn, he was seized by some young Tashkendians sent for that purpose, and brought to me with the Emir's letter which I here enclose together with a translation of it in Russian.

APPENDIX XLIV.

(Translation from the Persian).

He (God) the Everliving.

Be it known to all Seyds, head dignitaries, warlike and devoted descendants of the Prophet, learned chiefs of districts, Aksakals, and others of high and low degree, of the four parts of the town of Tashkend, that these are my gracious royal words:—

I have given orders that the following commanders should march to Tashkend on the road to conquest,—Abdul-Gaffar-Bek-Bi, Divan-Big, Khodja-Nazar-Bi, Mohamed-Goussin-Bi, Abdul-Halim-Khan, Khoudai-Berda, Imin-Aga-Bashi, Abdul-Vagab-Bek, Imik-Aga-Bashi, Umar-Bek, Imik-Aga-Bashia, Mirbaba-Imik-Aga-Bashi, Tuksaba-Mulla-Gedai, Tuksaba-Mirza-Abdul, and Tuksaba-Kourbak. But you, adhering to your faith and your co-religionists, after having admitted my generals into Tashkend, put suddenly to death all those people who are devoted to the unfaithful. All ye, true believers form but one body. Do not doubt, and without loss of time, let them in. If you encounter any obstacles, write to me immediately, and peace be with you. In the year 1282. On the seal is engraved Emir-Scid Muzafar.

APPENDIX XLV.

Report of General Romanovski, dated 6th June 1866.

In my letter of the 30th (O. S.) May I had the honor of explaining the motives which induced me, after the battle with the Bokharians at Irdjar on the 8th May, to direct my forces towards Nau and Khodjend

• These cogent reasons, as your Excellency already knows, consisted chiefly in the exact fulfilment of the views of the Government, which anxious to avoid all further conquests and to limit itself merely to such military operations as were of absolute necessity for the tranquillity of the country placed under the protection of Russia and for the maintenance of our dignity in Central Asia.

At first I hoped to have been able to profit in this movement by the same advantages which I enjoyed on my advance to Irdjar, namely, the assistance of the steamer *Perovsky*, but a preliminary investigation of the river with the steamer without the cargo proved that the navigation of the Syr above Irdjar was only possible for 20 or 30 versts up its course. Beyond this, the space of country along both banks of the Syr-Daria changes its steppe character to a mountainous one, and the Syr-Daria itself becomes a mountain torrent, forming occasional rapids. For these very reasons the steamer and the cargo were sent back to Chinaz with all the sick and wounded, and with all the superfluous incumbrances and trophies; while we had only left for our use a barge which, during the advance of the troops, was towed up the Daria by the men. For the conveyance, however, of heavy stores required by the detachment, camels were hired from the neighbouring Kirghizes.

On the left bank of the Syr-Daria, the country, while changing from a steppe to a mountainous one, becomes more populated. All the extent of country traversed by us, from the first village (Koshturmen) as far as Khodjend, was in general thickly populated, covered with gardens and mulberry trees, and intersected by small mountain rivulets and canals; the villages and settlements are generally speaking very well built, the fields are large and well cultivated, and all things show that the natives here have an abundance of everything—a rare phenomenon in these parts. Besides, in this country, owing to its mountainous character, the roads and communications are without doubt, of great importance. Roads fit for the use of carts and artillery are of rare occurrence, and are all concentrated in the extent of country between the Bokharian and Kokandian territories in the environs of Naï. The former rulers of this town, the Khans of Kokan, evidently recognised the strategic importance of this point: the fortress built by them, although of no considerable size, is very strong; the greater part of it consists of a triple, and only in some places, of a double wall, the spaces between which are exposed to a discharge of grape shot from the towers and barbets. But thoroughly convinced they would prove invincible at Irdjar, the Bokharians have of late occupied the fortress with but a small garrison, consisting chiefly of cavalry, which fled at the approach of our forces, leaving in the fortress the only gun there, and the whole of the artillery stores.

The inhabitants of all the settlements, including those of the town of Naï, received us very civilly, the Aksakals and Kazis crowding round us with bread and salt, and willingly providing for all the necessities of the troops, but at the same time not concealing their doubts as to the possibility of our capture of Khodjend.

Situated on the Syr-Daria, close to the bend of the river, where it takes an abrupt turn to the south-east, and which bend forms the central point of the roads to Tashkend, Kokan, Balkh and Bokhara, Khodjend has always played as important a part in commerce, as in the wars of Bokhara with Kokan; latterly, however, with the gradual decline of Kokan, Khodjend gained some political independence. The town authorities arbitrarily wielded the destinies of the town, and several times expelled the Rulers sent by Kokan, or Bokhara; and Khodjend prided itself on the fact that it had never been taken by force, and had never grudged means for the construction of

its fortifications. The town rampart, stretching to the extent of 11 versts, consists entirely of a double row of high and massive walls, strengthened like that of Naù, with towers and barbets. The north-eastern side forms the only exception, as the defenders thought it was better protected by the irregularity of the ground and the proximity of the river.

On the occupation of the fortress of Naù by 2 companies, 2 guns, and a portion of our Cossacks, commanded by Captain Lihacheff, the troops of the head Chinaz Detachment continued their march on the 17th May to Khodjend, and on the same day, when close to the town, at a distance of 5 versts, took up their position on the Bokharian road, close to the banks of the river, which in this place, as it approaches the mountains, runs through a narrow pass. The Kereuchi Detachment, which arrived at Khodjend almost simultaneously with the head detachment, placed itself on the same heights on the right bank of the river.

Our truce-bearers, who were sent over with proclamations, were met by a volley of shots, and the defenders stationed behind the walls refused to listen to any overtures. It was evident that the inhabitants had been preparing for a defence during the last few days. The gardens, the fields and numerous houses surrounding the town were abandoned; part of the roads leading to the town were inundated from the neighbouring *aryks*, and all the space in front of the walls was cleared of the gardens and trees for a more effectual action of their guns.

On the 18th, reconnoitrings were made on each side of the river, on the right bank by Colonel Kraevsky's column, and on the left by a small detachment of 6 companies, 3 sotnias of Cossacks with 6 guns, and a rocket company, commanded by myself. The enemy encountered the reconnoitring troops with fierce and frequent cannonade, and when a portion of the troops were approaching the walls, they were received by discharges from falconets and muskets, which did not, however, prevent the reconnoitring party from acquiring a general notion of the position of the fortifications and to discover their weakest sides. On the same day, part of the column having reconnoitred the town from the left side, took up its position on the Kokan road, about 3 versts from Khodjend.

On the 9th, with the purpose of making a more detailed inspection of the earth-works on the left bank, two columns were despatched, one under the command of Captain Mihailoff, who was commissioned to inspect the whole extent of country from the right of the Kokan road as far as the river, while the other column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pistolkohrs, was to follow the line of walls to the left of that road as far as the Syr-Daria. The inspection of the town from the right side, was, during the same time, being made by myself under the escort of Colonel Kraevsky's column.

A close inspection of the locality and of the town walls left no vestige of a doubt that in case an obstinate resistance on the part of the inhabitants, the only way to effect a speedy conquest would be by an assault; and that the points most favorable for such an assault were on the north-eastern side, *viz.*,—the barbet nearest the river, and the Kelenau gates, but that here also a successful termination of the assault, without preliminary arrangements, could only be the result of accident. In the meanwhile, it was most essential for many reasons that we should lose no time, and use all speed in taking possession of Khodjend. The very limited means of transport, which was the result of that impecuniosity which I have so frequently had the honor of mentioning to your Excellency, did not allow our detachments to be accompanied either by commissariat or warlike stores. At the same time we were daily receiving from Kokan reports of an unfavorable nature. On the following day when we arrived at Khodjend several Kokan parties made

their appearance in the settlements nearest to Khodjend, and demanded that the inhabitants should *en masse* proceed with them to the rescue of the town. A portion of this party contrived in the following night to make its way into the town, while another portion was kept behind in check by outposts and a small column, sent for that purpose to the lower Kokan road running parallel with the bank of the river.

On the night of the 19th, batteries were erected, two on the right bank and two on the left, the two last on the southern side of the town, one on the Bokharian, the other on the Kokan road, all of which opened fire at dawn. In all the four batteries there were 18 guns and two mortars in action. The firing continued the whole day until 10 o'clock at night, becoming fiercer on all sides at 8, 12 and 4 o'clock. The results of the bombardment were very important, and great confusion was caused by several fires perceptible in the town.

Contemplating to make the assault of the town on the morning of the 21st from the above-mentioned points on the north-eastern side, I removed the chief body of the troops at sunset of the 20th, to the lower Kokan road, which they reached by 12 o'clock at night. At 3 o'clock the troops were advanced for the assault. The columns had barely time to enter the gardens; when they were met by a deputation proceeding from the town, and headed by Khodja Gazamat, one of the most influential and rich inhabitants of Khodjend; the deputation stated that the town surrendered, consequently the troops were ordered back into position at the Kokan gates.

The negotiations that were subsequently opened led to no results whatever. Our truce-bearers, who were sent with Gazamat, were received with shots, and afterwards even Khodja Gazamat, who was sent by me into the town with proclamations, was arrested in Khodjend. The fact of the matter was this, the peace-party, headed by the Kaza-Khan, the Kaza-Kilian and the above-mentioned Khodja Gazamat, triumphant at the commencement, had to give in at last to the war-party, at the head of which was one of the oldest Aksakals of the town, a very rich and influential native of Khodjend, Khodja-Emin, who had all the three above-mentioned persons arrested.

At 12 o'clock on the 22nd, the period, fixed by the Kodjendians for the presentation of their answer, expired, and consequently the bombardment of the town recommenced from 2 o'clock, from all the former batteries, and continued unceasingly until the very moment of the assault. At 6 o'clock in the day on the 22nd, at 12 and 6 o'clock on the 23rd, and at 12 o'clock on the 24th, the town was bombarded as fiercely as on the 20th.

As it has been said above, owing to the strong profiles of the earth-works, the only hopes of a successful assault depended on accident, in order therefore to attain this object, it was necessary, after the discovery of the movement of our columns on the night of the 21st, to change the hour of the attack. For these very reasons, the assault was fixed for 2 o'clock on the 24th after the strong bombardment.

For the greater distraction of the enemy's attention, trenches were ordered to be dug on the night of the 22nd, on the south side of the town opposite the Kokan gates, a work which lasted until the very hour of the assault. This work, like the bombardment and reconnoitring, was always carried on under very fierce fire, and was, as a matter of course, attended with great losses on our side. The work on the left bank was superintended by the military engineers, Lieutenant Fischer and Bogaevsky and that on the right by Lieutenant Svitchevsky. All these officers discharged their duties in a very laudable manner. Lieutenant Svitchevsky is especially praised by Colonel Kraevsky, the commander of the column. It is but just to mention also the under officers who took part in the engineering work,

and who, by their great bravery and courage, and extraordinary activity, attracted general attention, and fully deserve every encouragement.

Two columns were appointed for the assault, one from the 3rd company of infantry,* with 2 batteries and 2 light guns under the command of Captain Mikhailof; and the other consisting of the same number of infantry, but without guns, under the command of Captain Baranoff.

Both these columns left their position at dawn on the 24th; the first advanced straight to the north-eastern side of the town, with the object of first erecting, at the nearest distance, a breaching battery opposite to the barbet nearest the river; and then opening fire at mid-day simultaneously with the other batteries; the second column first made an advance towards the Kokan gates, so as to be able, during the assault, to enter the Kelenai gates at the very beginning of the bombardment; to the Kokan gates at the same time, a large portion of cavalry was sent, whose duty it was, together with one of the companies belonging to Baranoff, to defend the bombarding battery and the trench-diggers in the absence of Captain Baranoff. At 7 o'clock the reserve force of the assaulting column was advanced; it consisted of two companies and of two light guns under the command of Major Nazarov; the main reserves consisted of the same number of companies, and of one sotnia of Cossacks under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Favitzky. Placing myself at the head of this reserve force, I marched to the Kelenai gates and remained concealed in the gardens on the Kelenai road behind the mosques where the *invalid dépôt* had been established. Owing to the broken nature of the ground in that locality, to the numerous buildings and to the dense gardens, the movements of the assaulting columns as well as of the reserves were entirely hidden from the enemy, and attracted no attention whatever. Captain Mikhailof's column having approached to within 150 fathoms of the forts without being observed, was made to rest with its right flank on the river, being located in a ravine which screened it from the enemy, then throwing out immediately a body of riflemen, that officer commenced the erection of a couple of batteries, one for 2 guns at a distance of 65 fathoms from the barbet, and another for two light guns at a distance of 50 fathoms. Notwithstanding the fierce fire of artillery and musketry, the labour at the batteries proceeded successfully and was completed by the time the cannonading commenced. The shots from the batteries erected so close to the walls were very effective; the enemy's fire ceased; the crest of the walls was much broken and the walls generally of the barbet were considerably damaged. In the mean while the troops of both columns had prepared themselves for the assault, supplying themselves with ladders, and taking up their position as close under cover of the walls as possible, awaited only the signal for advancing. The signal was to be given by Captain Mikhailovsky.

At 2 p. m., as soon as the bombardment was over, the rifle company of the 3rd battalion, headed by Ensign Shorokhof, an officer long known here for his bravery, and also by Mikhailovsky himself, the principal officer of the column, was the first to rush to the assault with a cheer: this company was followed by two others. The cheers had hardly echoed through Mikhailof's column when Captain Baranoff, who was only waiting to hear it, pushed on his company at a quick run towards the Kelenai gates.

* Captain Mikhailof's column: the 1st and rifle companies of the 3rd Orenburg battalion and the 1st battalion of sharp-shooters. Baranoff's, a rifle company of the 4th battalion, the 3rd company of No. 3 battalion, and 4 companies of the battalion of sharp-shooters. Major Nazarov's 3rd and 4th companies of the 4th battalion.

The Reserve: the 1st company of the 4th battalion and of a company of sharp-shooters of the 7th battalion.

Placing three ladders against the barbet, Shorokhof's company commenced scrambling up the walls, but no sooner had the foremost reached the crest when there suddenly appeared on the walls of the barbet a fresh body of defenders. Stones, bullets, and iron balls were showered down upon the assaulters. Captain Mikhailof, Ensigns Shorokhof, Kousonsky, and Beliaef were the first who fell sacrifices in this escalade. They were all severely hurt by the stones and bullets.

Although this caused some delay, it did not damp the ardour of the besiegers. Those who fell under the blows were replaced by others, and in order to weaken the fire from the fortress, the Commander of the skirmishers, Lieutenant Tille, boldly advanced his guns from the battery almost under the very walls, and directed a hot fire of grape at the defenders, when he was wounded by a ball in the breast; this, however, did not prevent his remaining with his troops. Whilst this determined struggle was going on at the barbet nearest the river, Captain Baranoff rushing quickly with his companies to the Kelenau gates, and regardless of the fierce fire, contrived to place some ladders, and under a shower of bullets, grape shot, and stones, and also of missiles in the shape of beams, climbed up the first wall, burst open the gates, and carrying the ladder through, soon reached the second wall. Of this column the first to mount the wall was Ensign Mazing of the artillery of the guard. The gates of the second wall were also thrust open, and both companies entered the town. Major Nazaroff's reserves followed next, and, according to the preliminary arrangements a portion of these led by Major Nazaroff himself advanced straight to the citadel, whilst another portion went to the aid of Captain Mikhailovsky. I sent also 50 Cossacks from the main body of reserve under the command of Prince Bariatinski, and a company of infantry with Captain Kirichenko. At the very commencement of the assault, Captain Mikhailovsky received several blows on the head, and bleeding fearfully was obliged to leave his troops, and to give up his command to Captain Bergbom of the Orenburg rifle battalion. Profiting by the passage of Baranoff's column over the wall, Bergbom renewed the assault with some reinforcements, and this time with complete success. All the defenders of the barbet were bayoneted: the besiegers ascended the barbet dispersed over the walls, and then descended into the town.

At this moment Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohs came galloping up to the main body of reserves with his Cossacks. Charging him to take the general command of the troops who had penetrated into the town, and leaving a small detachment of Cossacks and infantry under the command of Staff Captain Vodar for the defence of the *invalid dépôt*, I led all the remaining infantry with two lightened guns to the Kelenau gates, and placing the guns in the streets leading to the gates, I occupied the nearest portion of the town with the infantry. At the same time I sent a detachment of rifles, one body under Colonel Favitzky and another under Ensign Kalitin who was attached to me in the capacity of Adjutant of the Orenburg rifle battalion, to take possession of the barbets and towers nearest to the gates.

The enemy, although driven away from the gates by the attacking party, succeeded nevertheless in surrounding the columns, and strove once more to gain possession of the walls of the towns, but the grape shot and the well directed fire from our rifles, and more especially our occupation of the barbets, forced them to abandon all further attempts.

Having made mention of the *invalid dépôt* I consider it a bounden duty to testify to the self-abnegation and exemplary zealous conduct of all the medical men attached to the troops during the siege, forgetting their own personal danger—Doctors Pokrishkin, Nikiten, Nikitnikof, and Chestneishi

Barishevski, devoted their entire attention to rendering immediate assistance and to relieving the wounded.

The companies of Captain Baranoff, at the occupation of the Kelenau gates, detaching in accordance with previous arrangements, some of their men, advanced to the left along the walls, whilst Major Nazaroff's column marched straight through the bazar to the citadel. Dispersing themselves over the walls to the left of the besieged gates, this column destroyed the defences by spiking and overthrowing the guns, and after advancing steadily forward till they came to the Kokan gates, joined the third company which had been placed there. Here they co-operated for the last time in bursting open and in making their way through the Kokan gates; next, taking possession of six guns, one of which was taken by assault, the column proceeded along the walls, reached the river and joined for the night Nazaroff's troops which had contrived to occupy the citadel and to carry into it two guns.

Leading his troops over the walls, Captain Bergbon directed one portion to the left of the Kelenau gates, and another along the river to the citadel, where he seized several guns and entered into the citadel for the night. The Russian "hurrah" had hardly echoed through the walls of Kodjend when Colonel Kraovsky, placing some of his riflemen in a boat belonging to the detachment, crossed over quickly to the left bank of the river, and taking advantage of the tumult in the town, scaled the wall in front of the river and broke into the town. Seizing one gun on his way Kraevsky with his riflemen passed through several streets, and appearing again at the citadel where he encountered Major Nazaroff, he crossed over once more to the right bank.

All the columns during their movements through the town met with the most fierce resistance. The defenders fought every inch of ground in the town, erected barricades, placed guns behind them, and planted riflemen in all the houses that faced the streets. The troops had hard work in clearing the streets.

In order to clear the town as quickly as possible, I despatched, after the infantry to the Kelenau gates, a portion of Cossacks, of which one sotnia, commanded by Esipoff, was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Pistolko to gallop through the town, and another mixed sotnia, commanded by Chertorogoff, was led into the town for the purpose of reinforcing the infantry. Esipoff's sotnia of Cossacks obeyed the order most gallantly, and returned safely to the reserves.

By 7 o'clock the cannonading in the town had entirely ceased, and the fusillade was becoming apparently less. The citadel had already been in our possession some time; 10 companies, 4 guns, and 200 Cossacks, not including the Cossacks stationed at the Kelenau gates, had been introduced into the town and citadel, consequently our possession of the town could not be disputed. But at the same time some precautions were required as regarded the baggage waggons which had been left in the first position on the Kokand Road, protected merely by one company, 30 Cossacks, and 4 battery guns under the command of Captain Bourakoff. These baggage waggons were menaced by a party of Kokandians, assembled in our rear to render assistance to the besieged, as well as by the Kokandians who were defending Khodjend, and who, forced to take flight, must have either encountered Captain Bourakoff's column or Major Pishtchemoukoff's; the latter, consisting of two companies, two battery guns and 30 Cossacks, occupied a position on the Bokhara road. Thus, giving over the general command of the troops in the town to Lieutenant Colonel Pistolko, I hastened with a sotnia of Cossacks and a rocket company to Captain Bourakoff's column, having sent an order to Major Pishtchemoukoff to follow thither likewise. A portion of the defenders of Khodjend, mounted and numbering some hundred men, flying along the Bokhara and Kokand roads, actually came across our columns stationed there,

and suffering a great loss in killed and wounded (the former Kokandian Commandant of Kereuchi, Mulla-Touicha-Dadkha, was amongst the killed), scattered themselves throughout the neighbouring towns. As for the party which had assembled in the rear of the besieging troops, they all dispersed as soon as they heard that the town had been taken.

The night passed quietly in the town as well as along the position, and in the morning the Aksakals made their appearance with protestations of entire and unconditional submission.

In this manner, owing to the heroic spirit of the troops, the energy and management of the several Officers, the resistance of the Khodjendians was overcome; and Khodjend, which is considered the barrier to Central Asia, was occupied by Russian troops.

The obstinate resistance of the defenders cost them about 2,500 killed alone. The dead were collected and buried during the course of the week. Crowds of wounded began to make their appearance at the Medical Depot.

On the third day after our occupation of Khodjend the petitions received for medical assistance were so numerous, that, notwithstanding the efforts of our doctors, they were obliged to wait several days till they were all attended to.

The trophies taken at Khodjend, not including fire-arms, consisted of flags, falconets and other arms, 13 guns and one large Kokand Banner.

The opposition having been so great, our loss was necessarily severe. During the siege we had 5 killed and 65 wounded; 57 received contusions and 6 were missing; amongst these were, 1 officer wounded and 6 contused. But however severe our losses, and however great the heroism of our troops and of their several commanders, it cannot but be confessed that the rapidity with which we occupied Khodjend was in no small degree due to the circumstance of the total defeat of the Ameer prior to our attack on the town. Forsaken by the Bokharians and not having had time to establish good relations with Kokand, Khodjend could not prepare for a proper defence. The artillery and the garrison of the town were not numerically proportionate to the determined spirit of the defenders, or to the length of line of the earthworks. It was only under such favourable circumstances as these that it was possible to resolve on an attack. In any other case an assault against a fortification similar to that of Khodjend would have been out of the question, and the only way to take possession of this strongly fortified and thickly populated town would have been by means of a regular siege, which would have required great resources and much time.

Here follows honorable mention of all the officers and subaltern officers engaged in the operations.

APPENDIX XLVI.

To MAJOR GENERAL D. Romanofski, Governor of the Province of Turkistan.

Be it known unto your Excellency that by the grace of the Supreme Maker we live well and happily. My soul has but one desire: to be a sincere friend of the White Czar; I have no intention to be at enmity with him, but on the contrary, considering myself a friend of the White Czar, I cherish the hope that, in case the enemy should enter our borders, you will not fail to afford us your co-operation. Should traders or any other class of persons belonging

to the people of the White Czar come to us for any purpose whatsoever, we shall in every case treat them with respect, and favour them more than our own subjects; and they shall trade freely amongst us, as of old; also, whatever number of traders may go hence to the Empire of the White Czar,—we trust that as your own subjects will be treated here, you will in like manner favour ours and admit them to trade freely, for so it is always done. When that free commercial relation shall be established on both sides, the people will praise God for the enjoyment of such liberty and peace. I say in the name of the Almighty that we have but one God, and that, therefore, what is said is sacred. I herewith send you Mohamed Karim Mirakhur who wishes us well, and whatever he shall say in our name respecting peace and agreement, the same is to be believed and considered true, 1283. (The original was sealed by Khudoyar Khan Sait Mohamet.

APPENDIX XLVII.

Your High Eminence,

I have received the letters which you sent me by Mohamed Karim Mirakhur and am satisfied with their contents. I am likewise well satisfied with the acts of the commander of your out-posts, who restored our soldier to us. Most honoured Khan, you may be fully assured that as long as you act towards me as you act at present, you shall never suffer ill from me, or displeasure, but, on the contrary, I am willing and ready to give you every good and friendly co-operation.

Even up to the present time you may have seen that I have had no inimical intentions towards you, and, moreover, that after taking Khodjend, I did not march on Kokan, nor did I begin (nor have I now begun) any inimical actions throughout the whole of the summer. I have also done no harm to any of your subjects, except of those, of course, who have dared to attack the present subjects of the White Czar. Your trading caravans pass freely to Khodjend and Tashkend and they are not hindered in any way.

I repeat what I have said more than once both to yourself and to other rulers in this country, as well as to the inhabitants, that the mighty White Czar seeks no conquests here, but only wishes to restore peace and tranquillity and to protect those natives who have adopted Russian allegiance. Consequently, as long as your acts do not in any way appear in disagreement with the will of my mighty Master the Emperor of all the Russias, so long will I not only abstain from commencing military operations against you, but I shall also be ready to assist you in all good things; and I even now willingly propose to you to send your caravans and traders not only to Tashkend and Khodjend, but also to all other Russian towns. You may be assured that they will meet with nothing but favour and advantage. As regards, however, a close friendship and alliance between us, and the protection of the White Czar, mentioned in your last letter, and which Mohamed Karim Mirakhur has verbally communicated to me with great minuteness, I should be heartily glad to promote an intention so good and beneficial for Kokan. But I cannot undertake any representations on the subject until you have given me the fullest proof of your intentions being firm and sincere, and for that purpose it is necessary:—

1st.—That your bands shall not cross over to the right bank of the Syr, and shall not dare to attack the people who are subject to the White Czar.

2nd.—That none of our people who may wish to proceed to Kokan on business shall be molested or oppressed, and be made to pay more than the rate of duty ($\frac{1}{10}$ th part) agreed between us.

I must direct your special attention to this point, for our traders are still sometimes badly treated at Kokan, as you will see from the complaints which I have placed in the hands of Mohamet Karim Mirahúr. I beg your High Eminence will look into this complaint and give legal satisfaction, in case it should be found just. I engage on my own part to give the same satisfaction should any of your traders have met with any molestation at Tashkend, Khodjend, or in other parts of Russia.

3rd.—That you shall not receive or give shelter to our criminals or deserters, and that you will send all such to me at Tashkend or Khodjend.

4th.—That you shall not oppress, but in every way protect those who may wish to bring down rafts of wood or other merchandize.

If your High Eminence will be pleased to fulfil sacredly all the conditions I have laid down, then by God's help will be fulfilled that which you desire for your own welfare and for that of your people; and in the meanwhile, I beg you to accept the silver coffee pot and cup which I send herewith as a proof of my friendly intentions and in token of my respect for the friendly sentiments which you have expressed in your letter.

APPENDIX XLVIII.

Your High Eminence,

In my last letter I announced that in order to terminate the war between Russia and Bokhara, it was first of all necessary that the Russian merchants detained at Bokhara should be sent back to us, and at the same time, partly also, verbally, through your envoy, I communicated to your High Eminence the bases on which our former friendly relations might be resumed. To that letter I requested an immediate answer.

Two months have now passed since I sent that letter, but no answer has yet reached me. I must confess to your High Eminence that this delay, together with the unseemly acts of the Bek of Oura-Tiubé (which, however, have now ceased), have more than once called for the resumption of hostilities. But as in the meanwhile I have been in receipt of information from Bokhara proving your friendly intentions (such as the release of the Russian traders, your prohibiting the Bek of Oura-Tiubé from making incursions into the Naú district and the like), I have not only abstained from renewing the war (notwithstanding that you have sent no answer to my letter), but I have even permitted your envoy to remain at Kazala as long as he chooses. Having, however, received no answer, I have not been able to fulfil all that I promised. These are the reasons for which your traders have not yet been returned to you. Orders have, however, been given for their release immediately on the return of the last of our merchants.

I repeat to your High Eminence what I have said more than once, namely, that the mighty White Czar, remembering the ancient friendship between Russia and Bokhara, does not desire to be at enmity with you. I may direct the attention of your High Eminence to the fact that notwithstanding what has occurred between us of late, the troops of His Majesty have hitherto not entered within the ancient boundaries of Bokhara. Hostilities were provoked by the detention of our envoys and by the necessity of protecting those who had placed themselves under the protection of Russia, and as soon as we had attained those objects we stopped. Our future relations, *i. e.*, either peace or war, depend entirely on your High Eminence; and in order to prove to you that we do not desire war except as a last resource, I hasten to inform you notwithstanding the silence of your

High Eminence, that the Governor General of Orenburg, who is the chief Governor of this region, arrived yesterday at Tashkend in order to review the troops, and that as he is empowered by His Majesty the Emperor to treat with you and conclude a peace, I have obtained from him the enclosed letter addressed to your High Eminence, which will give you the possibility of durably restoring the peace that has been interrupted.

If your High Eminence does not desire war, will you be pleased to send an envoy to Tashkend with full powers to negotiate with the chief Commander of the region and troops; and if you choose to do this, be pleased to send him immediately, for otherwise military operations may be renewed, and of the responsibility of these I divest myself by the present letter. (Signed by Major General Romanofski, Military Governor of the province of Turkistan).

APPENDIX XLIX.

Your High Eminence,

Having recently arrived at Tashkend to review the region and troops which I command, I herewith inform you, through the medium of Major General Romanofski, that on the report of General Romanofski to my mighty Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty has been graciously pleased to order me to enter into direct communication with you for the purpose of concluding a peace that shall be durable and beneficial to all, for which object I have been furnished with the most gracious commission, of which I herewith enclose a copy.

I trust that this time nothing will hinder you from sending to me at Tashkend, with as little delay as possible, an envoy with a commission similar to that with which I have been honoured by the White Czar for the purpose of concluding final and durable conditions of peace. (Signed by General Aide-de-Camp Kryjanovski, Governor General of Orenburg).

APPENDIX L.

To the Russian Emperor's Major General Romanofski, Military Governor of the Province of Turkistan.

My words are as follows:—The letter which you sent I have received. You write respecting the despatch of a good man for the negotiation of peace. I have appointed such an one and he will speedily set out. I have read your proposals of peace. I understand them and fully agree to them. The month of Rabikhsani, year 1283. (Seal of Emir Seid Muzafer).

APPENDIX LI.

Extract from the Report of General Romanofski, dated the 7th October 1866.

By the 7th and 19th of September the troops concentrated at Hodjent; exclusive of the garrison, were 19½ companies of infantry,* 5 section of Cossacks,

*Depôt battalions were formed of the infantry. The first depôt battalion was composed of the 2nd company of the 1st battalion of the line, the rifle company of the 2nd battalion, the 2nd company of the 4th battalion, and the 4th company of the 5th battalion. The 2nd depôt battalion was formed by 4 rifle companies, the 6th battalion of the line, and the 3rd and rifle companies of the 7th battalion. The 3rd Orenburg battalion of the line retained its full complement. The 4th Samara battalion and two companies of the Orenburg rifle battalion formed a separate half battalion, with half a company of sappers.

with a rocket company, 16 foot artillery guns, 8 horse artillery pieces, and 4 20-pound mortars*. This force was supplied with a double complement of projectiles, and with an additional half complement of cartridges, with an engineer park, and with provisions for 15 days, which, having by your Excellency's permission included half a pound of meat in lieu of a half ration of biscuit, were sufficient for one month. The camp hospital was furnished with medical stores for four months, in case it should be necessary to establish new hospitals. All the above materiel, together with stores of spirits, groats, barley, sheepskin coats, &c., was loaded on 600 *arbas* (2-wheel carts) and 800 camels, besides the regimental wagons.

On the 21st September the force encamped on the road to Bokhara at about 7 versts from Hodjent, and in the expectation of an answer to the last letter addressed to the Emir, giving him an opportunity of bringing our quarrel with him to a peaceful termination, occupied the same position until the 20th September.

The term granted to the Emir for his final answer was to expire on the 23rd September (5th October), and therefore, in order on the one hand not to break any promises, and on the other to lose no time uselessly, considering its value at this late season of the year, the Hodjent force entrusted to me under your superior orders left its position by your Excellency's directions on the 20th September, and bivouacked on the same day at the fortress of Naû.

After passing a day at Naû, and taking a company from its garrison†, the troops continued their march on the 22nd September (O. S.) 4th October (N. S.).

The distance from Naû to Oura-Tiubé is considered to be about 40 versts (27 miles); the last 12 versts (8 miles) from the village of Naûgandy are over a mountainous country, and therefore, with the intention of making a reconnaissance of the country and roads in the vicinity of the fortress, the force was halted and encamped at Naûgandy.

Naûgandy was the first village within the district of Oura-Tiubé. From the summit of a high mound in the vicinity of the village may be seen in the distance the fortifications of Oura-Tiubé as well as a portion of the plain which that fortress commands. Following the foot of the hills parallel with their snowy ridge, the plain is dotted with a great number of villages and intersected in all directions by streams, forming evidently a very rich and populous district. But, notwithstanding its picturesqueness, the neighbourhood of Oura-Tiubé presented a very melancholy aspect on our march to Naûgandy. The villages were empty, and many of them with stores of forage had been fired. By orders of the Bek of Oura-Tiubé the inhabitants had been driven by force into the fortress or into the mountains, while the most influential families had been arrested as hostages. He also sent Bokhariani troops to fire the villages, but we soon arrested the conflagrations.

These measures clearly showed that we could not reckon upon a peaceful termination of our differences with Bokhara. Nevertheless, in despatching a column to reconnoitre the fortress on the 23rd September (5th October), its

* Of the Orenburg artillery brigade, a battery in full complement, 1½ divisions of light artillery, 1½ divisions of rifled artillery, a squad (?) of No. 1 Siberian Cossack battery, a squad of mountain artillery, and a mortar division.

† Two sotnias of Ural Cossacks and 3 sotnias of Orenburg Cossacks, with 8 rocket stands.

‡ The rifle company of the 4th battalion, which had been attached to the 1st dépôt battalion.

commander, Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, Aide-de-Camp to His Imperial Majesty, was ordered to parley with the Bek of Oura-Tiubé before opening fire against the fortress. Accordingly, although our troops were fired upon, Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, in strict compliance with his instructions, did not reply to the fire until the Bek sent out a messenger with a reply to the letter which was addressed to him, which messenger treacherously wounded in the hand one of our militiamen who had carried the letter to the fortress.

Count Woronzoff's column consisted of 3 sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket company, 7 companies of infantry,* with 4 pieces of horse artillery, and 4 of foot artillery. He was accompanied by the chief of the staff, by Lieutenant Colonel Trotski of the staff, and another staff officer for the purpose of making plans and surveys.

The northern façade of the fortress of Oura-Tiubé, to which the Naï roads lead up, extends over three considerably high and steep elevations, standing almost in a straight line and sloping gradually to the opposite or southern side. The town is situated on these slopes; it is surrounded on all the other sides by a great number of turrets, by a double row of high walls, and by a deep trench.

All the towers and barbets were armed with guns, which denoted that the fortress was strongly defended with artillery. According to the most accurate accounts, the number of guns was 30. Of course it was not to be doubted that the material portion of the artillery of Oura-Tiubé was imperfect. The guns were, for the most part, of small calibre, from 3 to 12 pors.; but justice must be done to the Bokharian artillerymen by saying that they availed themselves to perfection of the materials they possessed. Having large supplies of powder and shot, the Bokharians brought their guns to play with great precision, especially at long distances; firing with heavy charges, and almost vertically, they hit all the surrounding heights at a distance of 900 fathoms and more with remarkable accuracy.

The treachery of the Bokharians towards our militiaman (the messenger who carried Count Woronzoff's letter to the fort) untied the Count's hand; after advancing the batteries into position, and, in his turn, opening fire upon the fort, Count Woronzoff boldly, and regardless of the strong fire from the fortifications, moved forward with some small bodies of infantry and cavalry, and passing round the northern and western façades, succeeded, with the aid of the officers of the staff, in gathering ample and correct information as to the position of the town. Small surveying parties were at the same time sent into the neighbouring localities, and these returned with the requisite information respecting the nearest roads.

The result of Count Woronzoff's bold and thorough reconnaissance having finally confirmed the information already possessed that the northern front was the strongest side of the fort and commanded the whole town, and having also procured a circumstantial knowledge of the nearest roads, afforded the possibility of forming plans as to the distribution of the attacking columns and the movement of the troops.

On the strength of this, the next few days were employed in stationing the troops which were appointed for the siege, and which were formed into detachments, and at the same time a few more detailed examinations of the fort and town were made under the personal superintendence of Your Excellency.

* Two companies of the rifle battalion, the 3rd battalion of the line in full complement, $\frac{1}{2}$ a company of sappers, a division of the battery of artillery, a squad of rifled artillery, and a squad of the Siberian Cossack battery.

It was evident that the most vulnerable part of the town was its southern side. Having in their front no natural obstructions, and surrounded by gardens, which in some places spread to the very walls, the southern works of Oura-Tiubé afforded better chances for secretly placing breaching batteries close to them and for leading up troops for the storm. But it had at the same time to be considered that these works lay at the foot of an elevation upon which stood the principal northern fortifications of Oura-Tiubé, and that even the capture of the southern walls would not in itself be a guarantee of success beyond them.

Keeping the fortifications on the northern side, and at the same time holding the citadel which was in the very centre of these works, the enemy could maintain the defence of the town and dispute it step by step until we took the north side, more especially as the elevation upon which the north-east bastion stood was separated from the town by a double row of high walls with a deep trench. This was all the more to be anticipated, as the necessary preparatory arrangements for the siege, such as the erection of batteries, &c., could not be disguised from the enemy, who would have timely warning of the threatening danger.

At the same time the greatly extended limits of the province, and the many military operations which would inevitably ensue while our military resources continued still to be very limited, made it more than ever necessary to remember the rule of economy in respect of men and ammunition.

Taking all this into consideration, on the 27th of September (9th October) the troops, in accordance with the proposed plan of attack, were disposed around the fort in the following manner:—

The main forces, consisting of 11 companies of infantry and 1 sotnia, with 10 guns and the whole of their train, under the command of Colonel Mantéufel, were stationed on the road to Jizakh, within 3 versts of the south-western angle of the fort. They occupied an advantageous position on the slopes of elevations surrounded by ravines, which rendered it possible, in case of need, to leave all the heavy lumber under a very slight protection. In front of these, 1 verst nearer to the south-western angle under cover of some heights, was stationed the advanced guard composed of 4 companies of infantry, 3 sotnias of Cossacks, with 8 guns and 6 rocket stands, under the command of Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, of His Imperial Majesty's suite, while another detachment of 5 companies of infantry, a party of sappers, 1 sotnia of Cossacks, with 6 guns of the foot artillery and 2 rocket stands, under Captain Abramof, were left on the Naú road, also within 3 versts of the fort, protected by elevations from the fire from the fort.

On the 27th and 28th of September (O. S.) the walls around the whole of the fort were surveyed most minutely. Small foraging columns were in addition sent out from the main detachment into the nearest villages, which enquired into the character of the country; one of these under Lieutenant Colonel Grizorief, composed of 3 companies of infantry, a sotnia of Cossacks, with 2 rocket stands, to which were attached some officers of the staff, a party of the surveyors and engineer officers of mines, penetrated as far as the main range of snowy mountains, and brought back a great deal of important and useful information.

It was determined to commence storming the place simultaneously from the southern and north-eastern fronts with several columns,* some of which

* 3rd Orenburg battalion of the line in full complement, one rifle company of the 7th battalion of the line, and the 10th and 11th companies of the Samara battalion.

were placed under the chief command of Count Woronzoff, and the rest under that of Captain Baranof, whose detachment, under the circumstances, was augmented to 8 companies of infantry and 12 guns (8 battering guns and 4 rifled cannon), and 2 sotnias of Cossacks with 2 rocket stands.

In order to insure the success of the storming, it was considered necessary to establish several batteries on the south side and opposite to the north-eastern front.

Of these preparatory works the establishment of breaching batteries opposite to the north-east front was the most difficult, for the ground in front of the bastion to be attacked on this side was perfectly open and sloped down from the fort very abruptly. The only site it was possible to select for the battery was a hillock not more than 90 fathoms from the bastion, defended by a natural moat in the shape of a deep *aryk* (canal) running at the bottom of the slope of the fort parallel with the walls.

To facilitate the accomplishment of this exceedingly difficult work, which was to be done on the night of the 29th of September (11th October), Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashikoff superintended a severe bombardment from the south side, while false attacks of cavalry with a rocket company were made on the south-eastern angle, and small columns of infantry with 3 guns made demonstrations against the north-western angle. Before the night set Captain Baranof's column was to pass over to the position assigned to it opposite to the north-eastern bastion, keeping to the hollows so as not to be detected by the enemy, and to proceed with the erection of the battery when the firing commenced on the night from the south side.

By the time it was dark all the troops and guns which were to operate against the fort from the south and west were in their respective positions, and opened a fire, which they kept up all night without intermission. Full credit must be given to our artillerymen for their excellent practice, and to the men who worked the rockets. Major General Kondratief, chief officer of artillery in the Orenburg military circuit, personally superintended the artillery with unwavering zeal during the whole of the siege. It may be positively asserted that not a single shot was fired without effect; many of the enemy's guns, beginning even from midnight, being obliged to give up all competition; our rifled cannon and mortars were especially telling. The town was set fire to in several places, and in the stillness of the night the cries uttered by the besieged at the havoc and devastation caused by our shells were frequently heard.

This was the first serious operation of our artillery against Oura-Timé, which in the above respect was crowned with complete success. Unfortunately all that was intended to have been done that night could not be accomplished. Captain Baranof's column had to make a long and difficult detour, so that it could not have commenced its work before midnight, and consequently could not have completed it by daybreak. Fully realizing his position, Captain Baranof therefore rightly concluded that if he attracted the attention of the enemy he would not be able to carry out the project except at an immense loss, and so deferred the work until the following night.

Through the happy selection made by Captain Baranof of a place for stationing his column, which, though under the fire of the fort, yet screened our men from the enemy's sight, enabled us, while keeping up a slight cannonade during the day from the south and south-west sides, to keep our real intentions hidden from the foe.

In order, however, still more to mislead the enemy, whose attention was chiefly turned to the south and west fronts, the following manoeuvre was performed: at 3 p. m. on the 30th September (12th October), I collected all the

available cavalry of the force, *viz.*, 3 sotnias with 6 rocket stands, and adding to these a small body of infantry, with one gun taken from the detachment left by Captain Baranof on the Naú road, and directed them against the north-west angle of the fort, instructing Colonel Pistol Kors to make a strong demonstration against it and the junction of the forces (?) while at the same time I reinforced Captain Baranof with one company of infantry and a sotnia of Cossacks from the main column, which proceeded to join him by forced marches, and remained with him till the work in the trenches was finished.

The lodgment for the breaching batteries was effected with extraordinary success. As soon as the firing of the rockets commenced from Colonel Pistolons' column and the artillery began to play in that quarter, which was at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6 in the evening, Baranof's column, previously drawn up in an adjacent hollow, fully prepared and provided with all that was necessary for the work it had to perform, began to draw silently towards the place chosen for the erection of the breaching batteries. The enemy being attracted by the enforced operations against his south and west sides at first paid no attention whatever to this movement. He not only did not increase his fire upon the approaching column, but even silenced for a time the artillery that had been playing on this side during the day, and removed some of the guns from here to the opposite point. It was only when all the batteries were placed, the men told off to their posts, and when they began breaking the earth, that the enemy, hearing the sound, opened fire on the labourers. The most difficult part of the work was, however, done, and the enemy's fire did not for a moment interrupt our brave soldiers. With a very slight loss they completed during the night all they had been directed to do.

By daybreak the breaching battery was finished and the guns placed; a convenient passage was effected across the *aryk* protected by a trench, and a covered way was made from the battery to the hollow where the reserve was located. The total length of trench work performed that night under the clever and experienced direction of Lieutenant Colonel Yablonski, of the Engineers, was more than 200 fathoms. Two small lodgments for 4 rifled guns were also made there to support the breaching battery. These guns opened fire with those of the battery at daybreak. During the night of the 1st (13th October), under the general superintendence of Lieutenant Colonel Osipof (Engineers), Captain 1st Lt, Staff Captain Sristchevski, and Lieutenant Priorof, of the guards battalion of sappers, the batteries on the south side were also completed; these were mounted with 2 rifled and 6 lightened guns, and 4 mortars, which likewise opened fire at daybreak.

Both the breaching batteries operated with extraordinary success, especially the one opposite to the north-east front. Here Staff Captain Zinovief, of the artillery of the guard, managed the guns with remarkable ability; he made a point of proving the efficacy of artillery fire against the walls on that side, which were of a peculiar construction and considered proof against shot. It must be acknowledged that Captain Zinovief's efforts were crowned with complete success; by midday, before even 150 shells were thrown at the wall, breaches began to appear—one about two fathoms wide by about one fathom in height, and another somewhat smaller. The operation of the batteries on the south side was also very satisfactory; the firing from these was directed by Lieutenant Colonel Silveretan under the chief superintendence of Major General Kondratief, who frequently levelled the guns himself. On this side our artillerymen succeeded by the evening in making two large breaches, not only in the front wall, but also in the farthest at the shoulder angle of the south-west barbette.

The proceedings preparatory to the siege were thus coming to an end, all that there was left to do was to prevent the enemy from repairing the damages done to the fortification and to silence his fire; for which purpose the whole of our guns were brought to bear upon him during the night of the 1st (13th October), after which, at daybreak, a rocket gave the signal to storm the place from all sides at one and the same time.

The south side was to be stormed by three columns commanded by Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, each composed of 2 companies of infantry and a party of sappers. The first* led by Captain Schaufls of the life guard regiment of lancers, was to proceed to the gates nearest to the south-west barbet. The second† column was to advance on the left of the first, under Captain Glukhovski of the life guards regiment of cuirassiers, and the third,‡ under the command of Major Bazarof, was to be led to the breach near the barbet.

These columns were provided with a reserve of three companies§ with two mountain guns, commanded by Colonel Slantenfel.

The north-east side was to be assaulted by Captain Baranof, commanding two columns organized for the purpose, each composed of two companies and a party of sappers,—one headed by Lieutenant Shorokhof,|| and the other by Staff Captain Konopelski;¶ these also had a reserve of one company with two rifled cannons under Lieutenant Kuzminski.** These columns were to advance to the two breaches effected during the day.

At about midnight of the 2nd-14th the troops appointed for the assault having the scaling ladders with them, took up their positions, on the grounds previously chosen for them, as near as possible to the fort.

To the right of the storming columns, on the southside and in the valley of a rivulet, Colonel Pistolkors was located with a detachment of cavalry of 3 sotnias with 6 rocket stands, which thus formed a link between Count Voronzow's and Captain Baranof's columns.

Besides this, in order to divert the enemy, a small column under Captain Siarkovski, composed of 2 companies of infantry, one gun and a party of Cossacks detached from Baranof's force, was directed against the north front.

At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 in the morning, at early dawn, the signal was given, our artillery ceased fire for a time, and the columns advanced to the assault. From the south Schaufls' and Glukhovski's columns moved forward simultaneously, and these were shortly afterwards followed by Nazarov's column.

The riflemen of Schaufls' column were the first who, under a shower of balls and stones, cleared the distance to the trench, and they at once adjusted a ladder against the wall of the turret which protected the gates. Captain Griffenberg, commanding the rifles, mounted first; he was followed by Ensigns Mashin and Fëdorof and several men, after whom the ladder gave way. At this critical moment the small party that had mounted, animated by Griffenberg's example, boldly fell upon and put to death the defenders of the turret, while Schaufls was already preparing to assist them. Those who

* 3rd company of the Orenburg rifle battalion, rifle company of the 2nd battalion of the line, and a party of sappers.

† 2nd company of the Orenburg rifle battalion, rifle company of the 6th battalion of the line, and a party of sappers.

‡ 2nd and rifle companies of 4th battalion of the line, and a party of sappers.

§ 2nd company of the 1st battalion of the line, 4th company of the 5th battalion, and a party of sappers.

|| 3rd rifle company of 3rd battalion of the line, and a party of sappers.

¶ 1st and 2nd companies of 3rd battalion of the line.

** Rifle company of the 7th battalion of the line.

followed Griffenberg, but who could not get up by the ladder,—Ensign Kalitin and Mr. Lerkhé,* with other volunteers,—rushed at the gates with axes in their hands and cut them down. The rest of the riflemen had in the meanwhile placed another ladder. Thus, not only were the first who mounted the wall backed in proper time by assistance, but also, notwithstanding the most obstinate defence made by the enemy, Schauuffs' column in very quick time broke open both gates and penetrated into the town; the latter, however, had not yet altogether entered into the street before it was attacked between the two walls by large masses of the enemy, which had to be kept off with the bayonet. Having shaken the enemy off, the column passed through the gates, and, in accordance with an order previously given, proceeded to the right along the wall, where it forcibly took 4 guns.

By order of Count Voronzow, Captain Glukhovski advanced at the same time as Schauuffs' to the left of the latter, Captain Pletz with the volunteers and party of sappers marching in front. Our foremost men had hardly emerged from the corner of the gardens when the enemy opened a strong fire of muskets, falconets and cannon. Paying no attention to this, the volunteers, with Pletz at their head, descended into the trench and adjusted their ladders. Leaving only a portion of his riflemen on the edge of the trench to fire at the enemy on the walls, Captain Glukhovski, with all the rest of his men headed by Captain Sveltchkof, followed up the volunteers. A shower of stones, cannon balls and balls of burning pitch (fire balls) fell on the heads of the besiegers, who nevertheless passed over the first wall. But here the column stumbled upon large masses of the besieged, some of whom fell upon our men, while the others lodged themselves in the contiguous dwellings and turrets, and then opened a strong musketry fire. A long and bloody struggle now took place. Captain Pletz was killed, whereupon the command of the volunteers was taken by Lieutenant Komarof. Ensign Konchitz and Lieutenant Pleshkof, both of the Orenburg rifle battalion, were mortally wounded; Lieutenant Fëdorof, of the same battalion, was also wounded, and Captain Glukhovski, Lieutenant Komarof and Ensign Leontiéf received contusions.

Two guns and several falconets were here wrested from the enemy.

By this time some of the general reserves of the columns storming on the south side began to approach the outer gates broken open by Schauuffs, led by Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief, and Schauuffs' column, taking the second or inner gates, was already entering the town.

Glukhovski's column, strengthened with 2 guns from the reserve force, entered at the same time, and agreeably with previous orders advanced to the citadel.

It must be here observed that the brunt of the affair was borne by these two columns; each composed of 2 companies and a party of sappers, they separately did not number more than 250 men; Schauuffs' column sustained a loss altogether of 77 in killed, wounded and contused, and Glukhovski's 74.

By order of Count Voronzow, Major Varof, with his column and a party of sappers, followed up the preceding two columns. He entered the breach without any great loss, descended into the space between the two walls, and, clearing it of the masses which intercepted his way at the point of the bayonet, led a portion of the column against the second breach, while the other portion was directed to proceed along the western front. The two companies of the 4th battalion, led by their brave Captain Baron Renné

* Titular Concoillor Lerkhé was attached to the Military Governor of Turkistan, and took part in the military operations as a volunteer.

and by Lieutenant Bogolinhof, and the company of sappers, headed by Lieutenant Pletz No. 2, which composed Nazof's column, behaved with the courage for which they were renowned, and very soon took possession of that part of the town wall and 4 guns.

Thus, in not more than half an hour all the columns commanded by Count Voronzow succeeded in making themselves masters of the walls and in penetrating into the town. The first obstacle was overcome, but they might have encountered another and more difficult one. The streets opening to the walls on this side were narrow and tortuous and abounded with large dark caravanserais. These were occupied by some of the defenders of the walls, while others again filled the dwellings and stationed themselves behind the fences, and from all sides opened a strong fire of musketry.

Directing Lieutenant Colonel Trotski, of the *État Major* (and chief of the staff of the province, who was all throughout attached to the southern force), to support Schauß and Glukhovski with a portion of the reserve, Count Voronzow, with the rest of the reserve, himself marched to the breach, and when all the columns had penetrated into the town, he hastened with all the reserve force to support those in the streets where the firing was growing hotter, and the hand-to-hand struggle was becoming fierce. The resistance in the streets could not, however, last long; the besieged soon noticed Captain Baranof's column in their rear.

As soon as the signal was given with the rocket, Baranof, without losing a moment, boldly led his two columns to the siege, bidding Captain Demnet to follow with his reserves. The brave companies of the 3rd battalion with their worthy officers, Captain Baranof, Lieutenant Shorokhof, Captain Konopelski and Ensign Alenitch, paying no heed to the fire which was opened upon them, ran quickly over the ground to the breach, and scrambling up by ladders and over the ruins instantaneously occupied the wall. Shorokhof and Konopelski were the first to enter the breach. The enemy fell back into the nearest turrets and barbets, but before they had time to recover from the shock, Captain Baranof at once led one portion of the storming column straight towards the citadel, while the other was directed to pursue the enemy running towards the south side; Alenitch's company was told off to the left along the wall to seize a strongly fortified barbet in that direction and some guns,—an order which was soon and accurately fulfilled.

Generally speaking, Captain Baranof's orders were obeyed by all the officers of his column with coolness, bravery and alacrity. They were hard at work at once in all directions, and in less than an hour the citadel was occupied by Baranof's troops, and another portion of his force was proceeding to the south side in the rear of the obstinate defenders of the southern face. Baranof's storming column took 7 guns by main force.

The citadel was no sooner taken, than Baranof's reserves under Lieutenant Kuzninski appeared on the ground with 2 rifled guns, which, notwithstanding the steepness of the road, were brought up to the very gates of the citadel, from which points some telling shots were fired at the north-west bastion and at the masses of the enemy. Notwithstanding the great obstinacy of the besieged, their resistance could not possibly be of long duration. All the quarters of the town were soon cleared of the enemy, and then the troops were led to the last refuge of the defenders,—the north-west bastion,—which was situated on the most elevated part of the fort and armed with two large and several small cannon. From the commencement of the siege the defenders of this bastion directed a frequent fire on the contending parties without distinguishing between friend and foe. They continued this fire even when the greater part of the town

and the citadel were in our hands, but even here a cheer and a bayonet charge decided the affair ; by 7 o'clock the bastion was taken.

Justice demands that something be said too of the valuable assistance given by the small column under Captain Siarkovski, which during the siege succeeded in penetrating into the fort through the Nañ gates, and by No. 1 sotnia of Ural Cossacks under Lieutenant Prince Bariatinski (of the Preobrajenski regiment of His Imperial Highness Czarévitch's body guard), which in the very heat of the battle broke open and entered through the gates to the right of Schaufl's column, cut down the men on some of the barbets, overthrew several guns, and bravely swept through the streets to the consternation of the enemy. This sotnia came up in time to assist in the attack on the northern bastion,—the last refuge of the besieged. Mention must also be made of the excellent and praiseworthy management of Colonel Pistol Kors in command of the cavalry, who, despatching Prince Bariatinski's sotnia of Cossacks to the aid of the besiegers, failed not himself with the rest of the cavalry to cut off in proper time the fugitive garrison of Oura-Tiubé, the majority of which fled to the hills to the south-east of the fort.

The hundreds of dead bodies of the enemy which lay for several days on the ground in the neighbourhood of Oura-Tiubé bore witness to the terrible havoc made by our Cossacks.

At about 7 o'clock in the morning Your Excellency, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, personally thanked the troops in the citadel of Oura-Tiubé for their usual brave service rendered to His Majesty.

The firing in the town had almost ceased.

In this manner, after 1½ hours' hard fighting, fell Oura-Tiubé, one of the chief bulwarks of the Emir's power in Central Asia, and over the walls of its citadel now waves the Russian banner.

By God's aid we may expect that the fall of a point of such importance to Bokhara will have very great weight, not only with regard to the consolidation of our power in Central Asia, but also very beneficially as regards the general pacification of the region.

Situated on the confines of Bokhara and Kokand, Oura-Tiubé has very long and constantly served either as a point of defence or as an object of the hostile design of the barbarous despots of this country ; and its inhabitants, with the intention of stimulating their martial spirit, have systematically been trained by the native rulers to robbery.

The numerous and extensive burial grounds, occupying more than half of the town and the immediate vicinity, and the undeveloped state of trade and industry in Oura-Tiubé, as compared in that respect with the neighbouring towns, bears outward evidence of its mournful history.

The trophies of our victory on the 2nd/_{4th} October, besides the important fort, are 4 banners, 16 large mortars, including one 72-pounder mortar, 16 small cannon, a great number of falconets and muskets, immense stores of powder, lead, cartridges and projectiles, including bomb-shells, &c. The enemy's loss is enormous ; in the town and immediate vicinity alone not less than 2,000 bodies have been buried.*

Our loss, too, in this severe engagement was necessarily heavy—

		Officers.		Men.
Killed	3†	14
Wounded	1	102
Contused	6	101

*According to the Aksakals of Oura-Tiubé, the inhabitants of the place prior to the siege numbered up to 30,000 ; after the siege these were reduced by a half, and they assert that in killed and wounded their loss amounted to 15,000, but this is of course incredible.

† Captain Pletz No. 1 killed outright. Lieutenant Pleshkof and Sub-Lieutenant Konchitz, both mortally wounded, died within a few hours.

These numbers include the killed and wounded during both the siege and the storm, at which period our losses did not exceed altogether 3 killed and 10 men wounded.

Here follows honourable mention of all the officers engaged in the action,

APPENDIX LII.

Extract from General Romanovski's Report of the 1st 13th November 1866.

After the fall of Oura-Tiubé, the ruler of Bokhara remained possessed of only one more place which gave him a chance of still retaining hold of the valley of the Syr-Daria, and that was the fortress of Jizakh.

Jizakh, which always derived an importance from its situation, had of late risen into still greater significance, situated at the northern extremities of the Djalan-Uty defile, through which lies the main and almost the only convenient road from the direction of the Kirghiz Steppes to Samarcand and Bokhara. Jizakh had always served the Bokharians as a point of defence against the irruptions of their neighbours in the north, or as a means of support in their aggressive operations in the steppes and against the Kokanians. Jizakh had long been protected by a citadel and a town wall, but during the last eight months it had been very considerably strengthened. Several thousand men had worked daily in the fortifications.

A triple row of walls, one rising above the other (the outer one newly built this year was $3\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms high and 4 fathoms thick); a triple row of trenches, the front one being in parts as many as 11 yards deep; a great number of barbets and of works projected very far out, which well flanked the trenches, —the outlying country, too, being exposed to a cross-fire from them; the very system of the construction of the new fortifications of Jizakh, which were a great improvement on the old Bokharian forts, i. e., the system of sloping apertures, of covered ways, also with screened apertures; all this gave Jizakh really a very formidable appearance. To take the most moderate figure, the garrison numbered 10,000 men, consisting of the remnant of the Emir's best troops, and reinforced by fresh relays of Afghans, Persians, and Turkmen, who were armed not only with the old matchlocks, but also with very good muskets of the European pattern; after the siege a great many revolvers were found, besides percussion arms. The artillery consisted of 53 cannon, the gun carriages were well made according to the English pattern, and a great quantity of shells was found in the store houses.

The defence of Jizakh was conducted by the most trustworthy of the Emir's coadjutors, the Toksabapervanachi Alayar, Yobuk, the late Bek of Jizakh, the commander of the Afghan troops, and many other Beks, eighteen in number.

It will consequently be understood that so long as such a place like Jizakh, so strongly fortified and defended, remained in the possession of the late arbitrary controller of the destiny of Central Asia, it was not only in vain for us to look forward to any serious concessions on his part, but could not even expect that tranquillity would prevail in the valley of the Syr-Daria.

Seeing that even after the occupation of Oura-Tiubé there came not the promised friendly mission from Bokhara, the troops were immediately

marched towards Jizakh after the necessary arrangements were completed in Ora-Tiubé for the location of the garrison, and after the detachment received fresh supplies from Khodjend.

The garrison left in Ora-Tiubé amounted to three companies of soldiers, with two guns and a company of Cossacks.

A column of five companies, three sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket company and guns of the horse artillery, had previously (^{5th}/_{17th} October) been sent forward on the road to Zaámin, a small fort standing half way between Ora-Tiubé and Jizakh.* On the ^{6th}/_{18th} two other companies, with two guns and $\frac{1}{2}$ a sotnia of Cossacks, were ordered to follow. The command of these advanced troops was given to Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkof. The enemy fled so precipitously that he left a gun in Zaámin, and the fort was taken without a shot being fired.

The rest of the forces were then gradually advanced along the same road, and all assembled at Zaámin on the evening of the ^{10th}/_{2nd} of October.

Leaving in Zaámin, in the charge of a small force, all the heavy lumber that could be dispensed with, the detachment, consisting of $16\frac{1}{2}$ companies, 5 sotnias of Cossacks, a rocket company, with 8 guns of horse and 12 of foot artillery, moved towards Jizakh. Halting for the night in the village of Rabot, 12 versts from Jizakh, the Khodjend detachment marched at daybreak of the ^{12th}/_{24th} towards the south side of the town, and before midday took up a position on the Samarcand road between Jizakh and the mouth of the Djakan-Uty defile. The troops reached the heights forming the defile and skirting Jizakh on the south by about 11 A. M.; the enemy's pickets, which were fallen in with on resuming the march after the last night halt, gradually drew back towards the town, though they did not relinquish their posts without a more or less prolonged exchange of shots and hand to hand fights with our advanced bodies. In these encounters our militiamen and Cossacks made several prisoners, who gave us a great deal of valuable information on the situation of the town and about the garrison.

When the head of our column emerged on the Samarcand road, some of the enemy's pickets retired into the defile, although most of them drew back to the fort.

The strong fortifications of Jizakh and the numerous garrison could be easily discerned from the last gradients of the mountains at not more than 3 versts distance. The walls and the portion of the town nearest to them were crowded with defenders. We could see a great number of tents in the space between the town walls and the citadel. There were several guns mounted on the barbets and projecting parts of the walls. It is to be observed that, contrary to the practice of opening fire from a great distance followed by the Central Asiatics on all occasions up to this time, the enemy did not on this day and to the end of the siege open fire from his guns until our troops approached within close range, and then his artillery played rapidly and accurately upon us; it was evident that it was directed by an experienced hand. Some prisoners brought in apprised us of the important fact that Allayar Bek, commanding in Jizakh, had determined to make a desperate defence, and that in order to prevent the garrison from abandoning the fort and from entertaining any idea of surrendering it, he had closed all egress by blocking the gates, leaving all the small wickets free; the inhabitants were at the same time strictly forbidden to say a word about surrender. By his order the portion

* The distance between the two latter is estimated at a little more than 100 versts.

of the town nearest the wall and the market place were sacrificed to the purposes of defence; houses and fences were pulled down for the construction of an esplanade, some were burned down, and the gardens were cleared of the trees. All the preparations for the defence were made before our very eyes; up to the last moment of the siege, while the fire from our batteries and chain of riflemen was being poured in upon them, every possible thing was done to strengthen the situation.

After placing the detachment in position within 4 versts of the town on the banks of the river giving its name to the Djalan-Uty defile, a reconnaissance was on the same day performed under the personal command of Your Excellency. A survey was made of the main pass, about 40 to 50 fathoms wide, through which lies the road to Samarcand. The enemy's pickets found at the entrance into the defile disappeared and kept a good way off during the reconnaissance. It was nevertheless found necessary to establish a strong picket in the defile to guard the road; the picket remained there up to the close of the siege, under the command of Markofelder of Cossacks. On the evening of that day one of the officers of the Afghans was taken prisoner. We were impelled by the strong defence of Jizakh, the numerous pickets of the enemy in our rear, which confirmed the statements of the prisoners that large reinforcements were coming up from Samarcand, and also by the lateness of the season, to push the siege and to capture Jizakh as quickly as possible. It was at the same time evident that an open siege without preparations—siege work was an affair of too great a risk—and the erection of batteries and of more or less considerable covered approaches, were at all events indispensable. Therefore, without loss of time, gabions and fascines were commenced on a large scale on the next day. On the recommendation of the Military Engineer Osipof measures were at the same time taken to divert the water from the town, which flowed into it from the Djalan-Uty; this was done to the utmost of our ability.

These preparatory works lasted without intermission over the ^{13th}/_{25th} and ^{14th}/_{26th} and ^{15th}/_{27th} of the month; from three to four companies of soldiers being employed on them; while minute inspections of the fort and road through the defile was daily made by another portion of the forces, a third body being told off to cover the advancing transports from Zafānin, which, among other things, was bringing up part of the park of the artillery.

On the ^{14th}/_{26th}, two columns, each composed of three companies, were sent out to inspect the fortifications, one under the command of Captain Baranof, the other under that of Major Pistcheninkof. The first marched towards the Samarcand gates on the south side of the town, and the other to the Ouna-Tiubé gates at its south-eastern angle. On the approach of these columns to the fort they were met with severe discharges from the guns, and soon after found that ditches were dug across the roads, which were also obstructed by earth-works and barricades. The houses in the immediate vicinity of these, as well as these barricades, were occupied by Sarbazes, who fired upon our troops as they advanced. But the enemy's purpose here was utterly frustrated by a brave bayonet charge. With considerable loss and leaving several prisoners in our hands, the enemy hurriedly retreated into the fort; the obstructions were removed and the locality was surveyed.

The results of this reconnaissance were very valuable. It was discovered that, although the enemy had made great exertions to form esplanades around the new walls, yet in many places large buildings and stone fences were left intact, which, without much labour, could be turned into breaching batteries. Advantage was at once taken of this oversight on the enemy's part, by lodging three companies under Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief during the night

of the ^{3th}_{25th} and ^{14th}_{26th} in the gardens and houses nearest to the spots selected for the erection of the batteries.

At daybreak on the 14th, the neighbourhood of Jizakh on the western and northern sides was examined by Captain Gulkhovski and a surveying party under cover of two sotnias of Cossacks with two rocket stands. At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief's companies lodged in advance of the camp in the gardens and houses close to the fort were relieved by three other companies under Major Svintsitski.

At about 10 A. M., large bodies of the enemy began to assemble on the defile in front of the pickets stationed there, which in a short time made an attack on a picket of our foragers; the attack was repulsed; in the meanwhile, on receipt of the first intelligence of the gathering of Bokharian horsemen in the defile, our militia and two sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket company, under Count Woronzos Dashkof, were marched in that direction; and in obedience to Your Excellency's orders I myself followed with two companies of infantry and four guns; the militia under the elder Korin, who were the first to arrive after the alarm had been given, being backed in time by the Cossacks, rushed at the Bokharians, overthrew them, cut to pieces some scores of men, and took nine prisoners. On the approach of our companies the whole of the cavalry charged, and although the enemy was by this time $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 thousand strong, they were without much trouble thrown into confusion, turned and pursued as far as the southern extremity of the defile, *i. e.*, for about 20 versts from the camp: on this occasion some scores of the Bokharians were slaughtered and nine taken prisoners.

Simultaneously with the appearance of the enemy in the defile, that is, at about 11 o'clock in the morning, the Bokharians made a 'sortie' from the fort and attacked Major Svintsitski's companies. Here they were also repulsed with loss and our position was retained.

The transport from Zafmin bring up the remainder of the stores, &c., arrived safely in the evening of the same day.

On the ^{15th}_{27th} of October, a column of three companies under Captain Baranof was sent out to inspect in detail the southern and eastern and northern sides of the fort; engineering officers of artillery and surveying parties under the commands of officers of the Etât Major were attached to the column, which accomplished its labours successfully and without much loss.

Thus, by the evening of the ^{15th}_{27th} every information necessary for the formation of a plan of attack was obtained; all the material required for the erection of the batteries and for the approaches was in readiness, it was therefore determined by Your Excellency that same night to place the batteries opposite to the fronts to be attacked.

The numerous garrison of Jizakh enabling the enemy to make a good defence along the whole line of fire as well as to make sorties, and we being obliged as much as possible to concentrate our forces in order to keep a good watch on the defile, the fronts selected for the attack were the two nearest to the camp; the south front a little to the right of the Samarcand gates, where a breach was to be made, and south-east front, which was to be breached a little to the left of the Oura-Tiubé gates. There was this advantage to be gained from the selection of these fronts for an assault, that communication could be maintained between the chief camp and the batteries along the high roads to Samarcand and Oura-Tiubé. The batteries were to be placed in the houses and behind the fences which were left standing on the *esplanade*.

For the construction of these batteries two columns were sent from the camp on the evening of the ^{15th}_{27th}—one commanded by Captain Mikhailovskii, composed of four companies, six light guns, and two mortars, which

proceeded towards the Oura-Tiubé gates, and the other under Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief, composed of four companies, four battery guns, and two mortars, which marched towards the Samarcand gates. Colonel Yoblovski was charged to superintend the erection of the batteries.

These columns had not left the camp when a sortie in force was made from the fort against Major Donauf's companies stationed in advance of the position to guard the grounds chosen for the batteries. This sortie, notwithstanding the suddenness with which it was made, and the darkness of the night, was repulsed with very small loss on our side, and when the columns approached, the enemy withdrew into the fort, leaving several dead bodies on the scene. But in withdrawing the Bokharians set fire to the houses left standing on the esplanade, and our men had to make their way through the burning edifices and to extinguish the flames. The proposed works were, however, nearly completed that night, so that by the morning the troops were sufficiently protected. At daybreak the Bokharians noticed the danger which menaced them, and, opening a sharp fire upon both our columns, sallied out in large numbers, attacking the right flank and rear of Captain Mikhailovski's column, but they suffered such a considerable loss that no more sorties were made afterwards.

On the morning of the ^{16th}/_{24th} fire was opened from the batteries of both the columns, and to divert the enemy's attention at the same time, four rifled guns under cover of two rifle companies, two sotnia of Cossacks, and a rocket company, commanded by Count Woronzoff Dashkof, were sent out to operate upon the south-western angle of the fort.

The firing from the breaching batteries was very successful. Captain Mikhailovski himself directed the fire from his batteries, all of which were under the general superintendence of Colonel Silvershvan, and in Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief's column the fire from the batteries was directed by Captain Zinonief, of the artillery of the guards, who before Oura-Tiubé had so well proved the practicability of making breaches in the walls of Asiatic fortresses. By the evening, Captain Mikhailovski had half accomplished the breach, but as this was protected by a flank fire from some of the barbets and by a strong cannonade, it was found necessary to erect a new battery a little in advance of the other to operate against the latter. It was also found necessary to strengthen Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief's battery. All this work was very soon and well done through the aptitude of our engineer officers and the bravery of our sappers, notwithstanding that the enemy, after discovering our object, continued almost unremittingly a redoubled fire of cannon and musketry by night as well as by day, and to avert the threatened danger, the enemy's sharp shooters occupied the *covered* way and breach in great force, while, regardless of the fire from our batteries, the Bokharians endeavoured during the night to make good the dilapidations of the walls.

By the morning of the ^{17th}/_{25th} the Bokharians had raised an enormous shield higher than the wall by the breach at the Oura-Tiubé gates. By directing their fire first at the uninjured part of the wall against which the shield rested, and then at its base, our artillerymen not only succeeded in not alone knocking the shield over into the trench, but even in considerably widening the breach and in making it more passable.

By the same time Captain Zinonief's battery had also completed a breach.

During the course of the day a column under Count Woronzoff Dashkof, composed of two companies, two sotnias, and four guns, was sent out to create a diversion by operating against the western and northern fronts of the fort.

In the evening when, it became dark, parties were detached from Mikhailovski's and Grigorief's columns, which, under cover of volunteers, minutely

examined the ground in front of the batteries, with a view to the advance of the besieging columns, and Lieutenant Kuzminski, commanding a company of the 7th battalion of the 6th lancers of the line, with the assistance of Sergeant Gonnof, himself measured the depth of the trench.

It has become a regular practice in this warfare to commence the siege of a fort at daybreak. The negligence of the Asiatics, who do not follow our rules with regard to garrison duty and advanced posts, particularly at night time, justified this practice, which we followed almost without exception. But in the same way, as circumstances compelled us to disregard this practice at the siege of Khodjend, so there were conditions which, in the siege of Jizakh, obliged me to storm the place in the day time. Notwithstanding the animated fire from our batteries during the night of the ^{16th}/_{28th} the Bokharians still continued tolerably well to fill up the breach by the Oura-Tiubé gates; it was then to be apprehended that, in case of an assault at daybreak of the ^{18th}/_{30th} our troops would probably encounter some unforeseen impediment. Besides we could not fail to observe that the garrison of Jizakh, forewarned by our early attack on Oura-Tiubé just taken, was on the alert before the morning, and that it was exactly at that time that the fire from the works was more frequent. Yet a sudden attack on Jizakh, with its numerous garrison, than which no stronger fort had yet been found in the country, was more than ever an indispensable condition on which depended our success. It was only by a sudden attack that we could hope to gain the place without considerable loss.

Considering this it was Your Excellency's pleasure to authorize me to conduct the assault at midday on the ^{18th}/_{30th} of October.

The fort would be stormed by two columns under Captain Mikhailovski and Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief, each composed of four companies of foot, with companies of sappers and Cossacks. The reserve for these columns consisted of four companies, with two mountain guns and a sotnia of Cossacks under Count Woronzoff Dashkof. In order to screen our designs from the enemy, and to divert his attention from the points selected for the attack, a small column of three sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket company and two light guns under Colonel Pistol Kors, was sent out during the night of the ^{17th}/_{30th} to make a demonstration against the north-western angle of the fort, and the reserve force of the storming columns was marched out exactly at the time when the troops at the batteries were relieved, *i. e.*, at 10 A. M.

The fire from our batteries during the night of the ^{17th}/_{30th} which were strengthened on that occasion by the addition of some rifled cannon, did not allow the enemy to repair the damages done to the walls to that degree in which he had succeeded in doing so the day before, and all the effected repairs were at dawn of day very soon destroyed by our artillerymen, after which the action of our artillery was directed against the buildings flanking the breach, and against the guns covering the ground to be traversed by our storming columns.

Notwithstanding the strong cannonade from the enemy's works, our artillerymen succeeded by dint of their clever practice and *sang froid* in thoroughly effecting all these purposes, until most of the enemy's guns on the points attacked were either injured or silenced even before the commencement of the assault.

In the meanwhile the commanders of the storming columns, with the engineers, once more examined the roads to the trench and breach during the day, prepared the scaling ladders, ranged the storming companies, and waited only for the appointed hour to commence the assault.

At 10 o'clock in the morning, Colonel Pistol Kors was ordered to make a still stronger demonstration against the north-west angle. In obedience

to this order, Colonel Fistolkov, hurrying on a sofnia of Cossacks, leaving the other two concealed in the gardens, approached quite close to the walls with the former, with a rocket company and two guns, and opened so strong a fire that he obliged the Bokharians to sally out upon him from the fort. In the encounter which ensued, our Cossacks and men of the horse artillery proved themselves quite equal to combat on foot and in line formation against the best Bokharian infantry. We suffered in only 1 officer and 11 Cossacks wounded, while the enemy, leaving several dead bodies on the ground, was forced to withdraw in haste. It was, however, still more important that the chief object of the demonstration—the diversion of the enemy—was accomplished.

Thus by midday all was ready for the sudden assault. We had only to rely on the bravery and confident spirit of our troops, and on the good management of the different commanders.

The men of Mikhailovski's column had yet to pass over the ground between the battery and the breach, about 90 fathoms; those of Grigoriev's column had to traverse 100 fathoms of ground. Your Excellency was, of course, no indifferent witness to the worthy manner in which our officers and men of the storming columns obeyed the order to clear these distances.

Unhesitatingly our storming companies emerged from the houses and gardens upon the esplanade, and led by their worthy commanders, Captain Mikhailovski and Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriev, with Captain Konopelski, Baron René, Lieutenant Kuzminski, and Ensign Alenetch, then quickly and in good order marched to the breach, instantly threw their ladders into the trench, and in less than a quarter of an hour were upon the walls of the fort. By a previous order of Lieutenant Colonel Yoblovski, directing the siege works, small companies of sappers, under the command of Captain Svintchevski and Lieutenant Priorof, simultaneously rushed to the gates, supported by the brave rifle companies of Captains Griffenberg and Svertchkof. The enemy, not expecting the attack, had not time enough to meet with a fire, and although the Bokharians rushed to the defence of the breaches (where Lieutenant Kuzminski, the first to mount the wall, was severely wounded), their resistance could not long endure. Our brave cheer compelled the defenders to fall back, and then quickly to turn into flight in the greatest despair and disorder, which resulted in less than half an hour in the defeat of the entire garrison.

The besiegers on occupying the breach divided into several different columns, some proceeding along the wall, others into the space between the walls and the citadel. A portion of the reserve of the storming columns immediately followed the foremost troops into the fort; those under Captain Glukhovski following Captain Mikhailovski, and those under Captain Baranof following Grigoriev. With Glukhovski's column Captain Svintchevski and Lieutenant Leontief succeeded in quickly bringing two mountain and one rifled gun into the fort. Thus the enemy still held only the north gates, whereas in all the others there was only a small wicket open for escape into the fields.

We may easily imagine the terrible and desperate situation in which the garrison of Jizakh was now placed, but in justice to the Bokharians it must be said that, even in this difficult moment, many of them still displayed real heroism. Of the 18 Beks, 16 perished in a hand-to-hand struggle, and among these was the Toksabapervanachi Alayar, the chief of the garrison. A portion of the defenders threw themselves into a powder magazine close to the citadel, and seeing they were inevitably lost, they blew up the magazine, causing 16 of our men to be severely wounded or burnt.

It was not yet one o'clock when our reserves entered the fort and your Excellency yourself appeared on the scene of action. Our anxiety now was not concerning the possession of Jizakh, for it was already in our hands, but was for the re-establishment of order in the town, which was burning in a great many places, for the lives of the unfortunate defenders, who, despairing of their fate, were determined to surrender. A very small number of these escaped through the wicket of the Tashkend gate, but even there they were met by Colonel Pistolkor's cavalry and Bezobrasof's sotnia from Captain Mikhailovski's column, which passed round by the wall.

Judging from all that occurred, and from the statements of the Bokharians, very few of the defenders of Jizakh escaped; the majority were destroyed, and about 2,000 were taken prisoners.

While the events above described were taking place, there appeared within the walls of the fort and around it, in our rear and in front of the troops left to protect the camp under the command of Colonel Mantenpel, and in front of Colonel Pistolkor's column, fresh masses of Bokharian cavalry, followed at an interval of one march by 2,000 Sarbazes with 18 guns, despatched by the Emir to the support of Jizakh; met, however, with a fire from our guns, and learning the fate that had already overtaken Jizakh, all these masses disappeared in haste, after which no enemy was anywhere visible.

The trophies of the day, besides a first class fort, consisted in 23 large and 30 small cannon, 16 banners, a quantity of arms of various descriptions, and of very rich booty.

The loss of the enemy, according to the statements of the prisoners, amounted to no less than 6,000 men. Our loss, thank God, throughout the whole of the siege and on the day of the assault, was limited to only 6 killed, 76 wounded (among whom were 5 officers,* and 16 contused, among whom was one staff officer†). The greater part of those who received contusions and some of those who were wounded have returned to the ranks and are on active duty.

The General here mentions by name all the officers who took part in this siege and distinguished themselves.

APPENDIX LIII.

Proclamation.

It is hereby made known to all, that by the will of the all-powerful White Czar, the Russian troops have come here not for hostile purposes, but to put an end to war, to establish peace and tranquillity.

Having in the spring of the present year commenced military operations against the Emir to punish him for the detention of our envoys and for other malicious intents, we did not go any further after overthrowing the Emir's army at Irdjar and after taking Nau and Khodjend, in the hopes that the ruler of Bokhara would release our envoys and satisfy all our other just demands, but this last was not done. The Emir not alone failed to satisfy these demands, but even raised forts against us, collected troops, gave refuge to our deserters, and generally showed signs of hostile intentions with regard to us. We were once more compelled to have recourse to arms, and once more severely punished him, taking from him his strongest forts, Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, and annihilated his best troops. But having accomplished

* Lieutenant Kuzminski, Sub-Lieutenants Alenétch, Bievetski Spitzberg, and Redkin.

† Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief.

this, and having seized Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, we again halt in the hope that the Emir will understand the relations which he should have with us, and will satisfy all our just demands.

At all events, the inhabitants, not only of the districts bordering on the forts Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, which we have just occupied, but the population of Bokhara generally, are hereby invited to abstain from interfering with military operations, and in no way whatsoever to do harm to any of our newly-constituted subjects. If they act in accordance with this, then, on our part, no evil shall be done to them, no insult shall be offered; they will receive from us only favour and protection. If, on the other hand, they do not do as they are desired, and allow themselves to do any evil to us, or to any one of our new subjects, then severe punishment shall be meted to them.

Trade remains as it was, and caravans may proceed freely as they usually did in time of peace on the same conditions.

We trust in general that by God's aid trade and industry in these parts under our influence may not only not decline, but will flourish and increase for the general welfare.

APPENDIX LIV.

Letter from Khudoyar Khan, To the most worthy and respected Appreciator of Friends, Major General Romanofski, Governor General of the Turkistan Province.

The blessing of God be upon us.

I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency, as a faithful and honoured friend, that, thanks to the Most High Creator, we live in pleasure and in peace.

Hearing of your capture of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, I send you my congratulations on your victories, and enquiries after your health, by my faithful servant, Mahomed Karim Mirakhur, whose words I beg you will take for the truth; and in token of friendship I send you some *maj'a* for six robes as a keepsake. The month of *Razan* 1283.

[To the original is attached the seal of Seid Mahomed Khudoyar Khan.]

APPENDIX LV.

Letter to Khudoyar Khan.

Your High Eminence,

I offer you my sincere thanks for your friendly felicitations and kindly words delivered to me by your agent, Mahomed Karim Mirakhur. I was sincerely glad to hear of your co-operation in cementing the friendship between us, as, for instance, in encouraging caravan trade, in allowing rafts to be sent down to us, &c., and now I am more than ever convinced that all doubts and misunderstandings betwixt us are, thank God, at an end. I repeat to you that the greater our friendship, the better will it be for trade, industry, and for all peaceful people generally, and by it we should also give greater pleasure to the powerful White Czar, as His Majesty sincerely wishes for the happiness and welfare of this country. I thank you sincerely for the handsome presents you have sent me, and which I have received intact, and in my turn I beg you to accept from myself, as tokens of friendship and in memory of me, a gold watch, a silver tankard, and a crystal glass.

APPENDIX LVI.

- *To His Excellency the highly respected Well-wisher and Appreciator of Friends, Major General Romanofski, the Governor of the Turkistan Province.*

Your Excellency, I have to inform you, that, by the mercy of the All-High Creator, with us peace and tranquillity are flourishing in every respect, and that we pass the time well and merrily. Your friendly letter by Mahomed Karim Mirakhur and accompanying articles we have had the pleasure to receive; the contents of the said letter and your words delivered to us by Mirakhur were very gratifying to us, and gave us heartfelt pleasure. What has been said by us with reference to the preservation of amicable relations between us is sacredly observed and shall not be violated. What is not contained in this letter will be repeated to you by the said Mirakhur and is to be taken for truth. In token of friendship I send four pieces of blue *maifa* for four robes, two pieces of red *maifa* for two robes, and some *maifa* worked with gold for two robes. Month of *Shahban* 1283.

[Attached to the original are the seal and mark of said Mahomed Khudoyar Khan]

Your High Eminence,

Thanks to our mutual amity, both your letters have given me great satisfaction; but your last letter, and your words repeated to me by your faithful and good envoy, Mahomed Karim Mirakhur, have rejoiced me still more.

Being from all things assured that you, most respected Khan, have clearly understood our relations and have fully appreciated the beneficent intentions of the White Czar, I thank God that he has aided me in convincing our good neighbours of the same, and that he has rendered it possible for our mutual friendship to take root.

I am very grateful to you for the favour you have shown to our, Russian merchants. Your Kokan merchants shall also ever meet a like reception among ourselves in Russia.

I undertake with pleasure to execute all your commissions, and, by God's help, I hope to give you the most undoubted proofs that the beneficent intentions of my all merciful Sovereign, the Emperor of all the Russias, with regard to our good neighbours are as great and vast as the vastness and power and his White Emize.

^{10/h}
^{22nd} December 1866.

APPENDIX LVII.

To the Governor General of the Turkistan Province and the Ruler of the Kipchaks.

It is not unknown to you that from of old this country was in the possession of my ancestors, and that it has come to me by inheritance. At the time when the government passed into my hands, I was on terms of friendship with the White Czar, having pretensions to the lands belonging to him; but at that time fate deprived me of my khanat, and I retired to Bokhara. Malla Khan having seized my khanat, and the Kirghiz-Kipchaks, without any respect for the White Czar, began to oppose him. At last, after a lapse of some time, this country, as I heartily desired, became again mine. Intending

to continue the friendship with the White Czar, I was about to send you a letter by messenger, but fearing the Emir of Bokhara, I did not succeed in despatching it. In the meanwhile, the Emir wishing to commence a war, collected his troops, advanced to Jizakh, and invited me to join him, saying, that every Mussulman should defend himself against you according to the books of Mahomedan law. Preserving the friendship between me and the White Czar, I remained in Kokan under various pretexts, and assembling an army of 35,000 men for the protection of my frontiers, I stood at Shaidan Muzgar. I heard after this that the Emir withdrew his troops and their commander from Khodjend, leaving that place quite empty, upon which I returned back with my troops and artillery; if I had not desired to be friendly with the White Czar, I might have passed into Khodjend from Shaidan with my troops, by which means, with the Emir of Bokhara, I might have become a powerful enemy. By the help of God Khodjend was conquered by you; learning this, to strengthen our former friendship, I congratulate you on your conquest, and send you this letter by Mahomed Mullatun. Whatever you wish to communicate to me tell to Mahomed Mullatun; whether you wish to continue the former friendship or no, then I shall act according to your answer.

All the Mussulmen from Kokan to Kashgar are living in peace and prosperity; the people who were disturbed, and who were in war with you in Malla Khan's time, are now tranquil. Although we and you are of different religions, I send you, in friendship, a man, by whom I beg you will return a straightforward reply.

24th day of the month of *Muhurram*, 1283. Sealed with the seal of Khudoyar Khan.

APPENDIX LVIII.

Your High Eminence,

I hasten to offer you my respectful thanks for your friendly feelings towards the Russians, expressed to me by your Beks, and for sending back to us our envoys, of whom one has already safely arrived in camp.

I hasten to assure you that this news will be pleasing to my great Sovereign, who never wished to be at war with Bokhara, and that according to the measure in which your High Eminence will be pleased to return to the path of sincere amicable relations with us, you will more and more be convinced of the amount of friendly feeling for Bokhara which is still entertained by us Russians.

My gratitude for the return of our envoys is all the more deep-felt, because the intelligence of it reached us at the most appropriate time. Being compelled by circumstances to commence hostile operations, and yet desiring as much as possible not to extend them without extreme necessity, I have hitherto limited myself to such measures alone as are necessary for the safe defence of the peaceful inhabitants taken under the protection of Russia.

In the event of a prolongation of the war, after having occupied Khodjend, there remains no other alternative than to advance to the limits of Old Bokhara.

Now, thanks to the commencement of the return of our embassy, I shall not do this.

In compliance with the request of your High Eminence, verbally delivered to me by your people who accompanied the Horunji Jerassinof, I hasten, without delay, to give you on my part proofs of sincerely amicable intentions. Leaving a portion of the troops in Nau and Khodjend, I return

with the rest to the right bank of the Syr-Daria, and shall not even enter within the limits of Old Bokhara.

I trust your High Eminence will correctly appreciate my actions ; at the same time, I humbly beg you to bear in mind that I am only a military commander. Your High Eminence is free in your actions, whereas I am responsible to my Sovereign for all, consequently for loss of time as well.

Be pleased to hasten, as much as possible, the return of all Russians detained in Bokhara. I promise you that immediately afterwards all Bokharians shall be released, and that commercial relations will be at once renewed, whereupon, with God's help, the ancient friendship between your High Eminence and the all-powerful White Czar shall be at once resumed. Be pleased also to instruct your Beks to arrange for the safe return of our envoys, whom I beg you to send direct to Chinaz.

I cannot conceal from your High Eminence my fears, lest in the event of a detention in the release of the Russians, or, which God forbid, of any misfortune to our envoys on their way back, there should be a renewal of hostilities, when the re-establishment of peace will be a matter of great difficulty.

APPENDIX LIX.

Your High Eminence,

I offer you my heartfelt thanks for the friendly feeling towards the Russians, and for the congratulations on the fresh successes of the Russian arms, contained in your letter which I have received.

I have learned with pleasure from the verbal explanations of your envoy, that the Kokanians assembled for the defence of Khodjend, appeared there without your consent, and that Rustem Bek, Ishbuta and others in arms against us, did not find refuge with you. I was all the more pleased to learn this, since, fully appreciating your late arrangements, I myself wished you well and not evil, and did not desire to war against you, though I might have been driven to do so by your people who assembled in bodies. Now, however, on receipt of your letter, I hope you will yourself take proper measures against such people. I shall go beyond the Khodjend district with my troops.

I shall not fail to inform the Emperor of your letter, and I am sure that your friendly feelings will be pleasing to the White Czar, for the Emperor is not striving after conquests ; he was forced to open military operations, first to defend the frontiers, and then to release our embassy detained in Bokhara, and to defend the peaceful inhabitants of Tashkend and of the trans-Chirchik country, which were placed under the protection of Russia.

By God's help all this has now been accomplished or is being accomplished ; so that we may now hope that the other chief wish of the Emperor will be realized, *i. e.*, that peace and tranquillity will reign in these parts, that trade and agriculture will flourish, and that the lives and properties of all will be made secure.

In all things I sincerely wish to be your good neighbour, and beg, therefore, that you will communicate everything you may find necessary to inform me of, and I shall do the same.

APPENDIX LX.

To His Excellency the Governor of the Turkistan Province.

I am very well satisfied with the contents of Your Excellency's letter, and am extremely glad that there is concord between me and you, and that

trade may be opened. Having this in view, I send you again the former envoy with the present letter. I am first of all bound to apprise you that we Mussulmen, guided by our spiritual laws, take dues from every one, without distinction, at the rate of one from forty, neither more nor less, for it would be contrary to the *Shariat*. I do not know your laws and customs; and if I have really gained the friendship and favour of the White Czar, then you will oblige me by informing me without delay as to the basis and limits of the future trade between mine and Russian merchants; in accordance therewith we shall commence business.

At the present time all people and all States respect the White Czar; of course all is done by the will of God.

Relying on your letter, I have already announced to my traders that they may depart with their merchandise; it is desirable that you should do the same, and then the ancient trade of Russia with Kokun, if God so wills it, shall never be suspended. There is no untruth in these words; the trade will actually be splendid. We Mussulmen shall never violate terms of peace if they only conform with our *Shariat* and "*Sunna*"(?); but we have no knowledge whatever of your laws and customs, of your conditions of trade, but shall of course become sooner acquainted when you become friendly disposed towards us. To this object we entreat you to send us a circumstantial letter by our envoy, and to send him back to us without delay. In your letter you write that you are Major General Romanofski of the Great Emperor of all the Russias, and you signed your name and sealed it with your seal, therefore, in token of my friendship and good-will, I put my own seal to this letter, and beg you to believe all.

Written *Safara*, 4th day, 1283.

Inscribed on the seal, Sied Mahomed Khudoyar Khan.

APPENDIX LXI.

ON THE MEKHKÉMÉ IN TASHKEND.

(*Extract from an Official Document.*)

Mekhkémé means public court; it is no new institution in the Mussulman world. It existed among the Arabs when their civilization raised them above Mahomedanism, and was by them introduced everywhere. As their civilization increased and extended, this institution was well received wherever it was introduced, and it was preserved so long as the civilization of the Arabs kept up to its level; but when, in consequence of political revolutions, this began to decline, and in its place Mahomedanism gained ground, the institution of the Mekhkémé also lost force and significance, until, at last, it was replaced by the personal jurisdiction of the Kazy. According to the law of Mahomed, the spiritual classes could not, of course, reconcile themselves to an institution which rivalled them, weakened their significance, and partly overruled their judgments.

When their power increased they denounced this institution as antagonistic to the spirit of the laws of Mahomed and abolished it. Again, the Mekhkémé was established wherever the Mahomedan population was subject to European rule, the chief aim and object being to weaken the Mussulman influence and to accustom the people to accept the judgments of a regular court, as for instance in North Africa and in the Caucasus. Although the spiritual classes always opposed themselves to this institution, the people accepted them with gratitude, and on its establishment the influence of the spiritual classes sensibly declined. The people familiarized with

the Europeans, and availing themselves of a better and more just court, became more amenable to civilization.

An institution similar to the Mekhkémé was first introduced by us into the Caucasus among the conquered mountaineers in the time of Yermolof: one was established in Nalchik for *Kobarda*, and another in fort Vnozapnoi for the Kumyks—both of these were known under the name of popular courts. It is true that, owing to some defects in the organization of these courts, the first experiments with them did not produce the good they might have done. In the year 1825, Lieutenant General (now Field Marshal) Prince Bariatski, then commanding the left flank, remodelled the organization of the Mekhkémé, and, with the sanction of the Prince M. S. Voronzow, opened Mekhkémé on the improved principle in Fort Grosnoi for the Chetchuck District. This Mekhkémé had such great success, and was so quickly appreciated by the people, that in a year's time the hill tribes of the neighbouring districts prayed to be also endowed with one like it. After a time, during the governorship of the Prince Bariatski, Mekhkémés were established throughout the whole of the Caucasus.

A great fault in the original Mekhkémé was the very low rate of pay given to the Russian officers, the President and Secretary, and to the native officers of the court. This led either to neglect of their duties on the part of the officers or to abuses and it was very difficult to find any respectable men in the service willing to undertake duties in a distant country for which they received inadequate rewards. This fault was remedied by the Prince Bariatski and the Mekhkémé met with success among the people, who are now highly satisfied with it.

A Mekhkémé, after the latest Caucasian pattern, has been opened in Tashkend. Its organization is as follows:—A President—"the officer in charge of the native population,"—and three native members, besides the Kazy, a permanent member of the court.

The members of the Mekhkémé are chosen by the native population. But the system of election being almost entirely unknown to the natives, and the civil administration at that time being as yet such that the first election could not have been properly made by the people, the supervisor of the population invited the attendance of two hundred of the most respectable citizens of Tashkend, without distinction of grade or private means, but men commanding respect for their moral principles, and called upon the assembly to select from amongst themselves, or the people generally, some of the best known individuals. Thus were the first members chosen. The eldest member of the Mekhkémé receives R. 2,400, the two junior members R. 900 each, and the Kazy R. 1,200 per annum.

The Mekhkémé is strictly a judicial tribunal; it is literally a public court. In this sense it is a permanent institution. But as the administration of the province is not yet completely settled, the Mekhkémé, being composed of chosen members, and consequently of the most conscientious men who command universal respect, has sometimes served as a municipal institution, in the supervision of the dues and taxes, in the foundation of beneficial institutions in the town, such as dispensaries, hospitals, &c. But these services, as it is said above, were only temporarily performed, and the Mekhkémé had neither an administrative character, nor did it in any way act as a police.

There is a separate section of the Mekhkémé, composed of Beys or members of the nomad class of the population. This section deals exclusively with Kirghiz law cases, and the Kazy here is not a permanent member. The Kirghiz section of the Mekhkémé has one feature only in common with the *Sart* section, which is the president, who presides over both. The members of the Kirghiz section receive inferior pay to those of the *Sart*

section, both because the Kirghizes in Taskhend are few in numbers than the *Sarts*, and because the Kirghizes less frequently appeal to the court. The eldest of the Kirghiz members receives a salary of R. 500, and the junior members R. 250 each. The Mekhkémé bases its judgments in affairs between Sarts on the *Sharigute* and on *adat* or native customs, and settles Kirghiz affairs almost always in accordance with the customs of the nomads. The President follows the proceedings of the court merely to see that the judgments are correct; when a difference of opinion arises between him and the other members, the case is referred to the Military Governor. The order of the proceedings is very simple; appeals are made *vivâ voce*, and if possible the case is at once entered into and settled in open court. In the more important cases judgments are drawn up in writing, to which all the members attach their seals; the "Act" is then copied verbatim into the journal of the court, is numbered and handed over to the plaintiff. In cases of small impost the judgment is at once carried out.

As a court of law the Mekhkémé could not affect the system of police, though it has altered the legal process. Formerly in Tashkend there were three Kazys with associate Muftés; there are now in the Mekhkémé one Kazy and three counsellors.

There are still Kazys in the town, although they have lost their old powers, and they are sometimes summoned to the Council of the Governor.

The other functionaries, such as "Aksakals," "Ziaketchis," "Ruises," &c., are not yet interfered with.

APPENDIX LXII.

Circular Order to the Forces of the Province of Turkistan, ^{21st June} 1866. ^{3rd July}

1. A Statistical Committee, over which I shall myself preside, is formed of the staff of the Turkistan forces; this Committee will collate and correct the statistical data concerning the province which is already possessed by the staff; it will collect fresh information and will reduce all to a system with the view of publication.

2. The permanent members of this will be M. Yujakof, attached to me for special service, and Captain Debagori Mokriévitch, of the Etât Major.

An interpreter and two writers will be attached to the Committee.

3. The chief of my staff, my Chief Secretary and the Mining Engineers, Lieutenant Colonel Tatarinof and Captain Nikolski, Mr. Struvé of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Severtsof, Zoologist, are invited to be active members of the Committee, and to communicate all scientific information that may be required.

4. The officers in charge of the population of the country, chiefs of districts, commanders of troops, commandants of forts, medical officers and all the authorities in general are in duty bound to reply to all enquiries made by the Committee, and to send all the information demanded by the Committee, and to give every assistance to any active members of the Committee who may be prosecuting his labours within their districts.

5. When a member of the Committee is travelling in the province the commandants are enjoined to give him a proper convoy.

6. All questions before the Committee will be openly discussed by the members when I myself or the senior member is presiding.

7. The resolutions of the Committee will be carried out by the permanent members.

8. The permanent members will labour without intermission ; the whole Committee will assemble at the invitation of the President when occasion may require, all the members being called together.

9. Invitations to all others to attend the sittings of the Committee will be made subject to the approval of the President.

APPENDIX LXIII.

Address of the Inhabitants of Khodjend, submitted to General Romanofski,
^{5th}
^{17th} of June 1866.

The inhabitants of Khodjend meet you, General, with bread and salt. Since the occupation of our town by the Russians, we have suffered no injury or oppression ; from your officers we have received only justice and kind treatment. We see that in placing us in subjection to the White Czar you have consolidated our happiness. We pray to God for welfare and long life to the White Czar and his General, the Protector of Khodjend. We shall in the future be like all the other subjects and zealous servants of the White Czar, in order that he may love us as much as his other subjects.

APPENDIX LXIV.

Address of the Inhabitants of Tashkend, submitted to General Romanofski,
^{11th}
^{23rd} of June 1866.

We, all the inhabitants of Tashkend and its neighbourhood, accounting ourselves Russian subjects, venture to submit to our merciful and most kind Protector, that, being under the rule of the most equitable and autocratic White Czar, and well satisfied with everything, are exceedingly obliged, and bless God that you, like the Rinstiam (an ancient hero) the brave overthrower of the enemy's ranks, the generous and benevolent and wise ruler have been sent among us. Although Your Excellency has but lately come among us, you have already, by an attentive and wise government, given us peace and quiet, such only as could have been desired, and by beating the Bokharian and Kokan troops you have opened to our traders free communications, and at the same time you have finally rid us of those vicious robbers, the Bokharians and Kokanians, who always threatened us with evils ; now, however, we are perfectly tranquil and merry. On your return from your travels Your Excellency at once visited our Medressé, were gracious to the teachers, and distributed among them rewards in money, for which they pray to God in your behalf. Besides, while being mindful of the welfare of the teachers, you have promised to establish a hospital and to provide a Mussulman doctor. You have also given your attention to the establishment of a Mekhkémé, where all the appeals of the inhabitants will be heard, and where all affairs will be settled according to the *Sharigate*.

APPENDIX LXV.

Your High Eminence,

It was with great pleasure I received your letter, which proves that your High Eminence correctly values the real motives of the Russian Government.

I take upon myself once more to assure you that the powerful White Czar does not seek here for any conquests, but desires only that peace and tranquillity should be reinstated in these regions disturbed by war and disorders, so that all peaceful and industrious people may quietly follow their occupations to the success of the country and the increase of trade. The Great Russian Emperor sees in this, before all things, the real benefit of the people taken under the protection of Russia as of his neighbours, against whom he wages war only in such cases when they, like the Emir of Bokhara, venture to attack our frontier, or to foment disturbances and enmity within them. I hope, however, that after all that has happened, the Emir himself will abstain from similar proceedings, and that by God's aid, all our neighbours will evince towards us the confidence you have already shown in your letter.

Your letter to me I have forwarded to the supreme authorities, and it will be submitted to the all-merciful consideration of His Majesty.

The final settlement of all our future relations will, of course, depend on the will of the Emperor; but knowing, as I do, the wise and really just principles by which the powerful White Czar is guided, and which are above alluded to, I am convinced that these relations will be equally advantageous to both parties so long as Kokan places a sincere confidence in Russia.

But in order to accelerate these relations, I have, on the strength of the powers vested in me by one of your letters, already sanctioned the importation of merchandize from Kokan into Khodjend and Tashkend, subject to the duty mentioned by you in your letter, and which, be it observed, was in accordance with the *Shari'ate*, formerly levied by us, *viz.*, one on every forty. At the same time it has reached me that the Tashkendians who have brought cotton to Kokan are being charged 5 tikas on each camel over and above the one on every forty. I beg you will not make this levy, which is in excess of that laid down by the *Shari'ate*, and that you will receive Tashkend and Khodjend merchants on the same footing as you wish Kokand merchants to be received in Tashkend and Khodjend. Besides this, as I am desirous of showing you still greater friendship for your confidence, I am endeavouring to obtain the sanction of His Imperial Majesty to have resident commercial agents or consuls among us, and to send consuls to reside in Kokan, as it is agreed between the Russian Emperor, the Emperor of China, the Shah of Persia, and other friendly Asiatic States; together with which all your subjects will be permitted to travel and to trade in person throughout the whole wide extent of the Russian Empire; in Orenburg, Nijui, Novgorod, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and in other of our first class towns; we shall let your subjects enjoy the same great benefits which the Bokharians of old had long enjoyed among us.

I beg to be excused for having detained your envoy several days. I have done so in order to give him an opportunity, as a welcome guest, of taking part in a military festival held in Tashkend.

In conclusion, I repeat my former request that you will not allow parties of your people to cross over to the right bank of the Syr; and to communicate, as you now do, all that you deem necessary to acquaint me with.

APPENDIX LXVI.

Your High Eminence,

Your congratulations on our occupation of Khodjend, and the expression of your friendly sentiments I received in good faith, and in replying to you in the same spirit, I gave no small proofs of my own sincerity. I not alone refrained

from chastising the parties of Kokanians who dared to hinder me in the capture of Khodjend, and abstained after taking that town from passing your limits, but even consented at once to enter into friendly commercial relations with you, and agreed to levy the duty at the rate you begged. Besides this, I allowed your frontier post to stand on the frontier of the Khodjend District, and to avoid every kind of misunderstanding, I did not establish an advanced post there myself.

I long refused to believe the rumours that reached me from Kokan, which were in direct contradiction to the friendly professions of your High Eminence; for example, of the fortification of Kokan, the increase of the rate of duty which, by mutual arrangement between us, was to be levied on merchandize brought to Kokan from Khodjend and Tashkend, the obstacles placed by Kokanians in the way of floating down timber to Khodjend, and the molestation of the inhabitants of Makhrame, Beshkend, and other places within the Khodjend District by your people, &c., &c. But the letters I have received, of which copies are herewith forwarded, confirm the accuracy of the reports relative to the last mentioned circumstance. At the same time, I have also heard that two Cossacks, treacherously seized on the road from Tashkend to Khodjend, have been taken to Kokan, and that the same has been done with two Russian labourers,* seized by Kirghiz *baronta* men.

I could not endure any more, and then sent orders to one of my advanced posts to chase your party that had crossed to the right bank of the Syr; which was done. I even prepared for other measures. But taking into consideration the arrangements recently made by you for the return of the two labourers, who have returned, for which I am grateful to your High Eminence, I feel bound to suspend military operations, and to observe in this letter that your High Eminence might consider it more profitable to guard against a war, and to return to the path of negotiations, to which you yourself invited me, with the purpose, of course, of conducting them in good faith.

To this end you must remove all the above cited causes of a rupture in our friendly relations.

APPENDIX LXVII.

Record of Military Operations and Events on the Central Asiatic Frontier from the $\frac{15th}{27th}$ July to the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ August 1866.

It was mentioned in the last report that Captain Schauf's detachment was sent to explore the River Chirchik. This detachment has now returned, having executed that work most satisfactorily.

From the 27th of June (9th July) to the 20th July (1st August) the detachment was continuously on the move, making its way with difficulty in a mountainous country along narrow footpaths hardly practicable for single men. Captain Schauf was ordered to fell some timber, but in addition he was commissioned, if he found it possible, to connect Niazbek by a survey with the town of Chinaz on the Chirchik, a point to which the survey had been brought in 1863 by Major (now Colonel) Lerkhé. Captain Schauf succeeded in reaching Chinaz, which is 175 versts ($116\frac{2}{3}$ miles) distant from Tashkend.

On approaching within 30 versts of Chinaz, where the valley of the Chirchik (here called the Chotkal) widens, timber was at last found, but the trees were of no great size, although there were some which were worth felling

* According to later and more authentic accounts the Cossacks were taken to Samarand, and that the labourers who did actually get into Kokan were immediately released, and, after receiving kind treatment and presents by order of the Khan, returned safely to Tashkend.

to be floated down. A part of the infantry force was left here to execute this work; these men felled 300 trees; but unfortunately the labor went for nothing, because, owing to the extreme rapidity of the current and the number of sunken rocks, the timber could not be floated down in rafts, but singly; the greater part was consequently stopped by the rocks or broken into splinters. It was impossible to follow the timber down stream, because the road did not always run along the banks of the river, and these being very steep, the descents to the river were very few.

This unsuccessful attempt proved the impossibility of supplying timber to Tashkend, which is in great want of it.

During the progress of the detachment, a great number of *bis* and elders from *thauls* along the Chirchik came forward tendering their submission and requesting to be made subjects of Russia.

On its way back the detachment, starting afresh on the $\frac{11^{\text{th}}}{23^{\text{d}}}$ July, took another road to the Pskent river (an affluent of the Chirchik), so as to obtain a knowledge of a greater extent of country.

In the meanwhile, Anarbai's party hovering about Namangan, emboldened by the departure of the detachment, seized two Russian labourers, sent out by the goldseeker Kolesnikof on an exploring expedition with others. Kolesnikof, seeing the amicable disposition of the Kirghizes of the locality, thought the country was already perfectly secure, and dispatched his exploring party to a place 30 versts away from the line of march of the detachment.

On receipt of a report relative to this affair, measures were at once taken to discover the offenders, but before they could be carried out, the prisoners were returned to Tashkend by order of the Khan of Kokan, to whom they were taken, and who gave them money and presents.

At about the same time two Cossacks left Khodjend with the post bags; these men have not yet returned; it is to be presumed that they have either been kidnapped or killed.

It was mentioned in the report of the $\frac{1^{\text{st}}}{15^{\text{th}}}$ to the $\frac{15^{\text{th}}}{27^{\text{th}}}$ June that there was great agitation in the Great and Little Barsuks,* which, according to a report from the commandant of fort No. 1, were threatened with an attack by Turkomen. On the strength of this report a light detachment of 75 Cossacks was sent out in that direction. These men have returned without having encountered anybody and having left the country perfectly quiet.

Information has been received from Bokhara and Kokan that it is feared there we are about to make an attack; the forts and frontier posts are consequently being strengthened and armed, and troops are being collected. Although tranquillity prevails in the province generally, in the regions of Bokhara and Kokan bordering upon our frontiers there is evidently some commotion, and trading caravans, which, in the month of June, came to Khodjend and even to Tashkend in great numbers, now arrive much less frequently.

APPENDIX LXVIII.

Address of the Inhabitants of Tashkend, presented on the $\frac{-17^{\text{th}}}{29^{\text{th}}}$ August 1866, to the Adjutant General of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, Kryjanovskii, Governor General of Orenburg, and Knight of various orders.

Your Excellency,

This is your second visit to our country since our submission to the rule of the all-powerful Emperor of all the Russias, and we beg to welcome you

* Little and Great Barsuk sands lying to the north of the Aral.

with the bread and salt, according to the ancient Russian fashion, trusting that you will not refuse our offering, but will receive it in good part.

We know that Your Excellency has come to us as the representative of the most potent and most merciful White Czar, the fountain of all blessings and happiness to his subjects, overflowing with love and good will towards us, as a good and tender father to his children, and, considering ourselves in our hearts long the faithful subjects of His Majesty, we are not without hopes of finding the same love and good will towards us reflected in your own self.

Although we have not been more than a year under the protection of the White Czar, we have already, in that short time, realized the magnitude of the benefits which have been awarded to us, because our faith has remained inviolate ; our *Medressé* (schools) are supported and flourish ; a *Mekhkémé* (popular court) has been established, which, dealing equitably, honorably, and impartially, settles our affairs in accordance with the principles of our religion and with popular custom ; we are not burthened with any illegal taxes ; we are not injured or oppressed by any one ; in conclusion to all this we venture to assure your Excellency that, since the defeat of the army of the Emir of Bokhara, perfect peace and tranquillity prevail among us as well as in the neighbouring districts, which was not the case in former times.

Yet, notwithstanding all this happy state of affairs, we cannot help fearing that if, contrary to our expectations, and through some unforeseen circumstances, the Russian troops are removed from the Tashkend territory, the same horrors, oppressions, and compulsion which we suffered before the advent of the Russians will be repeated. We therefore venture to pray humbly and lowly that your Excellence will once and for ever free us from these dreadful thoughts, and will reassure us that the potent and merciful White Czar regards us as his children and as the rest of his faithful subjects.

There are not two seas in one sea ; consequently also, in one empire there cannot be two empires ; take it then upon yourself to endeavour to annex our region to Russia, as a part always to belong to her, on an equality with all the other parts of the empire.

By acceding to this our request you will make us ever pray to the All-High Creator for health and long life to His Majesty the White Czar, and will give us cause to bless your name as well as that of all Russians concerned in the fate and settlement of our country.

Sealed with the seals of sixty-two of the most respectable inhabitants, many of them being of the higher spiritual class ; fifteen signatures are attached, most of them being those of moollahs.

APPENDIX LXIX.

To all the Aksakols, Elders, and Inhabitants of the Village of Pishkand.

I hereby notify that the Khan Khudoyar of Kokond has annexed your village to Charku, and that I appoint Shofak Bey as chief of that village, and, by order of the Khan, you the Elders of Pishkand to appear before me. At the same time I warn you that if you offer your allegiance to the Russians it will go hard with you.

BEY ABRAKHMAN,
Dotkhu of the Agazot Tribe.

APPENDIX LXX.

To the Aksakols and Elders of Pishkand.

I appoint Mulla Batyr to be my assistant in your village. I command you to pay the full *ziopet* on your corn, otherwise I shall be obliged to destroy your village.

Seal of Shojak Bey of the Agazot Tribe.

APPENDIX LXXI.

To the Governor General of Orenburg and Commander of the Troops in the Orenburg Military District, the Adjutant General Kryzhanovskii.

Having constituted Sadr Kazy Mulla Mir Hamiditdin our agent, we send him with full powers. Month of *Djumaï-El-Erval* 1283 (August 1866).

Seal of the Emir Seid Muzzaffer.

APPENDIX LXXII.

Most Respected and Highly Reverend Kazy Mulla Mir Hamiditdin,

On receipt of this you are to set off to the Governor General of Orenburg to conclude with him a treaty of friendship and peace.

APPENDIX LXXIII.

Your High Eminence,

Your Envoy, Sadr Mir Hamiditdin, has neither brought full powers for the conclusion of a treaty of peace nor your consent to the conditions notified to you some months ago by General Romanofski, I therefore fail to see any sincere desire on your part to return to a good understanding.

I hasten to inform you of the following final decision :—

Your High Eminence broke the peace by interfering in our affairs with Kokan ; therefore, in pledge of abstaining for ever in entering in the affairs of Kokan, you will send us the young Khan of Kokan, Sultan Seid Murat Khan, whom you took after our occupation of Tashkend. You may rest assured that no harm will be done to him.

In order to establish peace your High Eminence will besides engage yourself—

1st.—To send immediately a sum of 100,000 tillas.

2nd.—To receive in Bokhara a Russian caravan-basha, who will at all times have the right to apply to you on matters concerning Russian subjects residing in your dominions.

3rd.—To allow Russian subjects to establish Russian caravanserais in Bokharian towns, wherever they may desire to do so, where they may store their merchandise.

4th.—To place Russian traders on a perfect equality in the matter of caravan and other dues, and not to levy any arbitrary contributions from Russian subjects.

To this I add that, if in ten days from to-day's date, the 100,000 tillas here demanded are not received, if Sultan Seid Murat Khan is not sent, and if your written consent to all my other conditions is not received, then on that day war will be renewed. In the mean time, I shall march from Khodjend with my troops only for the purpose of being nearer to you, and I shall not

commence hostilities if I receive no opposition, but every attack shall be resisted with arms.

In token of remembrance, I send the accompanying silver articles.

APPENDIX LXXIV.

Letter to the Emir of Bokhara.

Your High Eminence,

You will learn from the letter addressed to you by the Governor General the state of affairs and the conditions on which peace may be established. I as a good neighbour, can offer you only one piece of good advice, if you desire peace, then save time by hastening to fulfil all the essential conditions, for that is the only way to avert war.

I offer you my sincere thanks for the presents sent to me, and in return offer you others in token of my respect.

APPENDIX LXXV.

*General Romanofski's Report to the Governor General of Orenburg, —^{19th}/_{24th}—
September 1866.*

Herewith copies of letters addressed to me by Khudoyar Khan of Kokan and the leading inhabitants of Kokan.

I have, at the same time, the honor to state that Mahomed Karim Mirakhur, by whom they were delivered, whose words I am requested in the letter by the Khan and the inhabitants to believe, assures me most positively that the Kokan people and their ruler are not alone willing to submit to the Russian Emperor, but would consider themselves fortunate to be made subjects of his Imperial Majesty if only they could rely on the preservation of their sharigate.

Mirakhur at the same time refers with satisfaction to our new institutions in Tashkend.

APPENDIX LXXVI.

To Major General Romanofski, the Governor of the Turkistan Province.

Be it known that, thanks to the All-High Creator, by the mercy of our Khan we live well and merrily. The single desire of our Khan is to be the sincere friend of the White Czar; he has no intention to war, but, on the contrary, considering himself a friend of the White Czar, is in hopes that should an enemy enter our country, you will not refuse us your aid; if traders arrive here, or any other subjects of the White Czar, they will in every case be respected and well treated, more so even than the subjects of the Khan; we hope that all those from here entering the empire of the White Czar will be treated as your own subjects, and allowed to trade freely as of old. If in this way free commercial relations are established between us, people of all classes profiting thereby will bless God. We send this by our well-wisher Mahomed Karim Mirakhur; whatever he may say relative to peace is to be believed as true and just.

To the original are attached the seals of—

Prelat Dotkha Tuktakulyf.

Atabek Dotkha Mahomed Kul Otalykof.

Shirolı Bi-Husiagiladin.

Abdulnazar Dotkha Mirzanazarof.

Aluahman Musulmankulof.

Mulha Kashił Mulla Mirzayasof-IIudoyar Im-

Agazy-Muhometiarof.

APPENDICES LXXVII & LXXVIII.

ARE

Lists of Administrative and Police Officers serving in Turkistan.

Showing that in December 1866 twenty-two officers were employed on these services, one post being vacant. Twenty officers permanently attached to their posts, and only two temporarily.

APPENDIX LXXIX.

Observations on the Disbursement and Revenues of the Tashkend and Khodjend Districts (submitted to the Governor General on his visit to the region in August 1866).

It is impossible to determine the exact amount of the revenues of the Tashkend and Khodjend Districts for the present year 1866, or for the coming year 1867.

Up to the month of June of this year, the income of the Tashkend District was derived alone from bazaar and caravan dues collected in Tashkend. Bazaar dues were collected in other places, but the amount of these was very insignificant; for instance, in the village of Tai-Tiubé, although it contains about 2,000 houses and courts, the total amount of bazaar dues did not reach R. 100.

Nor was any regularity observed in the collection of these few items of the revenue. Although petty traders are always and everywhere made to pay bazaar dues, those were released from payment of the charge who brought less than two camel loads or *araba* loads of merchandise to a bazaar, and some very important items of revenue arising, duties on salt and coals were allowed to be appropriated by private individuals.

Since the month of June, attempts have been made to improve the system of levying dues, to which end the Mekhémé established in Tashkend has done much; this court has fully realized the injustice of increasing the wealth of the rich at the cost of the poor, and strives zealously to remove all irregularities.

In consequence of this, income from caravan and bazaar dues has greatly increased. While last year the sum raised in the bazaars and from caravans did not amount to R. 3,000* a month on an average, it was more than R. 5,000 in June of the present year, and in July R. 4,898. In other localities of the Tashkend District, the bazaar dues were last year so very small, that the amount did not cover the expense of its collection. In the month of July of the present year, a sum of R. 700 was obtained from this source in the bazaars of the trans-Chirchik country.

Arrangements have at the same time been made for the imposition of a land-tax, at the customary rate under the Kokan Government. There is no doubt that this work being new to us, we shall at the outset unavoidably make omissions. The accompanying returns at all events show that we may expect from these sources to obtain a revenue of not less than R. 100,000 in Tashkend and the neighbouring villages during the period from the 1st July of the present year to the 1st of July of 1867, and that a similar, if not a larger, amount may be expected from the trans-Chirchik country, so that the

* The caravan and bazaar dues collected in Tashkend up to the 1st of June 1866 from the day of our occupation of that town, *i. e.*, for nearly an entire year, amounted to about R. 33,000.

revenue accruing from the lands in the Tashkend District will amount to not less than R. 200,000, the caravan and bazaar dues to about R. 50,000. But there are some new items of income to be derived from a tax on salt, ferry charges, &c., as well as from the taxes collected from the nomads. These new items of revenue will not amount to much, not even the tax of the nomads, seeing that there are very few of the latter in the district. Nevertheless, these new items will bring in a sum of not less than R. 20,000.

Thus the total amount of revenue of the Tashkend District (rayon) for the period commencing from the 1st July 1866 and ending 1st July 1867 will be not less than R. 270,000.*

The revenues of the Khodjend District are calculated on the same principles, but they cannot all be gathered in this year, because, owing to the military operations, many of the taxes were collected by the Emir in advance. But there is reason to believe that this district will bring in a total revenue of no less than R. 100,000, so that the entire sum of the local revenue this year must amount to about R. 370,000.

The expenditure of the present year indispensably chargeable to the local revenue is as follows:—

	Roubles.
1. Military Administration of the Tashkend and trans-Chirchik region...	30,192
2. Military Administration of the Khodjend District	11,234
3. Military directions, considering the forts in Tashkend, Khodjend and Chinaz of the 1st class, and those of Nauf and Ablyn of the 2nd class	20,000
4. Quartering and provisioning of troops of the Turkistan region ..	62,000
5. Extraordinary expenses of the Military Governor	25,000
6. Engineering works	50,000
7. Building of Governor's house	20,000
8. Payment for land purchased of the inhabitants of Tashkend for European quarters	10,152
9. Payment for land purchased for the same purpose in Khodjend ...	10,000
10. Maintenance of postal communications	86,000
11. Purchase of houses from private individuals	5,000
12. Erection of mills, factories, workshops, hospitals for the natives, &c., &c.... ..	20,000
13. Elementary school	1,000
14. Despatch of a deputation of natives to the Imperial Court ...	10,000
TOTAL	360,578

* For particulars, see annexed return.

APPENDIX LXXX.

Approximate Estimate of Taxes payable by the Inhabitants of the Tashkend District and trans-Chirchik Region for the Year 1866.

	Roubles.
On Grapes	13,014
„ <i>Djaurékā</i> (?)	6,000
„ Guzal cotton	3,000
„ <i>Sakcha</i> (?)	3,000
Tribute in corn, about 20,000 botmans*, valuing each botman of anything grown at 4 roubles	80,000
The same tribute from the trans-Chirchik country	100,000
Caravan and bazaar dues from Tashkend	50,000
Taxes from the nomads, ferry charges, salt tax, &c.	20,000
TOTAL	275,000

* A botman is a Russian measure of 20 poods; 1 pood=36 lbs. English.

NOTE.—The amount of the taxes and tribute collected from the inhabitants of the trans-Chirchik country formerly was equal to that of the sum gathered in Tashkend, but in the present year it will be greater, because the taxes previously paid in Tashkend by some nomads, whose winter encampments were beyond the Chirchik, are now paid to the Superintendent of the trans-Chirchik country.

APPENDIX LXXXI.

REVENUE OF THE TURKISTAN REGION FOR THE YEAR 1866.

(Extract from the Report of the Military Governor to the Governor General,
dated ^{14th}_{16th} December 1866, No. 1234.)

IMPERIAL REVENUE.	RECEIVED IN 1865.		EXPECTED FOR THE YEAR 1866	REMARKS.
	Permanent Sources.			
<i>In the Turkistan Dis- trict.</i>	Rls.	Cps.	Rls.	
Caravan dues ...	946	75	2,000	Estimated by the Com- mandant of the town of Turkistan.
Tent dues ...	9,636	0	15,000	This increase is owing to the removal of some Kir- ghizes from the Chemkend to the Turkistan District.
<i>Chemkend District.</i>				
Tent dues ...	12,784	20	17,700	Increase owing to the more regular system of collec- tion.
<i>Syr-Daria District.</i>				
Tent dues ...	37,727	51	33,333	This figure is based on the actual number of tents : the amount for the last was calculated on the num- ber of tents throughout three consecutive years.
<i>Left Flank of the Region.</i>				
Caravan dues ...	17,723	89½	20,000	Approximately, since up to the 1st September the amount collected under this head was Rls. 15,000.
Tent Dues,—				
Aülüetä ...	(a)	80,284 0	(b) 77,520	(a). Including a sum of Rls. 10,417 not paid in. (b). This figure has de- creased, owing to the de- ficiency of last year, arising from the irregular system of assessment, the number of tents rated having been overesti- mated.
Merké ...				
Sakmak ...				
TOTAL ...	(c)	159,120 0	165,553	(c). Or, deducting the sum of Rls. 10,417, Rls. 148,703 15½ Copecks.

APPENDIX LXXXII.

Extracts from the Full Accounts and Estimates, submitted to the Governor General with Report, dated 28th February 1867, No. 313.

Receipts during the period beginning 1st April 1866 and ending 1st February 1867, and carried to the account of local Revenue.

In the Tashkend District.

				Rls.	Cps.
Caravan dues	32,872	0
Bazaar	"	"	...	20,481	5
Tent	"	"	...	15,196	0
Land taxes (<i>Heraḍj</i>)	136,515	45
TOTAL				205,067	50
Deduct amount expended during same period as per accounts	157,853	31½
BALANCE TO CREDIT				47,214	18½

Khodjend District.

From the period commencing from the occupation of Khodjend to the 1st February 1867—

				Rls.	Cps.
Caravan dues	23,605	59½
Bazaar	"	"	...	4,788	89½
Tent	"	"	...	nil	
Land taxes (<i>Heraḍj</i>)	18,016	87½
TOTAL				46,411	36½
Deduct expenditure for the same period	38,082	98½
BALANCE TO CREDIT				8,328	98½

Onra-Tynbé District.

From the date of the occupation of that place to 1st February—

				Rls.	Cps.
Caravan dues	1,767	88
Bazaar	"	"	...	809	5
Tent	"	"	...	nil.	
Land taxes	2,779	60
TOTAL				5,356	50
Deduct expenditure on account of military administration of the district and of commandantship	3,269	67
BALANCE TO CREDIT				2,086	83

Juzak District.

From first occupation to 1st February—

				Rls.	Cps.
Caravan dues	4,969	39
Bazaar	650	40
TOTAL				5,619	79

No expenditure.

				Rls.	Cps.
Sum total of local receipts to 1st February	262,455	15½
Expenditure to account of same	199,205	37½
BALANCE TO CREDIT				63,249	78

APPENDIX LXXXIII.

THE POPULATION OF TURKISTAN.

The exact number of the population of the Turkistan region was not known at the end of the year 1866, the difficulty of obtaining this information being rendered still greater by the prolongation of military operations, for the inhabitants who removed during the war had not all come back to their habitations ; but according to the

Information collected by M. Bekhekurin.

Tashkend has a population of about 100,000, Namousan 30,000, Iskend 10,000, Tzialu 5,000, Chemkend 4,000, Agalyk 3,000, Sairam, Karabulak, Karata, and Mengliand 2,000 each, Auliétá 1,000, Tai-Tiubé and Kerenche 1,000 each. The villages along the Chirchik contain altogether about 8,000, those along the Angren and in the Kurama hills 10,000, and other towns and villages not named about 10,000. Thus the settled population along the right bank of the Syr Daria numbers about 190,000, the nomads about 150,000, making a total of 340,000.

The city of Kokand and neighbourhood contain 100,000, Khodjend has 40,000, Kosiak 30,000, Morgilk 20,000, Chusa 20,000, Kanebodem 15,000, Una 5,000, Us-Kurgan 150,000 inhabitants, giving a total of about 300,000 settled inhabitants in the Khanat of Kokan on the left bank of the Syr. The number of nomads within the same extent of country is not known, but it does not exceed that of the settled population.

* This shows the population of the whole of this country to be about 600,000.

The Khanat of Kokand embraced then within its former limits an entire population of about 1,000,000, of which $\frac{1}{3}$ resided on the right, and $\frac{2}{3}$ on the left bank of the Syr-Daria.*

From information supplied by Superintendents of the Population.

Along the former Syr-Daria line there are about 100,000 nomads and 1,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Turkistan (Hazrel) District 30,000 nomads and 8,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Chemkend District 28,000 nomads, 12,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Auliétá and Tokmak District 130,000 nomads and 2,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Tashkend district 150,000 permanent inhabitants (80,000 of whom are in the town of Tashkend, and 70,000 in the trans-Chirehik region) and 5,000 nomads; in the district of Oura-Tiubé (including Zaámin) 35,000 permanent inhabitants and 15,000 nomads.†

The entire population, according to these particulars, would be only about 620,000, but it must be considerably greater, for the Superintendents as they themselves say, always accepted the smallest estimates when the actual number could not be positively ascertained, and when statements differed.

APPENDIX LXXXIV.

Extract from a Minute on the project for a temporary Military Administration in the Turkistan Region.

With reference to the inadequateness of the administrative staff of the region, as established in 1866 under the circumstances of the extension of the limits and of the increased number of troops, it was observed

* According to Mr. Vambéry the Khanat of Kokan contains 3 millions of inhabitants.

† They numbered 20,000 formerly; those who left the country during the war had not returned by the end of the year 1866.

in this minute that, in confirmation of this opinion, and for the purpose of better illustrating the utter futility of even the most strenuous efforts to overcome the existing disorder and to establish regularity in the military administration of the region, it is sufficient to point to the spheres of action of some of the branches of the administration, and to the means placed at their disposal by the temporary regulations of the ^{6th}_{18th} August 1865.

The infantry troops, *i. e.*, only those actively employed, without including garrison companies, engineers, &c., consist of 11 battalions and 1 company of sappers—or very nearly an entire division.

The cavalry are 21 sotnias of Cossacks, equalling a cavalry division.

All the accounts of these two divisions of infantry and cavalry are kept by the *Etât Major* of the region, which, by virtue of the temporary regulations for the administration of the region, are worked on the principle of divisional direction.

The *Etât Major* is charged with all the clerical work of the special arms in the region; with the correspondence relating to the Aral flotilla, which, according to the regulations for the flotilla, is subordinated to the Military Governor; with the very heavy and important accounts of the hospital establishments; with the superintendence of the military, topographical and military statistical labours; with the intricate correspondence relating to the receipt, disbursement, accounts of, and directions concerning, the sums raised from a greater part of the region for expeditions and extraordinary purposes, which, owing to the absence in the region of financial establishments, are paid into the *Etât Major* under the old system, &c., &c., &c. The *Etât Major* also takes cognizance of judicial affairs and of the distribution of prize money. All these occupations are considerably complicated by the incessant movements of the troops, by the constant military operations, more especially as there are no military offices or establishments, as the means of communication are imperfect and the material condition of the forces is generally bad.

And yet the staff of the *Etât Major* of the forces of the Turkistan region, as fixed by the regulation of the ^{6th}_{8th} August 1865, is composed of only *three* senior Adjutants, a Chief Auditor, an Assistant Auditor, three Roving Auditors, and 12 Writers.

It is no wonder then that the actual state of affairs of the *Etât Major* of the Turkistan region is as follows:—

The hospital accounts have not yet been touched, and the returns have not been looked into. The distribution of the prize money has been entirely neglected. The Tashkend prize money was paid nearly a year and a half after the place was taken (June 1865). The recommendations for prize money for Khodjend, taken on the 24th May (5th June) were forwarded to Orenburg on the ^{5th}_{27th} November. The confusion of the accounts of the commissariat, stores, and purveyor's branches is so great that, with the means now at hand, it is quite impossible to keep it from growing still greater.

The whole of the registry branch of the *Etât Major*, the courier's and post branches are at the present time under the sole direction of a single writer.

Heaps of papers, the accumulation of the last year and a half, and of papers relating to the direction of the former Syr-Daria line, are lying scattered through all the offices of the *Etât Major* through want of accommodation and of some person to take charge of them.

There is neither an office for printing or lithographing, nor a draughtsman's room.

All the topographical surveys and maps executed up to this time have been made by 2 officers and 3 topographers sent from Orenburg, and by 3 officers and 8 topographers from Siberia. The Siberian officers returned to Omsk in February last, and the Siberian authorities are now insisting on the return of the 8 topographers. We occupy a region of which we yet know almost absolutely nothing. There is not a single statistical fact, not a survey of the smallest extent of country, which would not now be invaluable to us. Military, administrative, and scientific interests demand the fullest development of this work in the region, and who is there to do it?

There are no materials, no funds for making topographical surveys or for constructing maps. The former surveys were charged to the sums appropriated for extraordinary purposes and expeditions, out of which sums various other allowances to officers and writers of the *Etât* Major are still paid.

Such, and even worse than this, is the condition of affairs of the *Etât* Major.

The work of the intendant's branch is performed by one officer, with two assistants, one book-keeper and two controllers of accounts, and yet the officer has actually much more work than any intendant of a military district in the interior of the empire. Under these circumstances, the troops at the same time being constantly on the march, and being scattered over a large area in small detachments having no officers specially acquainted with the economical branches, $\frac{9}{10}$ ths of the requirements of the forces are ill-provided for; as for checks of any kind, they are not to be even thought of, so that an irregularity in the mode of supply is perpetuated until it is discovered by a lucky chance.

In one word, the arrears and confusion in all the branches of the military direction of Turkistan are so great, that the condition of the forces and the interest of the State are very materially affected, and it is quite beyond the power and the will of the responsible authorities to put things in order. Therefore, and for political considerations, it is necessary not only to adopt palliative measures, but to organize (and that at once) a local military administration with the proper means for keeping affairs in a normal condition which would suit the exceptional position of the troops and the nature of the country, and which would inspire the native population, at the first step from chaos to a new form of life, with a faith in the superiority of our laws, and with a respect for our troops and Government institutions.

APPENDIX LXXXV.

Cossack population of the Ural, of Orenburg and Siberia (including the Semirechensk region), to 1st January 1867.

Ural	91,852	of both sexes.
Orenburg	239,046	ditto.
Western Siberia with Semirechensk	113,138			ditto.
Total			444,036	ditto.

APPENDIX LXXVI.

Return of Cannon taken from the Kokonians at the capture of Turkistan, Chemkend, Tashkend and Auliéti in 1864 and 1865.

AT TURKISTAN			AT TASHKEND AND CHEMKEND, (IN STORE AT CHEMKEND).		
No. of Guns.	Calibre	Length in inches	No of Guns	Calibre	Length in inches
2	6-Pr. cast-iron guns.	{ * 51 41			{ 44 44
1	4 „ brass ditto ...	70	5	18-Pr howitzers, brass	{ 43 12½ 42
1	3 „ „ ditto ...	50½			{ from 34 to 31
4			15	9 „ ditto ditto	{ 12 39
			2	7 „ ditto ditto	{ 12 47
			1	6½ „ ditto ditto.	{ 14 14 13
			6	6 „ ditto ditto	{ 11 40 39
					{ 77 74 40
			8	10 „ ditto ditto .	{ 37 35 33
					{ 32 32 77
			5	6 „ ditto ditto .	{ 72 70 67
					{ 44 43
			1	3 „ ditto ditto..	{ 44 44
			4	2 „ ditto ditto .	{ 44 44 43
					{ 44 43
			2	20-Pr. cast-iron ...	{ 44 43 78
3	2-Pr. { brass ... cast-iron ... ditto ...	{ 51 50 44			{ 75 45
3	1½ „ cast-iron ...	{ 30 30 41	4	10 „ ditto ...	{ 44 101 77
2	1 „ brass ...	{ 28 22			{ 76 72 45
8			6	6 „ ditto ...	{ 73

* The muzzle of this gun is broken, the length of the gun must have been about 70 inches.

† These guns and the carriages are made from the pattern of our mountain howitzer which fell into the hands of the Kokonians at Ikau.

Return of Cannon taken from the Kokanians at the capture of Turkistan, Chemkent, Tashkend and Aulietá in 1864 and 1865.—(Continued.)

AT TASHKEND AND CHEMKEND, STORED AT CHEMKEND.

No. of Guns	Calibre.	Length in inches	No. of Guns	Calibre.	Length in inches.
9	3-Pr. cast-iron ..	92	1	2 Pr. Cast Iron ...	40
		87	2	1 „ ditto ...	43
		48		1 „ ditto ...	41
		46	7	9½ „ mortars ...	26
		45	1	7 „ ditto ...	18
		45	1	15 „ ditto brass .	33
		44	—		
		44			
		44			

48 brass cannon

32 cast-iron ditto

TOTAL .. 80

Total number of guns captured in the years 1864 and 1865 .. 92.

Return showing the number and calibre of Bokharian Guns taken at Irdjar and in Khodjend, Oura Tiabé, Zaámin and Fizakh.

IRDJAR.			KHODJEND.		
No. of Guns	Calibre.	Length in inches	No. of Guns	Calibre.	Length in inches
2	12-Pr. brass	{ 98 66½ 115½	1	60-Pr. Cast iron ..	* 45½
3	6 „ brass ...	{ 74½ 70	2	6 „ ditto ...	{ 83 49
3	2 „ { cast iron ..	42	4	3 „ ditto ...	{ 112 77
	„ { brass ...	31½			{ 49 45
	„ { ditto ...	31½			{ 46 46
1	1 „ wrought iron ...	28	5	1½ „ ditto ...	{ 35 21
1	1½ „ ditto ...	28			{ 21 21
1	6 „ Howitzer, brass	45			
11 guns	besides, 11 others of a small calibre.		3	½ „ { cast iron ..	{ 42 28
				„ { wrought iron	42
			15 guns		

* The muzzle of this gun is broken off, the original length must have been 70 inches.

Return showing the number and calibre of Bokharian guns taken at Irdjar and in Khodjend, Oura Tiubé, Zádmin and Jizakh.—(Continued.)

OURA TIUBE.			JIZAKH.		
No. of Guns.	Calibre.	Length in inches.	No. of Guns.	Calibre	Length in inches.
4	6-Pr. { cast-iron ... {	126 63	9	6-Pr. { cast-iron ... {	76 67 64 51 51 72
	brass ... {	87½ 59		brass ... {	63 55 48
10	3 „ { cast-iron ... {	68 52½ 45½	9	3 „ { cast-iron ... {	62 60 54 55 54 52 48 44 43 39 32 43 40
	brass ... {	42 42 42		brass .. {	54 55 54 52 48 44 43 39 32 43 40
2	4 „ brass .. {	56 45½	2	2 „ cast-iron .. {	39 32
4	2 „ { cast-iron ... {	56 31½ 31½	2	1½ „ { cast-iron .. {	43 40
	brass ... {	50		brass .. {	43 40
2	1 „ cast-iron ... {	45½ 28	22 guns		
1	2 Pood (72 lb Engl.) mortar cast-iron	21		Besides 31 guns of small calibre.	
23 guns					
	Besides 6 cast-iron } guns 9 wrought-iron } of small iron . } calibre.				
	15				
	AT ZÁÁMIN.				
1	3-Pr. cast-iron gun	44.			
	Total number of guns captured in 1866. 129.				

APPENDIX LXXXVII.

Distribution of Regular Troops of the late separate corps of Orenburg and Siberia in December 1854.

ORENBURG CORPS.

23RD INFANTRY DIVISION, HEAD QUARTERS, ORENBURG.

Battalions of the Line--

1st Brigade	Town of Orenburg.
No. 1 Battalion	Uralsk.
				(Nos. 2 and 4 Companies in Fort Novopetrovsk)
Nos. 2 & 3	Town of Orenburg.
No. 4	Fort Perovsko.
" 5	Orsk.
2nd Brigade	Ekaterinburg.
No. 6 Battalion	Troitsk.
" 7	Zlatonstovsk Works.
" 8	Ekaterinburg.
" 9	Boyoslovski Works.
" 10	Ufa.
" 11	Samara.

SIBERIAN CORPS.

1st Brigade	Omsk.
No. 1 Battalion	Tobolsk.
" 2	Fort Okmolinsk.
" 3	Petropavlovsk.
Nos. 4, 5 and 6 Battalions	Fort Omsk.
2nd Brigade	Tomsk.
No. 7 Battalion	Semipalatvsk.
" 8	Fort Kapal.
" 9	Ust Kamenagorsk.
" 10	Barnaul.
" 11	Tomsk.
" 12	Fort Ustkamenosorsk.
3rd Brigade	} Serving under the command of the Governor General of Eastern Siberia.
No. 13 Battalion	
" 14	
" 15	
" 16	

Total, 23 Battalions of the Line exclusive of invalid and "étape" companies.

Distribution of Regular Troops in the Military Districts of Orenburg, Western Siberia and Turkistan in October 1867.

In Orenburg.

1 Battalion of Rifles	} temporarily.
1 " of 37th division of Infantry	

In Western Siberia.

Battalions of the Line	4
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In Turkistan.

Battalions of the Line	12
Ditto of Rifles	1
Ditto of 37th Infantry Division	1 temporarily.

1 Brigade of Foot Artillery.

Total No. of Battalions in active service ... 20

Without the 3 temporarily employed .. 7

With 1 Brigade of Foot Artillery.

Invalid and "étape" companies are not included, as also provincial battalions and battalions of the reserve, which are not appointed for active service, having their own special duties.

APPENDIX LXXXVIII.

*Circular to the Troops of the Turkistan Region, No. 173, dated,
St. Petersburg, the ^{14th}_{20th} April 1867.*

Giving up the duties of Military Governor of the Turkistan Legion and of Commander of the Forces therein, and parting with my companions, I beg each and all to accept my most warm, heart-felt gratitude for the distinction they have achieved in action, which has earned for me so many high imperial rewards; to the brave soldiers of the ranks I express my sincere and hearty thanks.

I shall ever bear in mind with special pride and satisfaction the period of my command over the brave Tarkistanians, and I shall consider myself perfectly happy when, by God's will, I shall again have the command over equally brave soldiers.

To be read in all companies, *sotnias* and batteries.

Military Governor of the Turkistan region and Commander of the Troops therein stationed.

ROMANOVSKI, *Major General,*
of His Majesty's Suite.



